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ABSTRACT 
 
On January 1, 1950 Nashville tourist Robert Dunn died after a long night of 
drinking on Bourbon St. An investigation ruled the death a homicide. That determination 
marked the beginning of a decade-long effort by prominent New Orleans residents, civic, 
and business organizations to pressure Mayor deLesseps S. Morrison and the New 
Orleans Police Department (NOPD) to rid the French Quarter of those deemed 
“undesirable.” Reformers aimed to make the French Quarter friendly for residents, 
tourists and businessmen who attended conventions. Throughout the 1950s, three 
committees were created that were comprised of local residents and businessmen to 
investigate the issues facing the French Quarter and create recommendations to help 
solve the problem. The first focused on vice crimes in the French Quarter, the second on 
police corruption, and the third on homosexual activities in the city. All three committees 
shared a tendency to scapegoat women and homosexuals for the many problems facing 
the neighborhood.  
This dissertation examines these committees, which were predominately 
comprised of white males who pushed to reduce the visibility of women and 
homosexuals in public. They also fought an effort by city officials to preserve a status 
quo that considered certain types of vice as a part of the tourism industry. The 
committees’ main targets were B-girls, barmaids, prostitutes, and homosexuals, who were 
considered easy targets due to their disreputable standing in society. The efforts promoted 
by these committees would set the stage for a much larger cleanup effort in the 1960s that 
completely disrupted the status quo, leading to what could be seen as a victory for those 
who sought the initial clean up.
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early morning hours of January 1, 1950, wealthy Nashville native Robert E. 
Dunn, Jr. and three companions, in New Orleans for the Sugar Bowl, wandered through 
the French Quarter to celebrate the New Year. As the night went on, they eventually 
found themselves at the Latin Quarter Club on Bourbon Street. Some time later, after 
drinking heavily, Dunn was found slumped over his chair by the club bartender who 
proceeded to call for an ambulance. After arriving approximately at 4:30 a.m., the 
paramedics examined and attempted to resuscitate Dunn. However, after much effort, 
Dunn was pronounced dead at 5:05 a.m. Initially ruled as a heart attack, a later autopsy 
revealed that he had ingested enough chloral hydrate to cause his death. It was believed 
chloral hydrate, a drug used by doctors as a sedative, was poured into his drink. This 
mixture, commonly known as a “Mickey Finn,” was thought to have gone unnoticed by 
Dunn until it was too late.1 
The death of Robert Dunn ushered in a decade-long effort to pressure city 
officials and the police department to clean up the French Quarter, also known as the 
Vieux Carré, of people neighborhood residents considered “undesirable.” The group of 
undesirables that residents sought to eliminate were an assortment of people that included 
B-girls, gambling operators, prostitutes, drug dealers, mob figures, peddlers of 
pornography, homosexuals, and all establishments that catered to and profited from lewd 
entertainment. The pressure campaigns, led by civic and business organizations, sought to 
make the neighborhood safe not only for its residents, but also for the bourgeoning 
tourism industry. In the views of reformers, these “undesirables” became an impediment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Death in Night Club Blamed on Knockout Drops,” Times-Picayune, March 23, 1950, 3; “Probe of Death 
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to a city government that sought to capitalize on the rapidly gentrifying French Quarter. 
What started as a way to prevent what happened to Dunn from occurring again, became 
an all-out campaign to scapegoat and rid the neighborhood of all those individuals they 
believed sullied its reputation. 
The gentrification that occurred in the French Quarter, which was started by 
wealthy and influential New Orleanians to preserve its architecture, sought to change the 
character of the neighborhood by removing a bohemian culture that existed since the 
early twentieth century. The 1950s saw a movement to modernize the city while 
preserving the French Quarter as a tool for tourism purposes. Those who sought to 
gentrify the neighborhood believed the only way to achieve this goal was to displace 
poorer residents, replace them with more affluent ones, and in doing so, remove all those 
they deemed undesirable. 
The pressure reformers placed on city officials and the police department resulted 
in the creation of three committees whose purpose was to investigate vice and corruption. 
Based on their findings, they recommend ordinances designed to promote better 
enforcement of existing laws with an eye to eliminating, or at least minimizing, 
undesirables from the French Quarter. This dissertation reconstructs the history of these 
committees and explains why reformers chose to target certain groups of people for 
removal. Women and homosexuals were repeatedly targeted by committee members. It 
must be specified that not all women were the subjects of their investigations. Women 
targeted by these committees were those who worked in what would be classified as the 
sex industry, such as prostitutes. One committee during their investigations, justified their 
targeting of B-girls and barmaids not only because they played a role in Dunn’s death, 
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but because they lumped them together with prostitutes, making no distinction between 
the three types of work.  
While the creation of committees such as these was not a new concept, the role 
they played in the maligning and the eventual persecution of certain groups allowed them 
to achieve an outsized influence in the city. The importance of these committees in New 
Orleans history is greater than the current historiography has presented. The ordinances 
and police procedures adopted in the 1950s can be directly traced to the work completed 
by these committees. Their work, in turn led to continuing harassment well in the next 
decade. 
Those who helped create these committees justified their investigations and 
crackdowns as a way to tackle problems some French Quarter residents as well as civic 
and business groups believed hindered economic growth and safety. But in reality, the 
committees were created in response to greater visibility of women and homosexuals in 
the public sphere. It was also a way for men, who solely comprised the committees, to re-
impose gender norms more common before World War II. For them, respectable women 
belonged at home taking care of their husbands and children. Homosexuals, these 
committee members believed, should remain hidden from view if their presence could 
not be eliminated. 
In order to place the committees into context of the 1950s, one has to look at who 
was politically dominant in the city at the time. DeLesseps S. “Chep” Morrison, mayor of 
New Orleans from 1946 to 1961, played a central role in the creation of these 
committees. Edward F. Haas’ definitive work on Morrison describes an administration 
obsessed with its “image of reform.” Throughout his political career, Morrison sought to 
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make himself the exemplar of reform. He hoped this carefully crafted image would one 
day make him governor of Louisiana. With regard to civic and business groups’ call to 
combat vice activities, Morrison had an ability to echo the calls of reform-minded groups 
to clean up the French Quarter while also doing very little of substance to achieve that 
goal. This became his modus operandi throughout his time as mayor. Morrison was more 
interested in maintaining a status quo and only engaged in halfhearted cleanup campaigns 
when it suited him politically. The connection between illegal vice and tourism most 
certainly was not lost on Morrison. Therefore, maintaining a status quo was beneficial to 
the continued draw of tourists and their money.2  
The events surrounding Dunn’s death and the subsequent committees Morrison 
helped create give credence to Haas’ argument. Haas portrays this continued status quo as 
yet another example of the mayor turning a blind eye to certain illegal activities in the 
French Quarter due his connections to vice elements in the city. This view is shared by J. 
Mark Souther in New Orleans On Parade: Tourism and the Transformation of the 
Crescent City. Primarily a book on how the tourism industry changed the culture of the 
city from a business hub to a tourist destination, Souther examines Morrison’s response 
to Dunn’s death and the actions taken by him. Recognizing the need to acquiesce to a 
clean-up effort in order to appease his constituents, Morrison also wished not to “quash 
racy nightlife because he understood the necessity of maintaining an atmosphere that 
outsiders found alluring.” Meaning, Morrison wished to use vice as a tool to attract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison and the Image of Reform: New Orleans Politics, 1946-1961 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 181-182.	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business conventions where men could seek lewd entertainment as well as the company 
of prostitutes.3 
The sometimes competing needs to attract tourists to the French Quarter while 
also making it safe for residents, led to the creation of three different committees. Each 
was charged with investigating a problem that pertained to a situation or specific activity 
that was prominent at the time. While the first two committees dealt with a range of 
issues, this dissertation will focus on two specific groups these committees targeted: 
women and homosexuals. These two groups were viewed by civic and business 
organizations as the main culprits in the problems facing the French Quarter. 
The first committee, formed by Chep Morrison in response to Robert Dunn’s 
death, was the Mayor’s Special Citizens Committee for the Vieux Carré (SCCVC), 1950-
1951. Pressure from French Quarter residents as well as business and civic organizations, 
were instrumental in the speedy creation of the SCCVC. The composition of the 
committee included two representatives from city government, Vieux Carré tavern 
operators, property owners and residents, the Chamber of Commerce, and a member 
representing religious organizations. Each member was appointed by Morrison, which 
allowed him to take credit for any positive outcome that might occur or deflect any blame 
that could come from a SCCVC failure. Richard R. Foster, a prominent businessman and 
civic activist, was unanimously chosen by the committee as its leader. Even though 
Foster headed the SCCVC, the most outspoken member was Rev. Robert R. Jamieson, 
pastor of St. Mark’s Methodist Church on S. Rampart Street, which borders the French 
Quarter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  J. Mark Souther, New Orleans On Parade: Tourism and the Transformation of the Crescent City (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 47.	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Before he agreed to join the SCCVC, Rev. Jamieson crusaded against vice and the 
presence of undesirables in the French Quarter. He reserved his most ardent criticism for 
prostitution, likely spurred on by the presence of a known house of prostitution operating 
a mere two blocks from his church. Jamieson encouraged the SCCVC to target 
prostitution and to help create a city ordinance that sought to arrest and prosecute not 
only the prostitutes themselves, but also those that helped them, such as madams, pimps, 
and others who helped solicit business. 
Initially charged with investigating an array of vice issues, the SCCVC instead 
concentrated on examining women in their roles as B-girls, barmaids, and prostitutes. B-
girls were directly involved with Dunn’s death, and, therefore became an immediate 
target for cleanup. B-girls were female employees sanctioned by alcohol establishments 
to solicit drinks from bar patrons, in exchange for a portion of the profits made from the 
patron’s bill. Barmaids, dealt with separately from B-girls by the SCCVC, served as 
waitresses and in some cases bartenders in bars and nightclubs. The SCCVC believed it 
was important to eliminate women from working in bars all together because they viewed 
both B-girls and barmaids as substitutes or gateways for prostitutes to solicit in French 
Quarter establishments. Committee members even targeted anyone that aided these 
women, including taxi drivers. 
Within the French Quarter, an aura of unchecked debauchery on Bourbon St. 
helped foster the kind of activity that led to Dunn’s death. In Bourbon Street, Richard 
Campanella describes the thoroughfare, which extends thirteen blocks from Canal St. to 
Esplanade Ave., as “attract[ing] flighty characters [that] brought out the ribald in 
otherwise level-headed folks.” Campanella’s description of Bourbon St. and the 
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“characters” it attracted, helped vice elements remain in business. Men came into the city 
seeking out the lewd and lascivious entertainment the street had to offer. Because of this, 
it made it easier for grifters, such as B-girls, to take advantage of individuals who were in 
an inebriated state.4 
Angela R. Demovic’s “’Quaint Creatures’: Public Discourse and the Role of B-
girls in the Heritage of Bourbon Street’ gives an anthropological study of B-girls in New 
Orleans, which she explains revolves around the French Quarter’s culture of alcohol and 
sex. Much like other vice and hustling that existed in the French Quarter, Demovic states 
B-girls were “generally tolerated as an expected, humorous, and logical part of business 
on Bourbon Street.” Because of this, she argues, B-girls challenged the power dynamic 
that existed where men dominated a situation or establishment, such as a bar or nightclub. 
B-girls used their sexuality to subvert this relationship, thereby allowing them to achieve 
dominance in this setting. However, by the 1950s Demovic surmises that the image of a 
B-girl had changed from “quaint trickster” to “a malevolent knock-out-drug-user.” This 
more sinister view was enhanced by the events that surrounded Dunn’s death.5 
In Creating The Big Easy: New Orleans and the Emergence of Modern Tourism, 
1918-1945, Anthony J. Stanonis explains the role taxicabs played in prostitution and the 
tourism industry during the interwar years. He describes how taxi drivers served as 
middleman when soliciting customers, thereby “provid[ing] a service both to men eager 
for sex and to prostitutes, who used the cab drivers to reduce the risk of arrest or 
harassment.” His research revealed a connection between prostitution and taxi drivers as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Richard Campanella, Bourbon Street (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014), 152.	  
5	  Angela R. Demovic, “’Quaint Creatures’: Public Discourse and the Role of B-girls in the Heritage of 
Bourbon Street,” Journal of Heritage Tourism 11, no. 4 (2016): 336-348, 337, 341, 346.	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existing well before the 1950s. Due to this longstanding association, the problem was 
already well known to the SCCVC members.6 
Before the SCCVC disbanded, its members crafted, submitted, and lobbied for the 
passage of ordinances designed to regulate B-girls, barmaids, and prostitutes. Members 
considered this a great achievement, but the effectiveness of these ordinances was mixed. 
B-drinking and prostitution continued in the French Quarter even though arrests were 
made, while a lack of convictions made these ordinances largely toothless. 
The second commission, the Special Citizens’ Investigating Committee (SCIC), 
1953-1954, was created in response to the failure of state and local cooperation in rooting 
out corruption in the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). The SCIC’s primary 
objective was to investigate corruption within the NOPD, including revelations about ties 
between police officers and criminal elements. SCIC members took particular interest in 
investigating police involvement in prostitution. What can be seen as a continuation of 
the SCCVC’ s work, the SCIC went further in their investigation by examining why 
prostitution continued to persist in the French Quarter even though ordinances 
recommended to, and eventually passed by, the city’s Commission Council, were not as 
effective as originally believed. 
Morrison and A. Brown Moore, Utilities Commissioner on the city’s Commission 
Council organized the SCIC. Its membership included representatives of the Society of 
Former Special Agents of the FBI, the Bureau of Governmental Research, and the 
Metropolitan Crime Commission. The head of the committee and chief investigator was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Anthony J. Stanonis, Creating The Big Easy: New Orleans and the Emergence of Modern Tourism, 1918-
1945 (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 117.	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Aaron M. Kohn, a lawyer and former FBI agent who received accolades for his work as 
head of the Chicago Crime Commission in 1952. 
Even though the SCIC was created with the cooperation of Chep Morrison and 
the New Orleans Commission Council, Morrison became a persistent impediment to the 
SCIC’s work. In Madame Vieux Carré, Scott S. Ellis describes the mayor as “grumbling” 
about the SCIC, even going so far as obstructing the investigation by “heckl[ing] 
witnesses” as they tried to speak during public hearings. Because of this, and other 
actions taken by Morrison, the SCIC was prevented from coming to a proper conclusion 
thereby forcing the committee to issue an incomplete report. Even with this impediment, 
the SCIC managed to prove itself effective as an investigative body. Much of this had to 
do with the dedication of Aaron M. Kohn, who helped establish the existence of a 
connection between police officers and prostitutes, helping to explain, at least in part, 
why prostitution persisted in the city.7 
Kyle P. Willshire’s thesis, “Aaron Kohn Attacks Corruption in New Orleans: An 
Intersection of Media and Politics, 1953-1955,” seeks to highlight Kohn’s professional 
career as a “citizen crime fighter” and give him credit for his work on the SCIC. Using 
television and print media as a way to connect with New Orleanians, Willshire views 
Kohn’s role as chief investigator of the SCIC as a being relatively successful even though 
the committee was seen as an overall failure. Even with this perceived failure, Willshire 
credits Kohn for having the fortitude to investigate a corrupt and uncooperative police 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Scott S. Ellis, Madame Vieux Carré: The French Quarter in the Twentieth Century (Jackson, MS: 
University of Mississippi Press, 2010), 63.	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department, as well as overcome the continued interference and objections from 
Morrison.8 
The third commission was more clearly defined in its mission. The Committee on 
the Problem of Sex Deviates (CPSD), 1958, had a sole mandate to investigate 
homosexuals in the French Quarter. Seen as “deviates,” “perverts,” and “degenerates,” 
the committee sought to remove them from the area due to the presumption that they 
engaged in other criminal behavior outside of illicit sexual activities. However, the 
actions taken by the committee and the conclusions eventually released in their report can 
rightfully be described as scapegoating, rather than providing any actual evidence linking 
homosexuality to widespread crime per se. The reason for the creation of the Sex 
Deviates committee was not so much in response to any specific event or crime 
committed due to a homosexual presence. Rather, its foundation came in response to the 
rise of homosexual visibility in the city. With increased visibility came an increase in 
NOPD harassment. 
The creation of the committee was the result of an eight-year long attempt to reign 
in homosexual activities in the French Quarter. In July 1958, the New Orleans City 
Council, led by council president Glenn P. Classen and councilman Fred J. Cassibry, took 
action. They sought help from Mayor Morrison’s half brother, Jacob Morrison, a lawyer 
and activist, in the creation of a committee composed of residents of the French Quarter 
and civic leaders, as well as representatives from the Metropolitan Crime Commission, 
the Chamber of Commerce, and the Young Men’s Business Club. Absent from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Kyle P. Willshire, “Aaron Kohn Attacks Corruption in New Orleans: An Intersection of Media and 
Politics, 1953-1955” (Thesis, University of New Orleans, 2013), 3-4.	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committee were any religious leaders even though clergymen requested the City Council 
take action against homosexuals. 
Historically, certain perceived homosexual activities, such as cross-dressing, were 
overlooked during Mardi Gras. In his unpublished dissertation entitled, City of Desire: A 
History of Same-Sex Desire in New Orleans, 1917-1977, Richard Clark argues New 
Orleanians would tolerate and even celebrate aspects of homosexuality, such as cross-
dressing, but only in the confines of celebrations, especially Mardi Gras. Even in the 
1950s, Clark stated police saw homosexuals as “generally harmless and better left alone.” 
However, he indicated that between 1950 and 1958, there occurred an increase of 
harassment of homosexuals by the police. A cycle of raids and arrests at establishments 
that catered to homosexuals became the new norm. One of the bars that experienced this 
routine harassment was Café Lafitte In Exile, New Orleans’ oldest gay bar.9 
The book, In Exile: The History and Lore Surrounding New Orleans Gay Culture 
and Its Oldest Gay Bar, by Frank Perez and Jeffrey Palmquist relies mainly on 
newspaper articles and oral history interviews to document the experiences of 
homosexuals from the founding of New Orleans to the twentieth century. While not a 
comprehensive history, the authors describe the hardships these men and women faced in 
in a city that had a reputation for being tolerant of unorthodox ways of living. In their 
chapter related to the 1950s, Perez and Palmquist documented “considerable amount of 
homophobia, especially from [the] police.” This harassment from police occurred in bars 
and other places where homosexuals gathered. The notion that homosexuals were 
considered “perverts” who actively recruited kids was a stigma that hung around their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	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necks. This demonization would later lead to much harsher police crackdowns in the 
1960s.10 
This enduring notion of labeling homosexuals as “perverts” and “deviates” 
allowed them to be easy targets as scapegoats due to dehumanizing language used by the 
police and the political class. It also calls into question the idea that New Orleans was 
welcoming to anyone who wished to call it home. Alecia P. Long re-examines the 
misconception that New Orleans “served as a sexually liberal oasis” that had always been 
welcoming to homosexuals. In, “Queers, Fairies, and Ne’er Do-Wells,” Long describes 
the various ways New Orleans sought to combat the presence of homosexuals in the 
French Quarter. The romanticism of the Vieux Carré created by writers, artists, and 
others, gave the impression of a fun-loving city where all were welcome. However, as 
residents began gentrifying the historic neighborhood, this romanticism faced a more 
conservative reality. Those who the French Quarter embraced in the 1920s were seen as 
undesirables by the 1950s. Homosexuals fell into this category. Long goes on to describe 
the efforts by reform-minded individuals and groups who sought to fix the problem 
through the creation and crafting of a commission, municipal laws, and state legislation.11 
In “Saving the City from Sex Deviates: Preservationists, Homosexuals, and 
Reformers in the French Quarter, 1950-1962,” Long continues her research into the 
targeting of homosexuals in the larger context of the arrest and prosecution of Clay Shaw 
in connection with the assassination of John F. Kennedy. She examines the rising 
importance of tourism as Chep Morrison sought to modernize the city and attract certain 
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kinds of tourists. Morrison “viewed as threatening…the rising visibility of gay and 
lesbian people,” and believed their increasing presence constituted a threat to the French 
Quarter – at least the French Quarter as Morrison wanted it to be. Thus began a decade-
long effort to eliminate certain homosexuals from the neighborhood by the use of 
committees such as the SCCVC and their encouragement if not sanctioning of targeted 
police harassment.12 
Taken together, the committees show how the 1950s were dominated by a white 
male, hetero-normative agenda. It also revealed how the same individuals who led the 
committees tried to legislate morality. All this served to perpetuate their efforts to re-
instate gender norms that existed before World War II. However, what their actions 
actually accomplished was not a re-ordering of gender norms, but an increase in 
oppressive actions taken against women and homosexuals. The ordinances and police 
practices common to this time period led to harsh crackdowns in the following decade, 
especially against homosexuals. 
The materials used in this dissertation come from primary source material 
consisting of meeting minutes, correspondence, commission reports, and newspaper 
articles and editorials. The use of newspaper articles intends to show how local news 
outlets, especially through their editorial boards, portrayed these committees and offered 
advice, on how the committees should conduct business. In some instances, public 
figures fought each other through the press, trying to get the upper hand on each other. 
The chapters are organized to focus on the reasons for the creation of a 
committee, followed by an examination of the success of the particular committee as well 
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  Alecia P. Long, “Saving the City from Sex Deviates: Preservationists, Homosexuals and Reformers in 
the French Quarter, 1950-1962,” in Cities as Multiple Landscapes: Investigating the Sister Cities Innsbruck 
and New Orleans, ed. Christina Antenhofer et al. (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2017) 460-461.	  
	   14	  
as explaining why its members chose to target certain groups and how they went about 
doing so. Each committee had both successes and failures. The successes came because 
civic and business organizations were able to draw attention to what they perceived as 
problems in the French Quarter. However, the failures were that the committees did not 
always fulfill the mandates they were given. An underlying theme that emerges in the 
chapters that follow is that the root of these failures could be explained by the lax 
enforcement of ordinances by the police. Without police cooperation, any ordinance 
passed by the city would be ineffectual at best.  
Chapter one discusses the formation of the SCCVC and the crucial role civic and 
business organizations played in pressuring the Morrison administration into acquiescing 
to their demands for a cleanup of the French Quarter. If not for their outcry and demand 
for action, it is quite possible Morrison would have responded to Dunn’s death with token 
raids and arrests, until the subject faded from press headlines. The chapter also shows the 
early steps taken by the SCCVC to legitimize their committee. The presence of Gasper 
Gulotta, a bar and tavern owner who was accused of harboring vice elements in his 
establishments, kneecapped the committee early on thereby causing New Orleanians to 
question its credibility. 
Continuing with the SCCVC, chapter two discusses why the SCCVC chose to 
target B-girls, barmaids, and prostitutes, all professions occupied by women. The 
committee recognized no distinction among the three types of work. In the thinking of the 
committee members, each was just a stepping-stone to the other. Because of this, SCCVC 
members sought to ban all women from working in bars and nightclubs in the French 
	   15	  
Quarter. It also examines whether the committee achieved some form of success and by 
what measurement. 
Chapter three provides a bridge between the SCCVC and the SCIC. Before the 
SCCVC officially disbanded, reports were made that recognized police corruption and 
lack of enforcement of extant laws were key factors in the perpetuation of prostitution. 
The 1951 Kefauver Committee hearings in New Orleans served as the basis for civic and 
business groups to investigate corruption in the police department. This corruption, when 
tied to prostitution, portrayed vice interests as taking advantage of these women by either 
exploiting them for monetary gain or by indulging in their services privately while 
publicly denouncing them. This led to the creation of the Special Citizens Investigating 
Committee, the sole purpose of which was to investigate police corruption. Through this 
investigation, the connection between the police and prostitution became more apparent 
and solidified the perception that the police were responsible for the perpetuation of 
prostitution. 
Chapter four looks at the relative success of the Special Citizens’ Investigative 
Committee (SCIC). The committee’s success became apparent during their investigation 
into prostitution. SCIC investigators were able to uncover a connection between police 
officers and house of prostitution. The SCIC’s findings were made public in hearings that 
were televised and reprinted in local newspapers. The hearings allowed for New 
Orleanians to see and hear first-hand what they had suspected. Corruption was rampant 
throughout the police and the Morrison administration appeared indifferent to the issue. 
A status quo was preferred that saw prostitution continue as a form of entertainment for 
male tourists who came into town. This, of course, was at odds with residents of the 
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French Quarter, as well as civic and business organizations that wished to see prostitutes 
removed from the area. 
Chapter five delves into the efforts taken by the SCCVC and the SCIC in the early 
1950s to eliminate the “homosexual problem” in the French Quarter. Efforts by the 
SCCVC, with the help of Jacob Morrison, laid the groundwork for the eventual creation 
of the Committee on the Problem of Sex Deviates (CPSD). Residents of the French 
Quarter resented the rise in homosexual visibility. Seeing them as the wrong kind of 
visitors, and a nuisance to residents and tourists alike, the goal of the new CPSD was to 
find a way to force them out of the French Quarter, and if at all possible, out of the city. 
Harassment was the most widespread tool used by the police to accomplish this goal. 
However, they did not have all the legal tools to take actions that could lead to an arrest 
outside of witnessing solicitation or seeing individuals engage in homosexual activities. 
Chapter six examines the Committee on the Problem of Sex Deviates; the only 
committee established that focused solely on homosexuals. The chapter focuses on the 
report, the recommendations given to the City Council for adoption of new ordinances, 
and evaluates the committee’s success. The consequences of this committee were far 
more significant than the SCCVC or the SCIC. An atmosphere of harassment by the 
police and an indifferent city government allowed for a much harsher crackdown in the 
1960s that was made possible because of the sanctioning of police actions taken against 
homosexuals. 
The competing visions of reform by Chep Morrison, civic and business leaders 
like Jacob Morrison, and the New Orleans Police Department were the foundation for the 
creation of the three committees. Chep Morrison viewed reform as a means for political 
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gain and used the committees as a way to achieve this. Civic and business leaders used 
reform as a way to impose their moral views on the French Quarter as well as to achieve 
their goal to gentrify the French Quarter for tourism purposes. And the police, who 
exploited prostitutes and homosexuals, viewed reform as an impediment to the status quo 
they sought to uphold. All three views contributed to the eventual creation of the 
committees. 
The death of Robert Dunn at the beginning of the decade provided the 
justification for people like Richard Foster, Rev. Robert Jamieson, Jacob Morrison, and 
other civic and business leaders to finally bring their concerns about vice in the French 
Quarter to the broad public’s attention. Not wishing to miss an opportunity, they took 
advantage of the situation and pushed Mayor Morrison and the NOPD to take action. 
These people laid the foundations for a much larger and more consequential cleanup of 
the French Quarter in the 1960s that eventually changed the long-tolerated status quo.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE MAYOR’S SPECIAL CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE 
VIEUX CARRE 
 
The creation of the Mayor’s Special Citizens Committee for the Vieux Carré 
(SCCVC) did not occur immediately after Robert Dunn’s death. What did occur in the 
aftermath was a backlash against the bohemian culture that had existed in the French 
Quarter for decades. Dunn’s alleged murder became a cause célèbre for those who 
wanted quick action from the city to address their concerns. Specifically, it was seen as 
an opportunity for influential residents and business organizations to finally gain the 
attention of city government and the police. With this attention, they hoped to be able to 
continue their gentrification of the French Quarter and root out all “undesirables” in the 
hope of permitting only certain types of residents and tourists into the neighborhood. The 
fruit of their efforts was the creation of the SCCVC. If not for civic and business 
organizations that, out of their own self-interest, demanded something be done, it is likely 
Mayor Morrison and the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) would have responded 
to Dunn’s death with indifference. 
A police crackdown initiated by Morrison and the NOPD began soon after Dunn’s 
death, but no major policy changes or city ordinances were introduced in the time 
between the death and the formation of the SCCVC. Influential French Quarter residents 
who deemed the police crackdown to be insufficient, however, quashed this hands-off 
approach. Business organizations also raised their objections to the way the city was 
handling the situation. Sensing a potential political liability, Morrison searched for a 
solution to placate these groups. That solution was the formation of the SCCVC, which 
was charged with investigating and drafting recommendations or ordinances pertaining to 
	   19	  
any vice issues in the French Quarter. Any recommendations or drafted ordinances would 
then be passed on to the city’s elected commission council, whose members would then 
take up the recommendations or shelve them. 
The outcries of influential residents of the French Quarter and the business 
community were instrumental to the SCCVC’s creation. The pressure they exerted on 
Mayor Morrison forced him to demonstrate he lived up to his reform image. Even with 
the initial police crackdown, the early response was perceived as inadequate to those 
influential individuals and business groups. 
This chapter seeks to show the influence prominent individuals, and civic and 
business organizations had over the Morrison administration. Their objective of cleaning 
up the French Quarter was initially met with token raids and arrests, which they found 
unsatisfactory. The outcry over Dunn’s death was not a coincidence. Dunn, a wealthy 
white tourist, was exactly who French Quarter residents and business organizations 
wished to draw to the city. If someone like him could easily fall prey to B-girls, 
barmaids, and prostitutes, then people of his status would be more hesitant to visit the 
French Quarter. 
The events leading up to the formation of the SCCVC played out in newspaper 
articles and editorials that helped pressure Morrison to act. His reform image was taking 
a hit and civic and business leaders took advantage of this to create the momentum 
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Citizen Outrage 
Initially ruled a heart attack in January 1950 by the Orleans Parish coroner, Dr. C. 
Grene Cole, a subsequent autopsy performed in Nashville, in conjunction with the 
Louisiana State Board of Health, revealed Dunn had ingested enough chloral hydrate to 
cause his death. Chloral hydrate, a drug prescribed by doctors as a sedative, can induce “a 
more natural kind of sleep” thereby causing drowsiness and eventual loss of 
consciousness. It was concluded the drug was poured in his drink. Even though the 
chloral hydrate evaporates quickly, the Louisiana State Board of Health found a large 
amount of the drug had remained in Dunn’s body leading to the conclusion the victim 
had consumed a lethal dose. Facing scrutiny for not performing an autopsy, Dr. Cole 
explained he had not done so because the initial police report “did not indicate ingestion 
of poison or chloral hydrate. [Eyewitnesses] reported the man had immediately collapsed 
at the table following the swallowing of the drink.” Based on this information, NOPD 
reclassified Dunn’s death as a homicide.13 
On March 23, in response to this information, Police Superintendent Joseph I. 
Scheuering announced a crackdown on French Quarter bars. Scheuering, believing B-
girls were involved in the murder, ordered his officers to “bear down on enforcement of 
the B-drinking ordinance” as well as be on the lookout for any bar owners possessing 
chloral hydrate. The B-drinking ordinance used by the police, City Ordinance No. 15697, 
was passed on March 13, 1945 in response to B-girls’ perceived harassment and 
swindling of service members on leave during World War II.14 The ordinance stated: 
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It shall be unlawful for the owner, operator, or manager of any 
establishment operated for the sale, purchase, or acceptance for 
consumption of alcoholic liquors, or other beverages on the premises to 
employ or allow the presence of any female, irrespective of whether or not 
any such female receives compensation from the owner, operator, or 
manager of such establishment, for the purposes of requesting or soliciting 
any person for any such female, or any other person any intoxicating 
liquors or other beverages, sold, purchases, or accepted for the 
consumption, in any such establishment; or to permit in said premise any 
female therein, who accepts the gift of any such intoxicating liquors, or 
other beverages, and who receives a commission therefor, or who receives 
remuneration therefor in any other way.15  
      
The breadth of the ordinance, however, proved difficult to enforce. Collecting 
evidence on B-girls allowed for the potential harassment of all women regardless of 
whether they were B-girls or not. Scheuering acknowledged this difficulty by stating, 
“suppose my wife and I go into a place for a few drinks and my wife asks for the 
bartender to mix me a weak drink because she doesn’t want me to get drunk. Would you 
call her a ‘B’ drinker? How are we to know who is and who isn’t?” Essentially, the 
ordinance was practically unenforceable.16 
With an unenforceable ordinance, the police crackdown effort did not have the 
effect the police had hoped. As a New Orleans States reporter discovered on a night out 
in the French Quarter only two days after Scheuring opened a homicide investigation into 
Dunn’s death, B-drinking continued unabated. The reporter concluded that “the city’s B-
drinking law – apparently killer of the ‘scourge’ – is nil, helpless, unenforced, dead.” To 
further prove the ineffectiveness of the crackdown, Bourbon St. nightclub employees 
indicated that not only had things reverted back to business as usual, but that they also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  City Ordinance No. 15697.	  
16	  “Scheuering Orders Drive on ‘B-Girls,’” New Orleans States, March 25, 1950, 1.	  
	   22	  
saw a potential surge in business due to thrill seeking tourists who wanted to see where 
Dunn was drugged.17 
Scheuering’s failed crackdown caused French Quarter residents to worry about 
the allegedly deteriorating conditions in the neighborhood. More needed to be done and 
many felt it was up to them to push the city into action. This sentiment was given a voice 
by prominent resident Mary Meeks Morrison, sister-in-law to the mayor. On the same 
day Scheuering announced the police’s crackdown effort, Morrison, speaking in front of 
the Independent Women’s Organization (IWO), challenged the group to seek better 
conditions in the Vieux Carré, which she describe as being “the worst since I’ve been 
living here and probably the worst in the history of the city.” She further noted, “it ha[d] 
been impossible to get any co-operation from the city or the police department to clean 
up the Vieux Carré” which she saw as New Orleans’ biggest asset.18  
Mary Morrison continued her critique by directing her most stinging criticism 
toward the police department. “When something happens in the Quarter which would 
bring at least three squad cars if it happened uptown,” she said, “the police don’t even 
bother to show up.” If they do show up, Morrison continued, they “just ask us why we 
don’t move out of the Quarter.” The criticism from a prominent citizen, especially one 
with close ties with the mayor, proved successful in lobbying the IWO’s support to go on 
the record for cleaning up the French Quarter by targeting bars and calling for the better 
enforcement of laws by the police department.19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  “Cops Ignore Victimizing of Suckers in Quarter,” New Orleans States, March 25, 1950, 2; “Dope Death 
Drawing Thrill Seekers,” New Orleans States, March 24, 1950, 1.	  
18	  “Women Object to Any Long-Morrison ‘Deal,’” Times-Picayune, March 24, 1950, 1.	  
19	  Ibid.	  
	   23	  
What made the IWO’s support so important was their ability to organize women’s 
votes in city elections. When Chep Morrison ran for mayor in 1946, the IWO supported 
his reform candidacy and sought to encourage women to vote for him. They even 
organized a “broom brigade” which they used as a metaphor for Morrison’s reform 
platform. Cognizant of the importance the IWO would play to Morrison’s re-election 
effort, Mary Morrison used their support as a way to further gain the mayor’s attention. If 
Chep Morrison refused to do anything about the conditions in the French Quarter, there 
was a possibility the IWO would not endorse his re-election bid.20 
The coverage of Dunn’s death by local newspapers brought the problems in the 
French Quarter to the general public’s attention and further fueled calls for action. Soon 
after Mary Morrison’s speech was covered in the press, newspapers received letters from 
New Orleanians who expressed their frustration with the city’s lack of progress in French 
Quarter cleanup efforts. They called for a vigorous response to the situation. “It’s time 
that we of the city insist upon cleaning out of all the undesirable places in the Vieux 
Carré. An all-out drive against these B-drinkers…would make them vacate our good city 
of New Orleans,” wrote John Scordill to the New Orleans States. Others offered advice 
on how to help the cleanup effort. “A. Visitor” suggested jail time was the best “broom to 
sweep out the French Quarter.” The writer proposed an ordinance that required jail time 
for both B-drinkers and bar owners for three months on the first offense and six months 
for the second. Another letter to the editor suggested the main problem with B-drinking 
was unescorted women in bars. “Unescorted women should not be allowed in those 
places.” “As long as unescorted women are allowed in the barrooms in the Quarter, B-
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girls will be there, too.” While not completely representative of the public as a whole, 
what the letters to the editor suggest was that cleanup effort had garnered the attention of 
other New Orleanians in the city, not just those in the French Quarter.21  
Editorial boards also felt compelled to express their opinions. A New Orleans 
States editorial emphasized the dangers of entering French Quarter bars and nightclubs, 
writing, “if you go inside some of these places you don’t known what’ll happen. YOU 
MIGHT COME OUT FEET FIRST.” It went on to pose the question, “what is New 
Orleans going to do about it? Forget it again?” The hyperbolic language emphasized the 
argument that police and city officials needed to act decisively in order to counter the 
threat posed by bars and nightclubs that were loosely policed. It also revealed that the city 
and police were known to take quick action with police roundups, but later reverse course 
once attention to the situation abated.22 
The Times-Picayune editorial board laid the blame squarely on the NOPD for the 
conditions in the French Quarter due to its lack of enforcement of existing laws. They 
accused them of having a “pass the buck” mentality even though they bore the 
responsibility “for decency and law observance in the operation of New Orleans bars and 
night spots.” Even though the editorial board believed the NOPD functioned in this 
manner, they still had faith they would take the issue seriously. The board was certain the 
citizens of New Orleans would hold the NOPD responsible if they did not engage in 
proper enforcement of existing laws.23 
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Other editorial boards from around the state also weighed in on the situation in the 
French Quarter. Baton Rouge’s States-Times believed no actions taken by the city would 
change a thing about conditions in the French Quarter. They doubted the city would even 
want to change things if given the opportunity. Dunn’s murder would be yet another 
myth and legend that would become part of the nightlife of the French Quarter. The 
Shreveport Times accused the police of ignoring the newspaper articles about the 
conditions of the French Quarter. “The police sit back and do nothing – other than an 
occasional ‘putting on the heat’ for a few days.” The board concluded the situation could 
be remedied if the police were willing to put in the work.24 
While not indicative of the entire population, various newspaper editorials, 
whether they came from New Orleans or outside the city, revealed a lack of confidence in 
the police. The editorials suggested the police had a history of not taking situations like 
the Dunn murder very seriously. Token cleanup efforts occurred after such incidents, but 
after a while things returned to business as usual. All these editorials agreed the inability, 
or the refusal, of the police to enforce existing laws perpetuated these problems. They 
firmly believed if the NOPD actively engaged the various crimes occurring in the French 
Quarter, what happened to Dunn need not happen again. 
As Dunn’s murder and the situation in the French Quarter garnered more 
attention, various civic and business organizations voiced their support for a cleanup. 
Much like the IWO before them, the Bywater Business and the Professional Men’s 
Association passed individual resolutions supporting a cleanup effort and requested the 
mayor and the police department “rid the Vieux Carre of undesirable characters.” Sensing 
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the potential economic problems from perceived danger in the French Quarter, these 
organizations were of the opinion that the area’s conditions were “detrimental to all 
business in the city.” Other groups such as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, New 
Orleans Business and Professional Women’s Club, and the French Quarter Property 
Owners Association favored strategies ranging from urging the police to enforce the 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act provisions prohibiting B-drinkers and the selling liquor 
to children and prostitutes, to “a citywide boycott of those bars that do not operate 
ethically.” The Young Men’s Business Club (YMBC) took it upon themselves to conduct 
their own independent investigation into the vice-plagued French Quarter. Club president, 
Jay Wells, Jr. said previous cleanup efforts of the French Quarter were ignored so the 
police must now conduct a “vigorous campaign to rid the city of the vices that have 
existed and to protect New Orleans’ national reputation.” Business and civic 
organizations made known their vested interest in keeping the French Quarter safe. If 
conventions or tourists did not come into the city, their profit margin was sure to suffer.25 
The last voice to advocate for the mayor to take a more assertive stance against 
crime in the French Quarter came from Chamber of Commerce president C.C. Walther. 
While speaking to reporters, Walther announced he intended to recommend to Morrison a 
meeting between residents of the French Quarter and business organizations to facilitate a 
plan of action. Walther hoped this meeting would help to “prevent any recurrence of the 
reported death” of Robert Dunn.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  “Mayor to Name Vice Inquisitors,” Times-Picayune, March 30, 1950, 1-2. This was not the first 
investigation the YMBC conducting regarding vice. The year before they produced a report recommending 
police rotations in an effort to minimize corruption in certain police precincts. The recommendations went 
unheeded and procedures never changed.	  
26	  “Promise Arrest If Report Shows Knockout Drops,” Times-Picayune, March 28, 1950, 3.	  
	   27	  
Pressure from the IWO, the YMBC, the Chamber of Commerce, and other 
business organizations was too much for Morrison to ignore. Finally, on March 30, he 
announced his intention to create a permanent committee devoted to investigating vice in 
the French Quarter. In his announcement, Morrison expressed how “everyone who has 
the interest of the community and his own business in mind is agreed that clip joints and 
Mickey Finns must go.” The committee’s mission was to “study all special problems 
presented in the operation of night clubs and bars in the French Quarter.” He announced 
that, “all suggestions relating to the improvement of conditions will be referred to this 
committee and…expect[ed] [the committee] to work quickly and effectively in making 
recommendations for official action.” Morrison hoped this committee would “improve 
conditions to the point that visitors may go anywhere without molestation and danger.” 
The committee would be composed of two representatives of city government, two from 
Vieux Carré tavern operators, two Vieux Carré property owners and residents, and two 
members of the Chamber of Commerce. Each member would be appointed by the mayor, 
which allowed him to take credit for any positive results the committee produced.27 
The persistent pressure endured by Morrison forced his hand in creating the 
committee. While he might have been able to weather criticism from citizens for his 
inaction, voices from civic and business organizations ultimately tipped the balance that 
caused Morrison to act. His acquiescence to these groups showed the amount of influence 
and power they could exert. However, the design of his new committee allowed for 
Morrison to leave it up to these organizations’ leaders to come up with a solution to 
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combat crime in the French Quarter, thereby taking the pressure off of him to produce 
immediate results.  
 
The Special Citizens Committee for the Vieux Carré  
  On March 31, 1950, at 11:00 a.m., the newly formed Mayor’s Special Committee for the 
Vieux Carré, referred to in the press as the “vice committee” or “vice commission,” met 
for the first time on the third floor of the Chamber of Commerce. The meetings would be 
open to the press, who would give their accounts of what was discussed during the 
meeting. Its membership consisted of Leonard V. Huber and L.N. Goll from the Chamber 
of Commerce; Owen Brennan and Gasper Gulotta, Vieux Carré bar owners; Frank Soule 
and Scott Wilson, attorneys, and French Quarter property owners and residents; 
representing the city government was Henry B. Curtis, a city attorney and Richard R. 
Foster, a businessman and civic activist; attorneys Edgar B. Stern Jr., Hugh Wilkinson, 
and W.H. McClendon, were appointed as members-at-large; and Thomas H. Schneidau 
represented the Louisiana Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. Foster was unanimously 
elected chairman. The choice of Foster was no surprise. Not only was he a member and 
chairman of the city’s police advisory board, he had also advocated for the creation of a 
crime commission since at least 1946.28 
The SCCVC was a mixture of civic activists, and business leaders with various 
degrees of involvement in public affairs. The majority of those appointed were attorneys 
by trade and business owners. Attorneys were a natural selection due to their 
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understanding of the law and their ability to craft any new legal ordinances that could 
withstand legal scrutiny. But the symbolism of where the committee met cannot be 
overlooked. The choosing of the Chamber of Commerce building, rather than in a city 
government office, shows how influential the business community was in the creation 
and operation of the new committee. 
While each member had their own idea of what problems needed to be addressed, 
Owen Brennan created, with Foster’s approval, an agreed upon list of issues that the 
committee should investigate. The first item on the list was the “prevalence of ‘B’ girls in 
the Quarter.” Since B-girls were seen as being directly responsible for Dunn’s death, this 
would naturally be one of their first priorities. Other items on the list include 
investigating the character of taxi drivers and the location of cabstands in front of 
businesses, reducing prostitution, improving the quality of entertainment and the quality 
of outside advertising in front of clubs, and “watch[ing] shady characters who migrate to 
the Quarter.” 
The list itself must be examined to show the SCCVC’s priorities, outside of 
addressing the B-girl problem. Taxicabs were high on the list due to two factors: the first 
is their history of harassing and accosting tourists when jostling for cab fares. The 
second, and the most important for the committee, was their involvement with the 
prostitution industry. But it makes one wonder why reducing prostitution, which appears 
fifth on a list of eight priorities, was not higher up on the list, especially since it was 
considered one of the major problems plaguing the French Quarter. Even the idea of 
rooting out illegal card games was placed higher on the list. It can be deduced that the 
reason why taxicabs was placed higher on the list is because they were seen as a major 
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avenue for facilitating prostitution. The inability for prostitutes to openly advertise their 
services caused them to rely on other sources to get their message out. Coordinating with 
taxi drivers made the most sense due to their proximity to male tourists in search of sex. 
The last item on the list goes to the heart of the true objective of the committee. 
That item asked the SCCVC to watch out for “shady characters [that] migrate to the 
Quarter.” The members of SCCVC wished to make the French Quarter safe for residents 
and tourists alike. Their solution to this was to minimize or even eliminate all 
undesirables who did not fit into their perceived view of who should live or visit the 
neighborhood. Whether on purpose or not, the committee used the term “shady,” which 
was ambiguous in its direct meaning. While clearly referring to tourists, the descriptor of 
“shady” could pertain to anyone that does not fit the desirable profile of a person visiting 
the city. 
One item that did not make the list but was seen as a major problem in the French 
Quarter was the rising visibility of homosexuals. Foster described them as “congregating 
in greater numbers in the Quarter” due to the fact that they were “not tolerated in other 
cities.” He even noted their dangerous nature of trying to recruit teenagers. Yet they still 
did not make the list. However, based on the description Foster and others labeled 
homosexuals, it can be assumed that they would fall under the last item on the list 
regarding shady characters.29  
The SCCVC members made clear they did not see themselves as a “moral” 
committee. Despite this acknowledgement, they agreed not to shy away from 
investigating “moral conditions” when they deemed it necessary. This was further 
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reinforced when Owen Brennan stated the need to “expedite [the] matter of eliminating 
objectionable people and situations in the Quarter.” One subset of those deemed 
objectionable were B-girls, the women at the heart of Dunn’s murder. Thomas Schneidau 
advised the committee that as the B-drinking law stands, “it is necessary to sign a warrant 
stating the [B-drinker] was apprehended participating in the proceeds of the place – 
which is impossible to do.” He suggested this provision be eliminated from the statute 
and intended to go before the state legislature to advocate for the revision to the law. The 
recognition of the difficulty of enforcing the law was readily apparent. However, this did 
not deter the committee from attempting to rectify the problem.30      
The SCCVC was not insular in its approach to conducting business. They 
welcomed help from any outside organizations and individuals. One of those outside 
groups was the Young Men’s Business Club (YMBC). The organization, led by Jay Weil, 
Jr. who had been appointed to the committee by the second meeting on April 5, submitted 
a letter to the SCCVC that stated the YMBC’s desire to help. “Our organization is 
determined that this historic center of the city shall continue as an attraction for tourists,” 
the letter stated. The members of the YMBC wished to “continue to lend [their] best 
efforts to see to it that this time the French Quarter is rid forever of its solicitous 
prostitutes, the dangerous and leaching ‘B’ drinkers…[and] its homosexuals.” The letter 
offered fifteen recommendations to achieve this goal. The highlights of the 
recommendations consisted of rotating police officers in and out of the French Quarter to 
prevent them from possibly forming relations with criminal elements, adding more 
patrolmen to the neighborhood, and requesting mandatory jail sentences for B-drinking 
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offenses. To the YMBC, the job of cleaning up the French Quarter rested squarely at the 
feet of the police department. “Whatever evils have existed in the French Quarter,” the 
letter read, “have been due to the failure of those charged with the responsibility to 
enforce the law to do so.” The committee took up the YMBC recommendations in their 
April 26 meeting. Even though many of the recommendations had already been 
implemented, the SCCVC’s willingness to take into consideration the YMBC’s 
recommendations showed they intended to listen to outside groups and individuals not 
directly associated with the committee.31 
One individual who would have an outsized influence on the SCCVC was Rev. 
Robert E Jamieson, pastor of St. Mark’s Methodist Church on S. Rampart St. in the 
French Quarter.  Jamieson’s mission to root out prostitution from the neighborhood led 
him to Jacob Morrison, a St. Mark’s congregant. Jamieson and Morrison conducted their 
own investigation into undesirables in the Vieux Carré. They ultimately delivered their 
findings in a report at the April 5 meeting of the committee. The report contained their 
investigative analysis of several French Quarter bars. Their initial intention was to gather 
as much information as possible for Thomas Schneidau to revoke liquor licenses. While 
Jamieson hoped the committee would achieve some success in their endeavor, he 
remained skeptical. This stemmed from the fact that the committee contained multiple 
members who themselves owned and operated bars on the French Quarter. Jamieson 
went so far to criticize the mayor in the press for not appointing any clergymen to the 
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committee. After hearing Jamieson’s critique, Morrison conceded the point and officially 
appointed Jamieson to the SCCVC.32 
Whether it was intentional or not, Jamieson’s criticism allowed him to not only be 
a member of the SCCVC, but also to bring a religious, and arguably moral perspective 
that was lacking prior to his appointment. Jamieson would prove to be a skillful 
investigator who could persuade others into accepting his ideas and recommendations. 
When the SCCVC began to focus solely on prostitution, he would take the lead and 
advocate for a strong response to the problem. 
 
The Gulotta Distraction 
Rev. Jamieson’s critique of some of the members of the SCCVC came to a head 
when a journalist from the New Orleans States conducted an undercover investigation 
into French Quarter bars and nightclubs. In the exposé printed on the front page of 
the March 25 issue of the States, the reporter entered a number of bars to determine 
whether the cleanup drive conducted by the police had any effect on B-drinking. During 
his investigation, the journalist entered a bar and was immediately approached by a B-
girl. What made this revelation so scandalous was that the establishment he entered 
happened to be owned by Gasper Gulotta, a friend of Mayor Morrison and member of the 
SCCVC. The events that followed led to a questioning of the SCCVC’s ability to 
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function honestly. Gulotta’s continued presence on the committee had the potential to 
derail and taint any recommendations it might make.33 
The exposé led to the States to print an article on April 4 implicating Gulotta in 
the death of Dunn. The implication rested on the account of B-girls who were arrested for 
theft at one of his nightclubs. The connection rested on their alleged involvement in 
Dunn’s death and the fact that they were arrested in one of Gulotta’s establishments. The 
alleged theft of $50 from a bar patron was committed five days prior to Dunn’s death. 
Appearing circumstantial, the flimsy connection was enough for the States to make a 
public recommendation for the mayor to remove Gulotta from the SCCVC.34 
Known as the “Little Mayor of Bourbon Street,” Gulotta was a nightclub and 
tavern owner who had a reputation for wielding vast political influence, especially with 
Mayor Morrison. He portrayed himself as a legitimate businessman, but many suspected 
Gulotta dealt in vice, specifically B-drinking and prostitution. The press saw his presence 
on the committee as a distraction and corrupting influence. In an editorial issued by the 
States the next day, the editorial board questioned whose interest Gulotta represented 
while on the committee; the citizens of New Orleans or B-girls? The States reiterated its 
stance that Gulotta should resign or, if he refused, Morrison should remove him. If 
neither were willing to do so, then “the committee he is serving with ought to demand it.” 
The editorial cemented its point by stating, “There is no place on the mayor’s vice 
committee for a B-drink operator, past or present. Start the Quarter cleanup with a 
cleanup of the mayor’s committee.”35 
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The States’ editorial highlighted the objections some members of the SCCVC, 
and those non-members who supported it, had with regard to Gulotta’s presence. Thomas 
Schneidau announced publicly the he would resign from the committee if Gulotta 
continued to serve. He also made it known privately to Richard Foster that he, “didn’t 
want to make an issue of it but it’s gone too far now. Gulotta has absolutely no business 
serving on a vice committee of this kind, and it’s so serious he must get off. Schneidau 
gave an ultimatum to Foster. Either remove Gulotta from the committee or he would 
submit his resignation.36  
Outside the committee, religious figures registered their objections to Gulotta. 
Archbishop of New Orleans Joseph F. Rummel, expressed his opposition to Gulotta’s 
continued presence and issued a public statement that noted, “In principle, I do not 
consider it wise or advisable that anyone should serve on a commission that involves 
social conditions in a particular district who was himself or herself a personal interest in 
the issues that are involved.” He continued, “All members of such a commission should 
be able to study the problem and make recommendations on a purely objective basis, 
apart from personal interest.” Rev. H.F.J Rest of the New Orleans Ministerial Union also 
expressed his organization’s “amazement” at Gulotta’s continued presence on the 
committee. “[I]f reports are true that he is the owner of one of those establishments 
frequented by B-drinkers,” Rest said, then Gulotta “ought to be under investigation 
himself.”37 
Public dissention from a member of the SCCVC against Gulotta as well as from 
other prominent New Orleanians, threatened to tarnish the committee’s reputation even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  “Morrison Rejects Gulotta’s Ouster From Probe Group,” New Orleans States, April 6, 1950, 1.	  
37	  “Archbishop Criticizes Gulotta as Vice Prober,” New Orleans States, April 8, 1950, 1; “Pastor Hits 
Presence of Gulotta on Probe Group,” New Orleans States, April 10, 1950, 5.	  
	   36	  
before it began its investigations in earnest. These critics however, failed to persuade 
other members to join Schneidau in openly threating to resign from the committee. Nor 
did it create any pressure for Mayor Morrison to request Gulotta’s resignation. In fact, 
Morrison became steadfast in his decision to keep Gulotta on the committee. 
In response to the States’ editorial, Morrison forcefully rejected their 
recommendation. In a public statement, Morrison defended his decision to appoint and 
keep Gulotta on the SCCVC. “It is my duty to do my job the way I think it should be 
done…” In defense of his appointment, he made it known that, “Mr. Gulotta ha[d] been 
chairman of the Tavern Owners’ Association and I have no apologies whatsoever for 
having appointed him.” In a pointed statement directed at the States, Morrison remarked, 
“Whenever I start letting [the New Orleans States] mak[e] my decision for me, I’ll 
consider my usefulness as a mayor greatly lessened.” Morrison’s refusal to budge on his 
decision showed his lack of concern about any appearance of impropriety. The supposed 
pressure from the press and the others was clearly not enough to force his hand on 
Gulotta. Knowing he had Morrison’s full support, Gulotta, in his own public remarks, 
indicated he had no intention of resigning and would work “100 per cent to clean up the 
Quarter the way the public wants it to be.”38 
Foster, as chairman of the SCCVC, also put to rest any idea of the committee 
removing Gulotta. In remarks to the press, Foster stated, “I didn’t put Mr. Gulotta on his 
commission. This is the mayor’s commission entirely. It is up to the Mr. Gulotta and the 
mayor. He was appointed by the mayor, not me.” Foster’s hands-off approach aimed to 
shift any blame for keeping Gulotta on the committee away from him and other SCCVC 
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members. It also showed how Foster wished to put this distraction behind them so the 
SCCVC could continue with its work.39 
The Gulotta distraction was eventually resolved during the SCCVC’s April 12 
meeting. True to his word, Thomas Schneidau submitted his letter of resignation to 
Foster. After Foster read aloud the resignation letter, various members, including Rev. 
Jamieson, voiced their support for Gulotta’s continued presence on the committee. They 
then voted unanimously for Gulotta to remain in the body. The controversy surrounding 
Gulotta’s appointment ended uneventfully. It appeared the pushback to his appointment 
was mostly relegated to newspaper editorial boards and some religious leaders. Public 
outcry for Gulotta’s removal never materialized.40 
The distraction showed the precarious ground the SCCVC stood on. It was 
perceived as having been infiltrated from its inception by the same vice elements it 
sought to root out. Gulotta, rightfully or not, became the face of those elements. His 
selection also continued the perception that Mayor Morrison was somehow in league with 
those very same vice elements as well. As an owner and operator of businesses in the 
French Quarter that were considered less than reputable, Gulotta had a negative stigma 
against him from the beginning. In spite of this, Gulotta remained on the committee.     
As head of the Tavern Owners Association, it would have been impossible to exclude 
him. But the taint on the SCCVC had been set. The committee would have to continue its 
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work despite the perception, and if need be, fix its image by becoming an effective body 
that produced results. 
With the Gulotta issue settled, the SCCVC was back on track to continue with 
their investigations. Their agenda, laid out in their first meeting, was their guide post as to 
how to prioritize their work. But in practice, the investigations conducted by the 
committee revealed their focus to be more targeted than their eight-item agenda would 
suggest. The actions taken by the SCCVC for the next two years signaled they cared 
more about certain issues than others. Those issues tended to focus on women working in 
French Quarter bars and nightclubs. Specifically, they targeted B-girls, barmaids, and 
prostitutes. It became so one sided that the majority of the committee’s achievements 
pertained to the investigations conducted on these three groups. 
The SCCVC’s success would be measured by how effectively they were able to 
change policy regarding B-girls, barmaids, and prostitutes. But before the committee’s 
investigations could begin in earnest, French Quarter residents, along with civic and 
business groups had already achieved a major part of their goal. They had the attention 
not only of city government and police, but also the public as a whole. Their issues were 
being listened to, and, they hoped, would be taken seriously by the city. While the 
SCCVC itself gave no guarantee that the issues they investigated would be completely 
solved due to their work, it did place in motion a decade’s long effort to use committees 
as a tool to effect change they felt was needed to rid the French Quarter of its seedy past 
and create an environment that suited them and attracted tourists. But these efforts would 
prove challenging. The majority of the committee members were not attorneys, therefore 
were not familiar with the legal process of drafting potential ordinances. They would 
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have to rely on a representative of the city attorney’s office to help guide them in any 
wording or recommendation in order for their draft ordinance to achieve maximum 
impact. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE SCCVC AND WOMEN  
 
The Gulotta distraction left the SCCVC with an image that needed to be mended 
quickly. The only way to do this was to dive headlong into their task of cleaning up the 
French Quarter. While the committee’s mandate was broad, a common theme arose 
during the course of their investigations. Women became a constant target of committee 
members who sought to minimize, if not eliminate B-girls, barmaids, and prostitutes from 
the French Quarter. What started as a way to tackle the problem with B-girls in relation to 
Robert Dunn’s murder became an obsession for SCCVC members who, instead 
increasingly focused their attention on all women they deemed disreputable. And they did 
this by taking a moral stance, attempting to bar women from work environments they 
considered inappropriate and corrupting. This was particularly the case for Rev. Robert 
Jamieson who enhanced his crusade against prostitution with the help of the SCCVC. 
These women became easy targets because no one was willing to speak up for them, not 
even women’s groups such as the IWO.  
While the SCCVC investigated B-girls, barmaids, and prostitutes concurrently, 
they agreed to focus their attention on B-girls first. Even though they could be classified 
similarly, the SCCVC decided to separate B-girls and barmaids from each other. This 
was done for two reasons. The first was that on most occasions there legitimately existed 
a distinction between the two. Barmaids could take on the role of B-girl when serving 
alcohol to customers. However, B-girls were not always barmaids. B-girls also did not 
always work as an employee of the establishment but in cooperation with them. The 
second reason was because committee members believed that having barmaids in bars 
and nightclubs was a cover for many women working as prostitutes. While there was 
	   41	  
some truth to this assertion, not enough evidence was presented by the committee, to 
warrant this conclusion. The assertion seemed mostly to rely on committee members’ 
prejudices and preconceived notions against women working in bars and nightclubs. 
The SCCVC finally targeted prostitutes. A two-pronged approach was taken to 
maximize their efforts. Not only did they investigate prostitutes themselves, they also 
targeted taxi drivers, who were seen as one of the biggest promoters of prostitution since 
prostitutes relied on word of mouth and cab drivers to bring business to them, in 
exchange for a portion of the profits.  
The police were also going after women employed in bars and nightclubs in the 
French Quarter. While the SCCVC was distracted with the question of Gulotta’s 
continued presence on the committee, the police continued their cleanup effort in the 
French Quarter though French Quarter business owners deemed the police tactics too 
heavy handed. On April 5 nightclub and bar owners expressed their displeasure with the 
cleanup effort and made their objections known to two representatives of Superintendent 
Scheuering in a meeting of the Vieux Carré Retail Liquor Dealer’s Association. The bar 
owners criticized the police crackdown as “too rigid.” Scheuering, unmoved by their 
words, stated firmly, “They’ll be no let up in the cleanup.” The focus on arresting women 
made it clear whom the police, much like the SCCVC, saw as the major problem in the 
French Quarter. Targeting women could be seen as logical considering the raids were in 
direct response to B-girl involvement in Dunn’s murder. However, by failing to target 
others, such as bartenders, and club and bar owners and managers, the police raids made 
it clear that women working in these kinds of establishments were unwelcome. Early 
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grumblings by bar and nightclub operators about the treatment of their female employees 
was a harbinger of things to come from the SCCVC.41 
This chapter examines the SCCVC’s preoccupation with targeting women 
working in the French Quarter. It also assesses the relative success of the committee with 
regard to ordinances they presented to the city’s Commission Council, including their 
eventual adoption. Ultimately the SCCVC would be disbanded, brought on by the actions 
and neglect of one member who wished to see a more expansive crime commission 
formed. With the creation of the succeeding crime commission, the SCCVC became 
redundant. The permanent committee Mayor Chep Morrison had envisioned quickly 
became obsolete. 
 
The Work Resumes 
The Gulotta distraction left a perception that the SCCVC was not fully committed 
to the task given to them by the mayor. This perception gave liberty to organization such 
as the Independent Women’s Organization (IWO) to give their input on the direction of 
the committee’s investigations. In a letter to Richard Foster, the IWO requested the 
SCCVC expand their inquiry and submitted for consideration two vice related 
recommendations. Reminding Foster and the committee of their voting strength, the letter 
impressed on them that the IWO was “deeply concerned with [the] exploitation and 
deterioration of the Vieux Carré which is rapidly transforming this rare community asset 
from a place noted for its beauty and historic value into a place notorious for its crime.” It 
went further when it blamed the “lack of proper policing” that caused things in the 
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French Quarter to go from bad to worse. The two recommendations called for the 
SCCVC to “recognize the necessity for adequate polic[ing] of the French Quarter” as 
well as for the “Vieux Carre [to] be rezoned against further exploitation of both an 
industrial and immoral nature.”42 
Even though the IWO did not specifically call for the removal of women from 
working jobs in nightclubs and bars, the organization was well aware of the SCCVC’s 
focus. Their call for the rezoning recommendation would limit any new businesses that 
would cater to “immoral” elements, which would in turn draw women to work in these 
establishments. The committee agreed to take these recommendations into consideration, 
but gave no guarantee they would be incorporated into any reports, recommendations, or 
draft ordinances that would be submitted to the New Orleans Commission Council. 
On April 12, the committee invited municipal judges Harold J. Moore, Edwin A. 
Babylon, and Paul P. Garofalo all of whom presided over cases that involved prostitution 
and other vice offenses. Committee members sought to question them and discuss actions 
taken by the court to prosecute individuals who violated various laws as well as to seek 
their input on what could be done to obtain more convictions. The first to address the 
committee was Judge Garofalo, who indicated insufficient evidence was the issue they 
encountered most frequently. He said, however, that judges tended to take into account an 
individual’s history when a case was brought before them. Judge Moore added that cases 
tended to fall apart due to “non-appearance of witnesses” and a failure to arrest “in the act 
of violation.” But Moore’s biggest concern was the large volume of women’s cases that 
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appeared before the municipal court, which at the time, stood at one hundred and twenty-
seven a day.43 
Rev. Jamieson asked next why the city did not have a woman’s court. Moore 
replied that he customarily assigned cases involving women to a certain day of the week, 
but also realized that with the increase in volume, another day might have to be added. 
Appearing not to be satisfied with his answer, Jamieson commented on the dangers of 
hearing women’s cases in open court due to the exposure of first-time offenders to 
potential panderers who pay their fine and make arrangements for bail. He suggested 
these cases should be held behind closed doors. The recommendation, however, was later 
dropped.44 
Though Jamieson’s recommendation was rejected, Judge Moore did suggest the 
municipal courts set aside one day a week to hear all “moral offenses” which would be 
held behind closed doors. The suggestion was taken up by Jamieson but was not 
discussed further until the SCCVC’s April 26 meeting. Assistant City Attorney Bueker 
Amann appeared skeptical of the idea. He reminded the committee there was a 
constitutional right to hold public trials if the defendant requested it. Jamieson rejected 
this argument by citing the precedent of closed-door courts held during World War II. 
Another committee member supported Jamieson but used juvenile courts as an example 
of potential closed-door hearings. Jamieson’s reasoning for his push was because he felt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Meeting Minutes, April 12, 1950, Richard R. Foster Civic and Community Papers, MSS 553, Williams 
Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection, Box 5, Folder 46.	  
44	  Ibid. Woman’s court, as reference by Rev. Jamieson, is was a specific court that catered to prostitution 
cases. First started in New York in 1910, its intended purpose was to “provide prostitution defendants with 
moral and social pedagogy and measure of material aid.” Amy J. Cohen’s article, “Trauma and the Welfare 
State: A Genealogy of Prostitution Courts in New York City” identifies vice reforms as pushing the state to 
create a woman’s court, which they praised as “deal[ing] more wisely and hence more effectively with the 
social evil” of prostitution. Cohen, however, concludes that the courts did not ultimately live up to the 
reform’s expectations and was eventually dissolved, see Amy J. Cohen, “Trauma and the Welfare State: A 
Genealogy of Prostitution Courts in New York City,” Texas Law Review 95 (2017): 915-991.	  
	   45	  
women charged with immoral offenses often used the open court as a means for 
advertising. Even though he provided no evidence to support this assumption, the 
SCCVC unanimously approved the recommendation.45  
The questions posed by committee members rested on the idea that with the 
creation of new ordinances combating B-girls, barmaids, and prostitutes, a potential 
influx of cases involving women could await judges in municipal courts. They also 
wanted to make sure that these women were kept separate from the general populous so 
they would not be a corrupting influence. Jamieson’s suggestion of a dedicated women’s 
court was rejected, but not the idea of having the cases tried in closed-door courtrooms, 
which was ultimately Jamieson’s key recommendation. Even before the SCCVC began 
their investigations in earnest, the idea that these kinds of women would be targeted was 
already underway. That decision guided to the majority of the committee’s work going 
forward. 
 
A Re-examination of the B-girl Ordinance 
  The SCCVC’s first order of business was to target B-girls. The committee members felt 
it could not effectively conduct its other investigations if they did not tackle this issue 
first. In their April 26 meeting, the SCCVC’s Sub-Committee on Legislative Affairs 
discussed possible changes to the existing B-girl ordinance. They recommended upping 
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the fine to $100 and increase the amount of jail time to no less than ten days for first 
offenses, and ninety days in jail plus any additional fines for repeat offenders.46  
Committee member Leonard Huber believed these changes were not enough of a 
deterrent to curb B-drinking. He wanted to put more teeth into the ordinance by not just 
going after B-girls, but also proprietors and owners of bars and nightclubs that allowed 
B-drinking to occur. Huber recommended making it mandatory upon a second conviction 
to revoke an owner’s liquor license and close the establishments where B-drinking was 
prevalent. What made this suggestion stand out was the fact that bars and nightclubs 
owners, up to that point, tended to escape scrutiny during the raids.47 
The threat of high fines and jail time was designed as a way to discourage women 
from working in these establishments. Whether it would serve as a deterrent or not 
remained to be seen. These were modest changes to the B-girl ordinance, but committee 
members hoped it would have more of an impact of than the existing ordinance. 
Committee members had confidence it would when they presented the recommendations 
to Supt. Scheuering. He found the recommendations satisfactory, commenting, “Nobody 
wants to spend a week or so in jail.” Enforcement was still key, however. When asked by 
Huber about the enforcement of the potential revised ordinance, Scheuering replied, “The 
police must observe or get a complaint or, they must see the actual accosting.” Even with 
a revised ordinance, the same problems of making arrests and obtaining convictions 
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remained. Regardless of this fact, the SCCVC approved of the recommendations and 
submitted them to the Commission Council for consideration.48  
Meeting minutes and the report created by the Sub-Committee on Legislative 
Affairs, do not indicate or suggest that any investigations were performed when drafting 
the recommendations. A report issued by the SCCVC indicates the sub-committee met 
and created a list of recommendations to revise the existing B-girl ordinance. If they 
sought out the advice from police official or government experts, they made no record of 
it. The sub-committee relied solely on their own expertise to draft their recommendations. 
And, they particularly did so without the input of women. 
 
A Revised B-Girl Ordinance 
On June 9, the New Orleans Commission Council took up discussion of the 
SCCVC revision recommendations to the B-girl ordinance. A revised ordinance 
effectively made it illegal for operators, managers, owners, or other persons, paid or 
unpaid, to engage in solicitation of drink purchases with or without profit. It also forbade 
any person employed as a waiter, waitress, or any position similar, to occupy a table with 
any patron or visitor to a bar or nightclub. Those who violated the ordinance faced a fine 
and a possible jail sentence of no less than ten days in jail for the first offense, and a jail 
term of up to ninety days on subsequent convictions. The ordinance, however, did not 
extend to the selling of food or non-alcoholic beverages.49  
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Members of the SCCVC attended the meeting in an effort to ensure its passage. 
When the Commission Council opened the floor for comments, SCCVC member William 
H. McClendon spoke first. He advised the council that the revised ordinance had already 
received Supt. Scheuering’s approval. He also mentioned that since the existing 
ordinance was found to be inadequate, why not give the revised one a chance.50 
Commission Council member A. Brown Moore immediately raised an objection 
to the revisions. He believed the ordinance might be applied too broadly, saying it could 
be interpreted to include any two people who enter a bar “and the slightest suggestion on 
the part of one to the other ‘buy me a drink’ could be implied as an infraction of the 
ordinance.” Rev. Jamieson pushed back on Moore’s assertion. He stated the SCCVC 
worked on the revisions carefully to avoid any possibility of innocent people being 
arrested. Jamieson stated the ordinance would only apply to people who make it their 
business to solicit. After hearing this, a compromise was reached to amend the language 
of the revisions to alleviate Moore’s concerns.51 
With Moore’s objection put to rest, the Commission Council voted unanimously 
to approve Ordinance #17832, more commonly known as the B-Girl ordinance. It would 
take effect ten days from the date of passage. The initial response by the press to the 
revised ordinance was positive. The New Orleans States’ editorial board approved of the 
Council Commission’s actions and described the ordinance as a “forward step in 
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combating evil forces which took over the French Quarter and led to the Mickey Finn 
death of Robert E. Dunn.” With the passage of the ordinance, the editorial laid the 
effectiveness of the law on the actions of the police department. It pointedly stated “ If 
police ignore the law, it may as well never have been enacted. All law enforcement, in 
the end, lies with the man on the beat and the man in the precinct, and in this instance, 
with the men of the vice squad.”52 
The editorial concluded that since the ordinance gained the endorsement of Supt. 
Scheuering and the SCCVC, there was no excuse for the law not to be enforced. The 
States editorial made it clear the revised ordinance had the backing not only of the 
Commission Council, but also from a newspaper, that could help steer public opinion. 
But, as the editorial board made clear, the success of the ordinance laid squarely on the 
police to enforce it. There was hope the police now had the tools needed to make more 
arrests and deter B-drinking. This hope, however, was short lived. 
Four weeks after the ordinance was passed, B-drinking continued unabated in the 
French Quarter. The SCCVC laid the blame squarely on the police department. Rev. 
Jamieson complained the committee had not received the full cooperation of the police to 
enforce the ordinance, even though Supt. Scheuering endorsed their work. “The police 
are not making too serious an effort to enforce the law aimed at B-drinking and 
prostitution,” Jamieson charged. “The police aren’t trying to get evidence to convict. 
They make no effort at all to break down the alibis offered by these women when they 
are brought to court.” He alleged the police looked the other way when evidence was 
presented to them. Thus, with a lack of evidence, the court could not convict. Jamieson 
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came to this conclusion after visiting court hearings for those brought in for B-drinking. 
Rather than being charged under the revised ordinance, women were charged with lessor 
infractions. A July 25 report to Supt. Scheuering, which was also delivered to the 
SCCVC, confirmed Jamieson’s conclusions. Even though Scheuering reported the 
ordinance was being enforced, he conceded that it still remained difficult to detect B-
drinking.53 
Supt. Scheuering acknowledged the difficulty of enforcing the law at the 
SCCVC’s April 26 meeting. In fact, that was his key concern with the recommendations. 
The committee took his concerns into account and decided to proceed with submitting the 
revised ordinance to the Commission Council anyway. Scheuering may have recognized 
the difficulty of enforcing the revised ordinance, but he did not outright reject to it. That 
was enough for committee members to feel confident about their work.  
This difficulty, however, did not prevent the police from targeting women found 
in bars and nightclubs. The report also indicated that “beatmen” were ordered to visit 
nightclubs to “check over the women” they find in them. If it were difficult to detect B-
drinking violations, police would arrest women who were unable to give a “good account 
of themselves,” and charged them with either loitering or “no honest means of support.” 
Admittedly, the police used this as an intimidation tactic to prevent women from 
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continuing to work in these establishments. Even though the ordinance allowed for the 
charging of bar owners and managers, police indicated they made no attempt to 
investigate them. Women were their primary targets and they made every effort to arrest 
them if they were employed by, and in the case of the report, frequented, bars and 
nightclubs.54  
Rev. Jamieson, not inclined to let the matter go unchallenged, was adamant about 
speaking to Mayor Morrison and Supt. Scheuering. He believed B-girls “[knew] how to 
get around the law covering B-drinking and other violations. And they [made] the law 
ineffective by their subterfuge.” Jamieson saw the futility in trying to arrest B-girls when 
the evidence gathered by police was insufficient to convict. Because of this, he suggested 
a possible amendment to the revised B-drinking ordinance to expand who could be 
charged with violating the ordinance. The expansion, however, never materialized.55 
A month after the revised B-drinking ordinance was passed members turned their 
attention to barmaids, who, it was suggested were the “source of B-drinking, prostitution, 
and evil.” Singling out barmaids served as a stepping-stone to going after those the 
SCCVC viewed as more trouble for the French Quarter: prostitutes.56 
 
Barmaids 
Rumblings of eliminating barmaids began during the SCCVC’s July 12 meeting. 
Even before Supt. Scheuering’s report was delivered, committee members believed B-
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drinking would not end unless they also eliminated barmaids. Thomas Schneidau, former 
member of the SCCVC and head of the Alcohol Beverage Control Board, suggested the 
elimination of barmaids would not only help combat B-drinking, but also help curb 
prostitution. Committee member Leonard Huber seconded the idea and brought up a 
report from the American Social Hygiene Association which contained “good points 
[that] the reduction of B-drinking, and the elimination of bar maids would in all 
probability alleviate the evil conditions now existing” [emphasis added]. By their next 
meeting on July 26, the Sub-Committee on Legislative Affairs agreed to study the 
proposal. The idea of further eliminating women from working in bars and nightclubs 
followed the same logic with which the B-drinking ordinance had been revised. Women 
were again seen as the common denominator for all the ills that plagued these businesses. 
Following B-drinking, targeting barmaids became the natural progression.57  
With the approval of the full SCCVC, the Sub-Committee on Legislative Affairs 
researched and examined the role of barmaids in the city. In an August 4 meeting of the 
sub-committee, they invited Bartenders Union president, Mr. Johnson, to speak regarding 
women working in bars. When asked by Huber whether he and the union were in favor of 
the removal of women as barmaids and bartenders, Johnson responded first by stating 
that only men can be bartenders. Because of this, women were not recognized as 
members of the union. Johnson used the remainder of his time to further show a disdain 
for women working in bars. “When you people eliminated B-girls, a number of them 
were taken from off the stools in front of the bar and placed behind it. In five instances, 
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men have been laid off as bartenders, and replaced by women.” He continued by 
asserting: 
A woman bartender is more poisonous behind a bar than in front of 
one…they do not get the same wages as a man would, therefore are 
underpaid and must get the difference in their own way – whether they 
solicit the customer, roll him, or offer to commit prostitution, which is 
done in a number of instances. There are places I know of where you can 
get the so-called ‘bar-maid’ to go upstairs with you. There are only come-
on girls, not bartenders, and that’s why they are in these places.58 
 
Johnson ended his rant by definitively stating “bartending is strictly a man’s job” 
[emphasis added]. 
Johnson played into the narrative that women who worked in bars and nightclubs 
were inherently doing so for immoral reasons. And if they did not start out that way, they 
would eventually be led down that path. Johnson, however, did not actually seek to 
eliminate barmaids and waitresses from these establishments. Rather, he believed a male 
bartender could keep a watchful eye on them as well as on the patrons who might try and 
get “overly familiar” with them. Notably, Johnson did not hold the owners or managers 
of these establishments responsible for any illegal activities occurring in their 
establishments.59  
On August 9, in a letter given to the SCCVC, the sub-committee presented their 
findings to full committee. They prefaced their report by indicating that prior to 1900 it 
was illegal for women to work as barmaids. Using this as precedent to support their 
recommendations, the sub-committee suggested the city should pass an ordinance to once 
again prohibiting the employment of women as barmaids. It was their opinion that “the 
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employment of barmaids [had] contributed greatly to the B-Drinking which led to the 
conditions which resulted in the death of the Mr. [Robert] Dunn.” The letter went on to 
state, “We are of the opinion that in many cases hole-in-the-wall establishments 
employing two, three, four and even in one case, six barmaids are merely fronts for 
houses of prostitution.” Their final assessment deemed barmaids as contributing to the 
“low character” of these establishments. Once again, the SCCVC put the onus of immoral 
and illegal behavior squarely on women. At no point in their report did they indicate that 
the predominately male proprietors contributed to the problem. Of course, even a small 
mention would have shown the committee intended to target all people associated with 
the problem. Nevertheless, the report failed to do so. This omission leads one to conclude 
that the SCCVC believed women, and only women, were the source of all the problems.60 
The proposed ordinance eliminating barmaids faced immediate opposition from 
the French Quarter Businessmen’s Association, an organization composed of bar and 
tavern owners. The attorney for the organization, Robert Pitard, attended the following 
SCCVC meeting and expressed his opposition to the ordinance, basing it on economic 
grounds. He stated the ordinance would create “a great hardship on many of the 
establishments that cannot afford to pay the wage asked by men.” Employers would be 
forced to pay a man $60 a week rather than a woman at $25 or $30 a week. Picard also 
argued that barmaids in many places worked during the day and typically acted in clerical 
positions. He suggested the committee and police should place more time and energy on 
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rooting out establishments deemed houses of prostitution rather than targeting 
barmaids.61 
After listening to the objections, Richard Foster defended the proposed ordinance. 
He informed the SCCVC of a report from the Army-Navy and Air Force board in New 
Orleans indicating a bar on Bourbon Street that employed barmaids was off limits to 
military personnel due to a high venereal disease rate. Foster then asked Pitard what 
could be done about this issue if the ordinance were not implemented. Pitard conceded 
the point and agreed restrictions on employment of barmaids might be needed. As a way 
to keep his clients’ interests alive, he offered to submit his own recommendations on 
language that could potentially be used in any proposed ordinance.62  
The argument Pitard used in his objection to the barmaid ban showed the 
economics behind bar and nightclub owners’ concerns. They preferred to employ women 
to serve as bartenders and barmaids because they found it cheaper than hiring a male in 
those same positions. Making money was their main objective. This meant agreeing to a 
compromise with the SCCVC to limit any possible damage a new ordinance might inflict 
on them. 
The States’ editorial board supported the SCCVC’s decision to issue a barmaid 
ban recommendation to the Commission Council. The editorial stated bars were primarily 
a man’s institution” and as such, there should be no reason to “accuse a bar of being 
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anything but a place in which to buy a drink. That’s what a bar is supposed to be.” The 
editorial board believed bars were no place for women, feeding further into the stigma 
already being advanced by the SCCVC.63   
The issue came to a head on August 23 when the proposed ban was debated 
between SCCVC members. Huber firmly stood by his recommendation to eliminate 
barmaids in the city. Gulotta, on the other hand, soundly rejected this idea. As a bar 
owner himself, he believed women were no more likely to steal from a business than a 
man in a similar position. Gulotta offered an alternative to an outright ban to counter 
Huber’s steadfastness. He recommended that one barmaid was allowed to work during 
the day, but none would be able to after 6 p.m. Huber, however, refused to budge from 
his stance and affirmed, “I can’t in any conscience back down in my stand. I have studied 
it for a long time. If you want to put a woman in a bar there is certain to be trouble.” 
After the exchange, the committee held a vote on the two proposals. Huber’s was 
ultimately rejected. The SCCVC voted instead in favor of an ordinance along the lines of 
Gulotta’s recommendation. Huber agreed to incorporate this language into the final draft 
of the ordinance.64 
The next day, the States published an editorial that gave the SCCVC’s proposed 
ordinance mixed reviews. With regard to a barmaid ordinance, the editorial stated that 
while the committee made “a big step in the right direction” they still did not go far 
enough. They stood by their original August 14 editorial reiterating that, “women 
attendants have no place in a barroom, which is a man’s institution…eliminating the 
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employment of barmaids altogether is the right course.” The editorial board made it clear 
they sided with Huber. The States took a more extreme position than the SCCVC was 
willing to take, but they provided no explanation as to why this was the case.65 
The SCCVC in the September 26 meeting agreed to submit their proposal to the 
city’s Commission Council. The proposed ordinance included Gulotta’s language as well 
as an additional paragraph regarding what acts were prohibited. Listed under “Rules of 
Operation,” the paragraph prohibited, “Employ[ment] as a singer or a dancer or 
employ[ment] as a beer carrier or waiter, girl bartender or barmaid; any courtesan, bawd, 
or lewd woman or any similar inmate of a brothel, or house of prostitution or of 
assignment.” The SCCVC sought to make the connection between barmaids and 
prostitutes. They saw no difference between the two, which former committee member 
Thomas Schneidau expressed in July. Barmaids were the “source of all evil” in the 
French Quarter he said, which also included prostitution. The language used in this 
additional paragraph, which was approved by the full SCCVC, continued to show how 
committee members believed women working in bars and nightclubs were there solely 
for immoral purposes.66  
The SCCVC through their actions and recommendations, continued to 
demonstrate their relentless bias against women. They looked at any woman who worked 
in a bar or nightclub with suspicion. To them, women who worked in these 
establishments were obviously prostitutes, especially if a place had more than one woman 
working there. Information collected through interviews, personal observations, and 
police data did not conclusively support their assumption. However, these assumptions 
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were not completely without merit. Houses of prostitution were prevalent in the French 
Quarter and the surrounding areas during the early 1950s. It some cases, they were found 
above bars and nightclubs. These examples were used as justification for linking the 
women who work in bars, either as bartenders or barmaids, with prostitution.  
The city’s Commission Council ultimately never took up the SCCVC’s proposed 
barmaid ordinance. No official explanation was presented as to why this was the case. 
One can assume that the Commission Council felt pressure from French Quarter 
businesses not to pass the ordinance. Also, the issue was being overshadowed by the 
work Rev. Jamieson was doing in his own sub-committee. Jamieson’s efforts focused on 
prostitution, which he saw as the most critical issue the SCCVC faced. They sought to 




Finding a way to minimize prostitution in the French Quarter was a task SCCVC 
members like Rev. Jamieson wished to tackle head on. He realized that in order to make 
any progress in this endeavor, the committee had to look at the different methods 
prostitutes used to advertise their services and attract business. This led them to 
investigate taxi drivers, who had become many prostitute’s main way of soliciting.  
It must be noted that both women and men worked as prostitutes in the city. 
However, the SCCVC chose not to mention nor investigate male prostitutes. The most 
likely reason for this was because they grouped them under homosexual activities. But 
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even under this grouping, male prostitutes were not mentioned in any of the meeting 
minutes, reports, or ordinances created by the SCCVC.  
 
Taxicabs 
When Supt. Joseph Scheuering announced a crackdown on bars and nightclubs in 
the French Quarter in late March, this also included taxicabs, which he described as being 
a part the apparatus of the prostitution business. Taxi drivers would “leave their vehicle 
and walk down the street soliciting for prostitution” and women who attempted to pick up 
men from clubs, Scheuering said. It was because of this that the SCCVC’s members were 
more inclined to include them in their investigation.67 
It had become quite common for prostitutes in New Orleans to form a partnership 
with an individual taxi driver. When a driver picked up a male passenger, he would, using 
his best judgment, casually inquire whether the passenger was looking for a prostitute. If 
he were, then arrangements would be made to either drive the man to a house of 
prostitution, or “deliver” a woman to his hotel. Since this arrangement was not done out 
in the open for others to observe, this way of solicitation made prostitution more difficult 
to detect.68  
In their first meeting on March 31, the committee discussed their options. Their 
initial recommendations varied in scope, with one member suggesting they obtain all 
information on taxi drivers who worked in the French Quarter from sunset to sunrise in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  “Scheuering Orders Drive on ‘B-Girls,’” New Orleans States, March 25, 1950, 1. It must also be noted 
that during the investigation into Robert Dunn’s death, investigators interviewed a cab driver who they later 
found out had eight convictions. This was another justification used by the commission to investigate cab 
drivers who work at night in the French Quarter, see Meeting Minutes, April 5, 1950, Richard R. Foster 
Civic and Community Papers, MSS 553, Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection, Box 
5, Folder 46.	  
68	  “Doris Gellman Questioned On Prostitution,” New Orleans States, December 30, 1950, 1.	  
	   60	  
an effort to determine if any of them had a criminal history Another suggestion called for 
the prohibition of drivers from leaving their cabs while on duty and making a driver 
convicted of soliciting face no less than ten days in jail.69 
After an initial investigation, on April 26 the SCCVC crafted and gave their 
approval of a proposed ordinance to regulate taxicab parking in the French Quarter. The 
ordinance called for the elimination of taxicab parking “in the area bounded by Esplanade 
Avenue, Howard Avenue, the Mississippi River and North and South Claiborne Avenue,” 
which is an area that encompasses the French Quarter and the adjacent Central Business 
District. Furthermore, it stipulated that “no cab is to stop except for the loading or 
unloading of passengers, or at designated stands within this area; said stands [are] to be in 
[the] area of hotels, restaurants, railroad stations, etc.” It also stated cab drivers could be 
no further than three feet from their car when on duty. With the approval of the full 
SCCVC, the committee presented the proposed ordinance to the Commission Council. A 
roadblock, however, soon appeared that prevented the Commission Council from taking 
up the matter, putting SCCVC’s proposal in jeopardy.70 
Weeks before the SCCVC delivered their recommendations the Commission 
Council had implemented a private vehicle-parking ban on Bourbon Street. The States 
posed a question to the city in an editorial, which asked, “Should parking be reinstated on 
Bourbon Street?” One response came from a salesman named Ed Andrews who wrote 
that conditions were so bad he “couldn’t walk down the street with [his] wife. It was 
disgraceful.” He praised the ban, saying he saw it as “a good thing because it [cut] down 
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on vice by not permitting cab drivers to solicit there.” Another respondent, John Jane, Jr., 
a clerk, wrote, “The ban not only help[ed] the traffic situation…but also ke[pt] cab 
drivers from pandering and soliciting for prostitution there.” Another proponent of the 
ban, O’Delle Brenan, believed the parking ban should remain because, “it’s good for the 
protection of the patrons of the French Quarter night clubs...” She went on to write, 
“Taxicab drivers have got to keep off Bourbon because that’s where they did so much 
soliciting.” In general, she believed, “the parking ban help[ed] to lower vice in the Vieux 
Carré.” All three responders agreed that a ban on taxicabs on Bourbon Street would help 
to lower and possibly eliminate vice in the French Quarter. And by vice, they mainly 
meant prostitution.71 
Not everyone in the city held this view. Those who opposed the ban showed 
sympathy to legitimate businesses that were being hurt by it.  B.L. Klein, a retailer, 
wrote, “I think parking should be allowed on Bourbon [Street]. By placing a ban on 
parking there we are depriving those people of making a living. The French Quarter 
nightclub owners are losing lots of legitimate business because of this ban.” He went on 
to state, “Most people will go to a place nearest to where they are parked, and as a result 
they aren’t going to the spots on Bourbon. We can’t hold everyone responsible for the 
actions of one or two men.” Another individual, C.J. Kennedy, a motion picture 
projectionist, believed cab drivers should be allowed to park in designated zones and “the 
police [sh]ould make sure they attended strictly to the taxi business.” For Kennedy, 
“Running a legitimate business in [the] French Quarter would bring a lot more tourists 
here.” The opinions given by these individuals, both for and against the ban, while not 
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indicative of the whole population, still managed to give an early indication of how any 
new taxicab-ban ordinance might be received if implemented.72   
The passage of the new ordinance was further hampered when on May 2, the 
Commission Council voted to restore parking rights on Bourbon Street, which drew a 
rebuke from the SCCVC. Committee members were blindsided by Supt. Scheuering’s  
apparent reversal on the parking ban during the Commission Council’s meeting before 
their vote. Scheuering had previously indicated to the SCCVC that he supported the 
parking ban. As a rebuke to Scheuering and the Commission Council’s vote, the SCCVC 
voted in favor of a resolution in support of the ban. The resolution stated: 
Be it resolved that the committee reiterates its position with regard to the 
banning of all parking on Bourbon St. The committee based its 
recommendations to the commission council on the advice of Police 
Superintendent Joseph I. Scheuering…whom at all times expressed 
themselves as opposed to all parking on Bourbon St. and upon the 
opinions of the committee members themselves. Therefore, while it does 
not agree with the action taken by the majority of the commission council 
on Tuesday, May 2, it accedes to their authority, reserving the right to 
carefully observe the resulting situation. Should the committee find that 
the parking of private cars on Bourbon St. causes or contributes to a return 
to conditions which have been so objectionable in the past, it will then 
demand that the commission council change its position and ban all 
parking on Bourbon St.73 
 
  All but one committee member voted for the resolution. The lone dissenting vote came 
from Jay Weil, Jr., who objected to the language of the resolution, specifically the portion 
that indicated that the SCCVC “was acceding” to the action of the Commission Council. 
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The dissenting member believed the committee should not back down when a 
recommendation was made.74  
Weil’s objection was largely ignored. The committee had a more pressing issue to 
address. Their proposed taxicab-parking ban faced new opposition from French Quarter 
business owners. The Commission Council’s removal of the Bourbon Street parking ban 
gave business owners cover to speak out against the proposed ordinance. French Quarter 
restaurateur and SCCVC member, Owen Brennan, asserted that the previous parking ban 
caused a drop in business in the area. However, he conceded that the death of Robert 
Dunn brought a barrage of negative coverage to the French Quarter, which caused some 
people to stay away. Brennan’s comments, along with other nightclub and bar owners, 
caused the Commission Council to balk at the idea of a taxicab-parking ban. This 
ultimately led them to shelve the SCCVC’s proposal.75  
The SCCVC’s strategy to target taxi drivers was the first time the group centered 
their focus on a male dominated profession. If implemented, men were to face real 
consequences if they helped solicit prostitutes. But the ordinance proved to be too 
unpopular for French Quarter business owners and to an extent, ordinary New 
Orleanians. This failure by the SCCVC revealed just how difficult it would be to at least 
minimize prostitution in the city. A main resource for prostitutes remained open. If the 
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Prostitutes 
Reeling from the defeat of the taxicab-parking ban, the SCCVC on July 12 
proposed a study of the conditions of areas that were considered hotspots in the French 
Quarter for prostitutes. Rev. Jamieson was chosen by Foster to be the chairman of the 
newly created Sub-Committee on Prostitution Activities, which began its work with an 
overnight investigation in late July. Investigators went to Decatur Street, on the periphery 
of the French Quarter, where they witnessed the arrest of three women for loitering. Their 
report made sure to note that police were actively engaged in making arrests in the area. 
It was concluded that there was “an [apparent] laxity on the Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Board in making spot checks on the bars located on Decatur Street.” It was particularly 
noteworthy because previous discussion of laxity of enforcement was laid at the feet of 
the police rather than the ABC board.76 
Rev. Jamieson managed to witness only two solicitations from known prostitutes, 
which occurred outside the French Quarter. The reason he did not witness more 
solicitation in the French Quarter could be one of two reasons. The first is that 
prostitution was not as rampant as Jamieson and the rest of the SCCVC believed it to be. 
The most likely reason, however, is because taxi drivers were working as middlemen, 
thereby avoiding the prying eyes of Jamieson and the police.  
The sub-committee also included a study of court cases that involved prostitution 
from January 1 through August 15, 1950. The report indicated that out of twenty-six 
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cases brought before the municipal court, twenty-one were outright dismissed and four 
were levied nominal fees or the women forfeited their bail. They also found that when 
women were brought before the court, the names of the houses of prostitution were not 
recorded, even if raids were conducted on the houses and women were arrested in the 
same house. In most instances, even if women were arrested in a brothel, they were 
charged with a lessor violation. Because of this, the sub-committee blamed the low 
conviction rate on “an inherent weakness in the [o]rdinance and its [s]ection covering 
prostitution.” This weakness, they observed, was because “it [was] almost necessary for 
the arresting officer not only to see the actual intercourse, but also the payment for same 
by one of the participating parties.”77 
Before the release of the sub-committee’s findings to the full commission, 
newspaper editorial boards made their opinion known about a revised prostitution 
ordinance. The States opined that the prostitution problem was not due to a lack of a clear 
ordinance, but rather a lack of enforcement of the existing ordinance. If the SCCVC 
could find a way to help with this, the editorial suggested, then the committee would 
“reap the appreciation of the people of the city.” The Times-Picayune, on the other hand, 
differed slightly in its approach. While its editors believed strict law enforcement was key 
to solving the problem, the Picayune opined that the ordinance on record lacked “teeth” 
which failed to discourage repeat offenders. And if criminals continued to flaunt the law, 
it was up to the police to do their duty and arrest the offending persons. They encouraged 
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the SCCVC to fix these issues as well as shed light on why prostitution convictions were 
so low.78 
The editorials gave a sense of what work needed to still be done in order to fix the 
prostitution problem. They showed there was no unifying solution that would satisfy 
everyone. While both editorials sought more robust police action, the Times-Picayune 
expressed doubt that this alone would be enough. They believed the prostitution 
ordinance must be revised and updated to close any loopholes in the law and provide law 
enforcement the tools needed to obtain more convictions. Seeing this issue being 
discussed in such a public forum, the SCCVC felt the urgency to produce a solution.  
A full report was presented to the SCCVC on September 6 and discussed at the 
following meeting. The report offered ten recommendations for a revised ordinance and 
provided a range of remedies to curb prostitution. They ranged from targeting the 
prostitutes themselves to going after those who employed them and those who employed 
their services. Key recommendations dealt directly with prostitutes, although some in a 
roundabout way. The first recommendation called for any “bawd, or lewd woman” found 
wandering the streets at night, or found frequenting houses of prostitution, to be charged 
and found guilty of a misdemeanor. The next two recommendations prohibited the 
employment of prostitutes, or “lewd women,” in public places, such as bars and 
nightclubs. It also prohibited these same women from being employed as singers or 
dancers who performed in a “lewd or indecent manner.” One recommendation went after 
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those who employed the prostitutes and the other went after the women themselves who 
were employed by the owner of the establishment.79 
The fourth recommendation targeted males connected with prostitution. The sub-
committee suggested a male should be charged with a misdemeanor if they “inhabit[ed], 
[ate], or sle[pt] in a house of ill-fame, bawdy house, or house of prostitution…or house of 
bad reputation.” This also extended to those men who were found to be connected in any 
way with “the keeping, management, or control” of any house containing prostitutes. 
This was the only recommendation that specifically targeted men. The rest of the 
recommendations sought to strengthen existing law and called for an increase in fines. 
These tended to focus on the denying alcoholic beverage licenses to businesses that 
continuously employed or catered to prostitutes and those that solicited them.80 
The recommendations as a whole sought to keep women away from 
establishments that catered to men. The sub-committee wished to make sure that any 
woman, either a prostitute or one suspected of being an immoral woman, could not be 
employed. More specifically, not be employed in a business that might tempt men into 
engaging in an immoral act. The recommendations were similar to those made for the 
barmaid ban.  
Even though the SCCVC released their recommendations for a revised 
prostitution ordinance in September, the committee would not deliver them to Mayor 
Morrison until November 16. Between that time, Rev. Jamieson and his sub-committee 
continued to investigate conditions on Decatur Street. On October 18, Jamieson delivered 
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a report indicating the “low character” which establishments on Decatur Street catered to. 
They observed prostitution flourish in the same places they observed in July. The 
aggressive police presence on the street then, was nowhere to be found in October. The 
situation had deteriorated so much that Jamieson was even approached by a man who 
asked if he wanted to “see the pretty girls.” The committee called on law enforcement to 
once again clean up the streets.81 
Another update delivered to the SCCVC on November 15, showed that the efforts 
put forth by the committee had failed to produce the desired results. It also revealed the 
lack of interest by the police in enforcing the prostitution ordinance as it stood. Since the 
city’s Commission Council had yet to take up the recommendations, Jamieson inquired 
during this same meeting if prostitutes could be charged under the State Law of 1942, Act 
241, which required a suspected prostitute to undergo a venereal disease test. If the 
woman was found to have a venereal disease, they could be charged and prosecuted by 
the District Attorney. This suggestion was dismissed when Police Capt. William Dwyer 
of the First District informed the committee that the law was found to be unconstitutional 
and could not be used as a tool to combat prostitution.82 
The harsh suggestion by Jamieson of forcibly testing alleged prostitutes showed 
the lengths he was willing to take to solve the issue. A skewed view that women were 
solely the reason prostitution existed ignored those individuals who helped perpetuate the 
practice. Rarely did the police seek to arrest and convict those who might possibly be 
exploiting them, which for women not associated with houses, tended to be men. But 
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Jamieson’s updated report began to shift the blame in another direction, away from 
women and on to law enforcement. Areas deemed hotbeds for prostitution lacked a strong 
police presence thereby allowing prostitution to continue unabated. His conclusions were 
further proved in a subsequent report released before the Commission Council voted on 
the SCCVC’s recommendations.  
The final report issued by the Sub-Committee on Prostitution Activities on 
December 9 detailed what the sub-committee saw as a well-organized citywide 
prostitution syndicate. The proof offered in the report relied on the arrest records of two 
hundred and three white females for prostitution from January 1 to December 1, 1950, 
many of whom were arrested on multiple occasions for the same charge, but from 
different houses. Based on the records, the report concluded that a syndicate was the only 
way “prostitutes [could] be shifted from one establishment to another even though these 
houses [were] operated under separate management.” The report also concluded that the 
police themselves were responsible for the lack of arrests and convictions of prostitutes. 
Jamieson and the sub-committee believed if the city’s Commission Council failed to vote 
in favor of the prostitution ordinance or if the police did not properly enforce the law, 
then other measures would need to be taken to go around them. They suggested they 
would consult with Orleans Parish District Attorney Severn Darden in order to file suit in 
district court to padlock establishments found catering to prostitutes in order to “protect 
the citizenry, not only from the effects of this menace of prostitution, but from the lack of 
law enforcement on the part of the proper officials as well.83 
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The SCCVC was adamant about their recommendation for a revised prostitution 
ordinance. Though their threat to circumvent the city seemed genuine, it was uncertain 
whether it would have worked. Regardless on December 20, the Commission Council, 
almost three months after the SCCVC recommendations were submitted to them, voted 
and unanimously approved of them. Rev. Jamieson attended the meeting as a 
representative of the SCCVC. After the recommendations were approved, he stated, “The 
old ordinance [was] extremely full of loopholes. You have only 10 percent of convictions 
under the present ordinance.” City Attorney Henry B. Curtis agreed with Jamieson that a 
new ordinance was necessary to combat prostitution. Curtis even pledged to assign more 
assistant city attorneys to the municipal courts to help prosecute alleged prostitutes. They 
would make sure important cases moved forward as well as make sure witnesses, such as 
police officers, appeared before the court when summoned.84  
The passage of the revised prostitution ordinance was a great victory for the 
SCCVC, especially for Rev. Jamieson. It was the culmination of a yearlong campaign 
that resulted in not only the renewed effort by the city to combat prostitution, but also an 
effort that yielded positive results within the first few months of its enactment. Police 
Capt. Joseph Sonnenberg of the First District, provided information to confirm this point. 
He reported that one hundred six prostitutes were arrested by February 1951. These 
numbers allowed the committee to believe their work made a drastic improvement to the 
French Quarter atmosphere.85 
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The End of the SCCVC 
By the end of 1952, the Mayor’s Special Citizens Committee for the Vieux Carré 
had lost its relevancy and disbanded. It must be noted that the eventual downfall of the 
SCCVC began soon after its creation. Richard Foster was the main reason for this, due to 
his advocacy and successful push for the creation of a new crime commission that largely 
encompassed many of the activities the SCCVC was established to perform. Foster, who 
had resigned as chairman of the committee, lobbied for a new crime commission with the 
help of Commission Council member J. Bernard McCloskey, and the New Orleans 
Chamber of Commerce. The announcement of a new crime commission appeared on 
September 27, 1950, approximately six months after the start of the SCCVC. Foster 
rationalized his decision by saying any new commission must be “composed of persons 
outside of the city government.”86 
Foster said the objectives of the new commission would be to “correct inadequate 
law and procedure; help control and punish those guilty of crime and corruption; work 
with and encourage all good and honest public servants and help correct conditions that 
breed crime and make criminals.” He wished to build on what the SCCVC had done and 
expand the range of territory to investigate. In other words, instead of focusing solely on 
the French Quarter, the new commission would take the entire city under its purview.87 
Chamber of Commerce president, C.C. Walther, agreed with Foster and decided 
to sponsor his efforts. But, he wanted the Chamber of Commerce to “watch [the crime 
commission’s] formation from the sidelines, and later on take up the question of acting as 
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a cosponsor.” Walther explained his hesitation was due to there not being a fully fleshed 
out plan for the organization. He also believed that the new commission should be 
composed of representatives like those who served on SCCVC.88 
Commissioner McCloskey’s support of the commission was viewed through an 
economic lens. He wanted to promote the city as a destination for business conventions 
as well as vacationing tourists. McCloskey wanted to ensure the safety of tourists within 
the French Quarter and beyond. If tourists felt safe to visit, then they would spend money 
in nightclubs and other establishments in the city. With the backing of the Chamber of 
Commerce, Foster’s crime commission would mainly focus on how the new commission 
could benefit business interests rather than focus primarily on the safety of city residents 
and tourists.89 
The final nail in the coffin for the SCCVC came from Mayor Chep Morrison who 
released a statement soon after McCloskey’s announcement. Morrison gave his support to 
Foster’s crime commission “in principle” after citing the success of the SCCVC, which 
had only been in existence for six months. Morrison explained that he spoke with Foster 
“about expanding the work of his committee…to include a broader field in law 
enforcement matters.” He further stated:  
A citizens’ commission of this sort can accomplish a great deal of good. 
This has been the experience of the California, Chicago, Greater Miami, 
and other crime commissions throughout the country There is no doubt the 
civic minded leaders who have the interests of the community at heart can 
actively assist the governing authorities – police department and courts – 
in the very important job of law enforcement, and that of building a better 
community…While we feel our situation has greatly improved in the last 
4 ½ years, and New Orleans does not have some of the special problems 
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of these other areas mention, we still welcome the assistance and help of 
such a commission.90 
 
With Morrison’s endorsement, the SCCVC’s continued existence was in peril. 
Even though Foster was not the most influential member of the committee, the 
appearance that the chairman of the SCCVC was not as committed to the committee’s 
work, made all the difference. But one of the major criticisms of the SCCVC was that 
their work did not go far enough in investigating vice. Crime existed in other areas of the 
city and the SCCVC was too narrowly focused. 
Newspaper editorial boards also waded in on the issue of creating a new crime 
committee. The Times-Picayune endorsed the idea, even though they did not believe the 
city had the amount of organized crime that Sen. Kefauver’s committee alleged existed in 
Louisiana. Still, they advocated for the committee, which they believed would benefit the 
city “both in fact and by reputation from an adequately supported, nonpartisan 
commission to fight as well as study and report on crime.” They found it a necessity to 
bring attention to the “genesis and environment of rackets and lawlessness, and to the 
effectiveness of enforcement methods.” The Times-Picayune editorial pointed to 
Morrison’s SCCVC as an example of how a well-organized body could provide a 
“valuable service” to the city.91 
The New Orleans States editorial board gave a mixed response to the idea. They 
endorsed the formation of a crime commission if its goals were to “survey the 
competence of law enforcement in the ordinary grist of murder, theft, robbery, banditry 
and assorted felonies.” However, if the group were to “delve into the higher strata of 
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crime, the organized brand concerned with large gambling, vice, narcotics and murder 
rings,” then they felt this job should be left to Sen. Kefauver and his committee. The 
States felt the Senate committee had certain powers, which a local crime committee 
would lack and any move to create one “should be held in abeyance pending an effort to 
get Sen. Kefauver’s investigators to sift the local connections, if any, of the big 
syndicates.”92 
The local papers supported the expansion of the work being done by the SCCVC. 
But, they gave no indication of their continued support for the committee, even as they 
debated the necessity for a new crime committee. The SCCVC seemed to get lost in the 
rush to create a new committee that it appeared no one bothered to ask or question if the 
SCCVC should just expand their duties rather than creating a whole new committee. 
Word eventually reached SCCVC members of Foster’s intentions. Leonard V. Huber 
asked what was to become of their committee if Foster’s crime commission came into 
existence. Foster assured him that any potential new crime commission would not 
supplant the SCCVC. He said, “A crime commission would have only publicity as a 
weapon, whereas this commission has the fist in back of it. It has the support of the 
mayor and the police.” Still, Foster expressed his support of a new organization when he 
said, “I do think, however, that a crime commission modeled along the lines of that in 
Chicago would be beneficial to the city.” With this assurance, SCCVC members agreed 
that in the event a new crime body was to be organized, their group would not disband.93 
Foster’s assurances, however, would ring hollow. As the Sen. Estes Kefauver 
prepared to convene his committee in New Orleans in January 1951, Foster pressed 
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forward. On January 24, he attended a meeting of the Rotary Club where he informed the 
members that, “New Orleans has drawn groups of individuals here…who have set 
themselves up to prey not only on unwary visitors but on natives as well.” He went on to 
describe the prostitution racket the SCCVC subcommittee on prostitution had uncovered. 
Foster told the Rotarians, “It is apparent that New Orleans is a clearing house for the 
prostitution racket of this section…the mayor recently told the [SCCVC] that he would 
institute padlock proceedings against several notorious houses which were brought to his 
attention.”94 
In order to further sell his idea of a new committee to the Rotary club, Foster 
emphasized tourism. He indicated that because of New Orleans’ background, “it [was] 
easy to see it is the sort of city where gambling, prostitution and crime can 
flourish...Tourists are its second largest source of income and a great many of those who 
come here want in come in contact with the bizarre, the unusual, to do and see things they 
wouldn’t do at home.” Foster then went on to stress, “What makes this city a hard one to 
administer is the difficulty of determining where pleasure ends and vice begins.” Foster’s 
intention in his remarks was to show that he and many others accepted that people come 
to the city to experience things that they could not experience anywhere else. But, 
because of this Foster believed a new crime committee would be the safety net used by 
tourists to make sure that they could experience the care-free aspects of the city without 
worrying about harm that could come to them from various criminal elements.95 
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The one thing that Foster could not do to create a new crime committee was to 
justify why a new one was needed even though the SCCVC still existed, and had, up to 
that point, produced results with their investigations. One can only guess that the reason 
for his push to for a new committee was because it would be one that he helped create. 
Foster had sought to create a crime committee since 1946 but had failed to achieve this 
goal till Dunn’s death. Even though he was the chairman of the SCCVC, he still sought a 
committee of his own, one free of any political affiliation. The SCCVC, whose 
membership comprised of various business and civic members, still had a political aspect 
due to link to having been created Mayor Morrison.    
Despite Foster’s assurance to its members, the SCCVC officially disbanded with 
the establishment of the new Metropolitan Crime Commission in 1952. The two-year 
time span of the SCCVC existence can be seen as both a success and a failure. It was 
successful in its ability to convince the Commission Council to adopt the 
recommendations it presented. It was a failure because those recommendations did not 
fulfill what civic and business groups sought to accomplish. While there was an initial 
uptick in arrests, that did not last long. B-drinking and prostitution continued to persist in 
the French Quarter because of the same problems that existed before the adoption of the 
ordinances. Lack of convictions continued to be one of the major impediments to the 
cleanup effort. What the committee activities did reveal was that the police were integral 
to any cleanup efforts. Without their cooperation, any committees created by French 
Quarter residents, and civic and business organizations would ultimately fall short.      
The SCCVC began to question why the lack of police cooperation in enforcement 
existed. Were the police doing this on purpose? Or did they lack the resources to enforce 
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the law effectively? These were questions that needed to be answered because the police 
were the key to eliminating undesirables in the French Quarter. The creation of the next 
committee sought to provide answers. This committee would delve into allegations of 
police corruption that many in the city believed to exist but lacked the proof. During this 
next committee’s investigations one theme kept arising. That theme was the connection 
between the police and prostitution. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLICE AND THE PROSTITUTION CONNECTION  
 
The Mayor’s Special Citizens Committee on the Vieux Carré (SCCVC) 
investigation into prostitution revealed how police raids and a new ordinance did little to 
change the trajectory of prostitution in the French Quarter. But it also exposed police 
officers’ lax enforcement of the law, which became a hindrance to the work the SCCVC 
had accomplished. This revelation raised the question as to why this was the case. Was it 
a lack of interest on the part of the NOPD or was it purposeful? The effort to try and 
answer this question led to the formation of a new committee: the Special Citizens’ 
Investigating Committee (SCIC). Its purpose was to investigate police actions and create 
a complete record of any corruption NOPD officers might be involved in. The goal was 
to eventually root out any corrupt police officers and hold them accountable, as well as 
recommend any new protocol or laws to better police the city. It was hoped that this 
could help alleviate vice in the city, particularly the prostitution problem, and stop its 
spread in the French Quarter and surrounding areas. 
While realizing there might be a possible connection between police officers and 
proprietors of vice, there was little effort on the part of the Morrison administration and 
the NOPD to investigate the matter between the end of the SCCVC and the formation of 
the SCIC. This lack of will gave further credence to the criticism that the police were 
either involved in vice activities or were more than willing to look the other way for a 
price, thereby perpetuating the situation civic and business organizations sought to 
eliminate from the French Quarter. In either case, it provided enough cover for houses of 
prostitution to continue to operate with few interruptions.  
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Between 1950 and 1953, an inability or unwillingness on the part of the city and 
the NOPD to investigate their own officers allowed vice to fester and thrive in the French 
Quarter. During their first year the SCCVC did not broach the subject at all. Only when 
Sen. Estes Kefauver’s 1951 national crime commission investigation in New Orleans 
exposed police corruption that allowed crime to fester in the city and state, did the issue 
appear on their radar. But even then, no full investigation was attempted. The SCCVC 
continued to investigate and make recommendations to the city’s Commission Council, 
but their influence had begun to wane. Any information and work the Kefauver 
Committee could provide to the SCCVC went unused.  
Realizing this could damage his reform image, Mayor Morrison launched a 
halfhearted effort to investigate police corruption; even going so far as to seek 
cooperation form state officials to help shut down disreputable establishments. But 
Morrison’s actions soon after his request was made, show he never truly wanted their 
help. There existed a lack of willingness by Morrison and the NOPD to accept any 
responsibility for the conditions of the city and police force. Morrison sought only to 
deflect attention from his inaction and shift the blame to others.  
A public feud arose between Morrison and Guy L. Deano, Jr., attorney for the 
state Revenue Department, who helped organize and execute raids on establishment in 
New Orleans with possible connections to criminal elements. The back and forth over 
who had jurisdiction over shutting down disreputable establishments caused a major rift 
that ultimately never healed. This feud played out in public with both Morrison and 
Deano making statements to the press. Newspapers captured this exchange and therefor 
provide a record of the events that led to the creation of the SCIC.  
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April 1953 was a critical month for Morrison. It began with a state police raid on 
a bar that saw NOPD officer Raymond Hughes arrested for ties to prostitution. This 
quickly snowballed into Morrison’s public feud with Deano, creating an environment of 
mistrust as well as misdirection. The month ended with another police controversy. This 
time, evidence of police corruption emerged when a state Revenue Department informant 
tried to entrap NOPD officers. All these events provided the impetus for the creation of 
the SCIC. No matter how much Morrison tried to ignore the problem, police corruption 
was an issue that had to be addressed. 
The purpose of the chapter is to not only to chronicle the creation of the SCIC, but 
also to explain the transition from the SCCVC to the SCIC. A correlation between the 
police and prostitution was established when evidence emerged through investigations 
conducted by the Kefauver crime commission and the subsequent Hughes raid that 
occurred in 1953. The SCCVC did not (either willingly or unwillingly) look into this 
issue. By having this corruption exposed to the public, Kefauver’s commission gave local 
activists license to investigate this “open secret” further.  
The Hughes Raid and Jack Richter controversy covered in this chapter show that 
attempts were made by Morrison and the NOPD, whether superficial or not, to tackle the 
problem. The Hughes Raid gives an example of how corrupt police officers conducted 
themselves when engaging in illegal activities. The raid also established the city’s lack of 
interest in fully investigating their own officers, especially those who had previously 
been suspended for similar charges. More often than not, internal investigations favored 
the accused.  
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While Morrison asked for the state’s help in the endeavor to close disreputable 
establishments, his actions immediately after his request suggest he never really wanted 
their help to begin with. The very public back and forth between Morrison and Deano 
also revealed Morrison’s intentions of placing the blame on the state rather than 
acknowledging the city’s own failings, which sabotaged the partnership. The Richter 
controversy gave Morrison the excuse he needed to abandon city/state cooperation. 
However, realizing his need to show he was doing something about the problem, 
Morrison sought to create what would become the SCIC.  
 
Sen. Kefauver Comes to New Orleans 
The anticipated arrival of Sen. Estes Kefauver’s crime committee brought intense 
media attention to New Orleans. Newspaper accounts reported public reaction ranging 
from worry, fright, belligerence, and just plain eagerness to see what the committee 
would uncover. There were also those who viewed the proceedings with skepticism, 
believing the committee to be nothing more than a publicity stunt. Regardless of people’s 
thoughts on the hearing, the Kefauver Committee, as it was colloquially known, held the 
attention of everyone in the city, including those who were involved in crime related 
activities.96 
Those involved in illegal activities had reason to pay attention. The purpose of the 
Kefauver Committee was to “investigate all phases of crime and rackets – gambling, 
prostitution, bribery of public officials, etc. – on a local scale to determine whether there 
are hookups between the underworlds throughout the country.” In previous committee 
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hearings, Sen. Kefauver heard New Orleans mentioned as one of the places where a 
national gambling syndicate functioned. A committee spokesman later announced that 
New Orleans “appear[ed] to be part of the patchwork of a national crime quilt” that saw 
the likes of notorious New York underworld boss Frank Costello and his New Orleans 
associate Carlos Marcello.97  
Upon his arrival in late January 1951, Sen. Kefauver met with Morrison and 
former district attorney Herve Racivitch. He expressed hope that New Orleans was 
“brazen enough” to be wide open in its cooperation with the committee. He also informed 
them that his investigation had occurred in New Orleans, unbeknownst to them, from 
June 1 to August 2, 1950. While not disclosing what was uncovered during this time 
period, he hinted that investigators had looked into Mafia connections. What was also not 
disclosed was the extent to which the police were also included as subjects of their 
investigation.98 
On January 25, 1951, Sen. Kefauver and his assistants entered a packed 
courtroom filled with reporters and television cameras. After taking his seat in the judge’s 
chair, Kefauver gaveled the hearing to order. Prominent New Orleanians were in 
attendance including Rev. Robert Jamieson. His presence was notable because of his 
longtime crusade against prostitution. When the SCCVC disbanded 1952, his work came 
to a halt.99 
Mayor Chep Morrison was asked to testify before the committee. He touted his 
administration’s efforts to “wipe out” gambling in 1946, soon after he came to office. 
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“We immediately laid down the policy of law enforcement,” Morrison said, “which has 
since been consistently followed throughout the past five years of this administration.” 
He continued, “We say, with some justifiable pride, that in New Orleans today we have 
achieved the greatest degree of enforcement against gambling and related rackets within 
recent memory.” Morrison’s boasts about his administration’s efforts to combat gambling 
masked his true record. Gambling had not ceased in the city. In fact, as Morrison spoke at 
the Kefauver’s hearing, newspaper reports recounted lottery venders selling tickets in the 
central business district, near the very courthouse where he spoke. Gambling, in the form 
of a lottery racket, had never ceased to function in the city. Regardless of this situation, 
Morrison tried to convey a more positive outlook on his record. He informed the 
committee that the New Orleans Police Department had made an inordinate number of 
arrests from August to December 1950. Those numbers included 165 for prostitution and 
10 for B-drinking.100 
The Kefauver Committee hearing continued for two days, during which the 
committee learned how illegal gambling and out-of-state crime organizations infiltrated 
Louisiana. Testimony revealed that sheriffs in the parishes surrounding New Orleans 
received kickbacks from local crime syndicates to overlook illegal gambling operations 
and prostitution within their jurisdictions. One such sheriff was Frank J. Clancy of 
Jefferson Parish. When called to testify before the committee, Clancy pled the Fifth 
Amendment when asked if gambling was against the law and if he had made any attempt 
to enforce the state’s antigambling law. His unwillingness to answer and his lack of 
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transparency caused Kefauver and the committee to conclude that sheriffs such as Clancy 
were both directly and indirectly responsible for the state’s thriving crime syndicates.101 
When the committee proceedings concluded, the Kefauver Committee Report on 
Organized Crime was released. In its section on New Orleans, the report concluded law 
enforcement and local officials were partially to blame for the city’s toleration of 
criminal elements. The committee wrote that law enforcement had a “deep-seated 
aversion” to enforce the laws which they pledged to uphold. This conclusion brought to 
public view what was already seen as an open secret; local authorities knew illegal 
actions were taking place under their noses and willingly let it happen. Civic and business 
leaders were reinvigorated in their attempts to cleanse the city of undesirables. Their only 
problem was, the institutional mechanism by which they could accomplish this goal stood 
accused of being directly and indirectly involved in criminal activities.102  
Various attempts to hold the police accountable through the creation of additional 
committees failed to materialize. Questionable practices continued to plague the police, 
especially when it came to prostitution. The Kefauver Committee revealed that police in 
the surrounding parishes also received kickbacks to look the other way when it came to 
vice in the New Orleans area. It could only be assumed that police in the city itself were 
no different. The SCCVC’s last report on prostitution stated the police did not vigorously 
enforce recently-passed ordinances. This would continue until a raid on a bar on 
Magazine Street brought to light the extent of police corruption and extensive ties to 
between police and prostitution interests. 
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By January 1953, individuals such as Richard Foster sought to renew efforts to 
reengage the business community to help to rid the city of crime. On January 29, at the 
St. Charles Hotel, the Chamber of Commerce sponsored an event that was attended by 
business and civic leaders. The headline speaker was Spruille Braden, chairman of the 
New York City Crime Commission. Braden emphasized the need for businessmen to 
contribute organizationally and financially to efforts to clean up crime in the city. He 
argued that businesses would suffer if vice and other criminal activities infiltrated the 
city. “Well organized crime always shows up where money is and I prophesize that 
organized crime will come in and make a concerted effort to control business,” Braden 
warned.103 
Braden expressed his belief of an added benefit of the creation of a committee that 
fought extortion better than the public could. Citing the Kefauver Committee’s findings, 
Braden said it “listed over 100 types of legitimate businesses as being infiltrated by 
organized crime.” He explained that any complaints brought to the committee regarding 
business extortion would remain private and not be made public, unlike what would 
happen if these same businessmen went to the police and had to disclose information that 
would eventually be made public.104 
Braden’s argument made it clear that the business community had a vested 
interest in taking a prominent role in clearing the city of criminal elements. Keeping 
businesses free of extortion was just another reason for cleaning up the French Quarter. 
But Braden failed to mention the more probable impediment for business to function in 
the city; police corruption. Still, the renewed emphasis on the creation of a committee to 
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help with cleanup efforts was reborn. But this time, the focus would shift from focusing 
solely on vice elements, to focusing on how and why these vice elements continued to 
exist, even after new ordinances were passed by the Commission Council. Morrison 
would once again find himself in the middle of making a decision on how any new 
committee would be created and what it would look like. Things would eventually 
culminate in a one-month period that saw a flurry of events that led to swift action taken 
by Morrison.  
The month of April 1953 would be a contentious time for Morrison and the 
NOPD. Not only were they dealing with the fallout from the feud Louisiana Revenue 
Department attorney Guy L. Deano, Jr., Morrison also sought the help of the city’s 
Commission Council to form a new committee dedicated to investigating the police 
department. Events that occurred simultaneously that showed Morrison’s ability to 
deflect from his unwillingness to investigate police corruption and shift the narrative to 
focus on cleanup efforts in the hopes of preserving his image. He did, however, manage 
to accomplish the creation of the SCIC, which would be considered a win for those 
groups and individuals who demanded police accountability and an end to the ties with 
vice operators, especially ones connected to prostitution.  
 
Formation of a New Committee  
On April 1, 1953 Morrison and Utilities Commissioner A. Brown Moore 
submitted two separate proposals to the commission council for the creation of a 
committee to investigate the NOPD. Moore believed Supt. Scheuering’s internal 
investigations into his department were inadequate. “Despite the voluminous reports 
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received from the head of the police department,” he said, “several questions appear[ed] 
unanswered.” Both Morrison and Moore believed only an outside investigation could 
ascertain the truth behind any possible police corruption.105 
Morrison’s proposal called for a committee that encompassed the Commission 
Council members, excluding the mayor. Its job would be to investigate the police 
department’s administrative officials. The proposal also sought recommendations and 
advice about the objectives of the department “including specifically its 
recommendations regarding [the] need for additional personnel and increased pay.” 
Morrison also adamantly insisted that any investigation conducted into the police 
department must be done by a grand jury.106 
One can assume that Morrison’s decision to exclude himself from the committee 
is that he wanted to distance himself from any fallout the investigation might create. It 
can also be assumed that by not participating in the committee he insulated himself from 
making tough decisions that might affect his reform image. When compared to his 
previous effort in creating the SCCVC, a lack of community involvement also 
distinguished this second committee. Elected officials would be its only members, 
thereby making the committee appear political. 
Moore’s proposal took a different approach. He called for a three-member 
committee comprised of appointed citizens who would be given subpoena power and the 
authority to take testimony under oath. This group would further have the power to 
investigate the police department and, if needed, authorize the hiring of private 
investigators These three members would consist of representatives of the Society of 
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Former Special Agents of the FBI, the Bureau of Governmental Research, and a newly 
created local organization called the Metropolitan Crime Commission. Moore insisted the 
committee should be free of any political influence, which he said, “might be subject to 
the political stresses and cleavages normally found in any elective body.” With its 
reliance on citizen investigators and leaders, Moore’s proposal was a direct counter to 
Morrison’s proposal.107 
A few days after Morrison and Moore introduced their proposals, the Commission 
Council chose Morrison’s plan. The new committee, consisting of the entire council, was 
given the mandate to investigate the police department. They also had the ability to 
request help from outside agencies which Moore, who headed the new committee, 
advocated for in his initial proposal and immediately took advantage of. In a meeting of 
the new committee conducted in Moore’s office, representatives from the organizations 
Moore originally wished to be represented on the committee were in attendance.108 
After the meeting, Moore issued a statement to the press announcing the new 
committee’s promise to develop and use any process necessary to obtain facts in their 
investigation. They also sought to reassure citizens that “It is the intention of the 
committee to conduct an impartial and thorough investigation.” Moore made it clear the 
committee had no wish to conduct a witch-hunt or persecute anyone. The committee 
made the decision to keep the details of the plan of action secret but agreed to reveal it at 
a later date. The compromise committee, which incorporated both Morrison and Moore’s 
plan, allowed the process to include elected officials but also have the ability to allow for 
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citizen input in the process. Even though this compromise was reached, Moore was not 
completely finished fighting for his vision of the committee.109 
With the new committee taking shape under Moore’s supervision, police 
corruption continued to come to light. This was apparent in the 1953 Hughes Raid, in 
which a police officer was arrested for managing a bar with ties to prostitution and B-
drinking. The raid, conducted by Louisiana State Police, blindsided Morrison and the 
NOPD. But, much to the chagrin of civic and business organizations that saw this an 
opportunity to discuss police corruption and their ties to vice, Morrison used the situation 
to shift the topic to cleanup efforts. This would spark a month-long back and forth that 
would put police corruption on the backburner. 
 
The Hughes Raid 
Shortly after midnight on April 2, 1953, troopers from the Louisiana State Police 
raided four bars they alleged had connections to houses of prostitution and B-drinking. 
One of those bars was the Green Lantern at 1157 Magazine Street. Multiple people were 
arrested, including bar operator Raymond Hughes, a New Orleans police officer. On the 
surface, the raid appeared to be routine. However, the procedures taken by officials 
proved it to be anything but. State Police in conjunction with the state Revenue 
Department executed the raid and only made it known to the New Orleans Police 
Department after the fact. The raid’s secrecy was so paramount that Guy L. Deano, Jr., 
attorney for the Revenue Department, acknowledged that the “troopers who made the 
raids, three from New Orleans and two from out of town, were not told of the impending 
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raids until 30 minutes beforehand so that there would be no leaks.” When asked if he 
believed these establishments had police protection, he responded, “That would be the 
great suspicion. These places had not been raided in several years.”110 
The state police and the Revenue Department were right to be suspicious of the 
NOPD. In the case of Raymond Hughes, the April raid was not the first time he was 
arrested on prostitution related charges. He had been previously arrested in 1951 for 
operating a rooming house on Camp Street that housed a “scantily clad” 16-year old 
female tenant. The female also informed the police she worked as a barmaid at a Hughes-
operated bar. Hughes adamantly denied the accusation and was eventually cleared. But 
the raids and arrest gave further evidence that police were heavily involved with the 
city’s prostitution problem. If they were not directly involved, many were willing to look 
the other way for a price.111 
Superintended Joseph I. Scheuering vehemently denied the allegations brought by 
Deano. The denial, however, was not enough to satisfy a public that continued to view 
the NOPD with mistrust. To remedy this, Scheuering ordered Hughes suspended, pending 
an investigation into involvement with the bar and the alleged prostitution allowed on the 
premises. Scheuering made it clear that any officer found to have any knowledge that the 
establishment they operated housed prostitutes would be suspended or dismissed, 
depending on the level of knowledge. He wished to make Hughes an example of this 
policy. Scheuering then turned the investigation over to the precinct supervisor and 
ordered him to question Hughes, in addition to other beat policemen and captains in the 
precinct, about their knowledge of the bars raided and any possible links to prostitution. 
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Scheuering also transferred eighteen officers to the Sixth District to “strengthen” the area 
where the bar raids were conducted. This action was also recommended by Hughes’ 
review board, which ultimately deemed his involvement “unbecoming of an officer,” and 
dismissed him from the police force.112 
The actions taken by Scheuering were cosmetic and did very little to persuade the 
public that the NOPD took the allegations of corruption seriously. In a press conference, 
Morrison rejected any idea that the police department was under a cloud of suspicion. He 
saw recent and past criminal activities as isolated incidents that were not indicative of the 
NOPD as a whole. He also expressed his belief that most of the criticism came “from 
rumors planted by persons who [were] hostile” to his administration. In an effort to show 
good will, Morrison suggested a pay increase that he hoped would help eliminate 
policemen’s temptation to seek outside work to supplement their income.113 
Privately, Morrison knew corrupt police officers were a major problem not only 
for the city but also for his administration. On January 13, three months before the April 
raids, Morrison sent a memorandum to Scheuering and demanded he take action. He 
derided Scheuering for allowing the state police to have “better sources of information 
than our police.” He went further, writing that “we should know our own town better; we 
should know what’s going on more accurately than they do.” Raids were eventually 
conducted by the NOPD but as Edward Haas wrote, any impact these raids may have 
had, proved to be brief. Haas is correct in this assertion; however, it must also be said that 
Morrison’s image seemed to be the main point of these actions rather than any sincere 
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interest to stamp out corruption. The raids conducted in April only further proved to an 
embarrassment for the mayor and his administration.114 
Feeling the pressure to take action, Morrison visited every police precinct and 
urged officers to be more aggressive in their enforcement of the law. His call to action 
resulted in the New Orleans vice squad, in an undercover operation, arresting five 
women: three for B-drinking and two for loitering in a house of prostitution. The arrests, 
which occurred on April 6, while making good headlines the following day, did nothing 
to address the issue of police corruption. Morrison and the NOPD skirted the issue and 
relied on old tactics of conducting raids to try and placate the public. He continued this 
approach when he sought help from the state to help crack down on crime in the city.115 
 
A Different Tactic is Taken 
Morrison continued to see this as a criminal issue rather than a police corruption 
problem. In a letter to Guy Deano, Jr. on April 24, Morrison requested the state Revenue 
Department and the NOPD cooperate in an effort to shut down “disreputable places,” 
especially those that continued to function as spaces for B-drinking and prostitution. 
Morrison directed his police superintendent to review past arrest records on 
establishments known for continuous vice problems. He also issued a standing order that 
police visit these places each day and write a report on “any conditions of vice, gambling, 
and or suspicion of same that might exist.” In an attempt to begin the process as soon as 
possible, Morrison enclosed in the letter a list of establishments he requested the Revenue 
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Department investigate in order to revoke their state liquor permits, thereby forcing them 
to shut down.116 
Morrison’s request for help from the state signaled a change in tactic. Until this 
point, Morrison directed any and all investigations be conducted internally and within the 
confines of city authorities. Raid after raid on “disreputable” establishments, however, 
made this untenable. The raids failed to achieve the results the city desired. Prostitution 
and B-drinking continued and nothing appeared to be stopping them. Morrison hoped, 
with the state’s power to revoke liquor licenses, those establishments catering to vice 
would be shut down permanently. This would eventually be a point of contention 
between the city and the state. 
Receptive to Morrison’s request, Deano announced that state revenue agents and 
the NOPD prepared plans to raid establishments suspected of being in violation of state 
law. Two days later, these plans went into effect when the police raided various bars and 
arrested eight people on prostitution charges. The raids proved helpful in identifying bars 
that catered to prostitutes and arrested those who operated the establishments as well as 
the prostitutes themselves. While the arrests were appreciated, Morrison hoped the raids 
would lead to the quick revocation of the establishments’ liquor licenses, especially those 
on the list he gave Deano in April. He made it publicly known that the Revenue 
Department was not acting fast enough, even though it had only been three days from 
when the letter was sent to Deano before joint-raid agreement was executed.117 
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Morrison used the media as a tool to express his displeasure with Deano. He also 
used it to shift the blame of continued vice problems in the city to the state as a way to 
deflect from his own police department’s ineffectiveness. Within days of initially writing 
Deano for help, Morrison publicly complained that the Revenue Department had ignored 
his requests to revoke liquor licenses for bars that had repeated liquor law violations. 
There were eighteen such establishments Morrison targeted for license revocation, eleven 
of which were on Bourbon Street. He described those establishments as “constant trouble 
spots for vice.” Morrison stated the NOPD found it “wasteful, inefficient and frustrating” 
not to receive the help he requested.118 
Deano took issue with Morrison’s characterization of the work done, or not done, 
by his agency. In a letter responding to Morrison’s accusations, which was also published 
in the local newspapers, Deano wrote that the mayor “showed a complete lack of 
knowledge of the work being done by the Department of Revenue and its co-operation 
with the law enforcement agencies of the city of New Orleans.” He informed Morrison 
that of the fifty establishments on the list he provided, six had already forfeited their 
licenses. As for the eighteen bars Morrison accused of having been ignored by the 
Revenue Department, Deano shifted the onus to local municipal courts. If these bars were 
continuously cited for containing B-drinking, then it was the duty of local law 
enforcement and the courts to find them guilty, giving his department cause to revoke 
their licenses. Deano attempted to get in one last dig at Morrison when he wrote, “We 
have on several occasions attempted to meet with your honor to discuss our mutual 
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problems, but evidently your heavy schedule of business prevented meeting for that 
purpose.”119  
It was clear even to Deano that Morrison wished to shift the blame of continued 
vice in the city to the state. Not only was it unrealistic to expect the state to revoke liquor 
licenses within four days of Morrison’s initial letter but, as Deano pointed out, it was 
mainly a failure of law enforcement to properly enforce the laws, make arrests, and 
gather evidence in order to achieve a conviction in court. But despite Morrison’s 
accusations, Deano advocated for continued close cooperation between the state and the 
city. Toward the end of his letter, Deano asserted: 
If we are sincere in our desire to clean up our city, if we really want to 
offer our citizens the full protection to which they are entitled – if we are 
firm in our purpose to safeguard the morals of our youth and if we want to 
assure our visitors that they can enjoy our culture, entertainment and 
hospitality without fear of being victimized by unscrupulous operators, 
then we should get our heads together in co-operation without trying to 
excuse our own shortcomings and place the blame on someone else.120  
 
Deano ended his letter by emphasizing the state’s willingness to cooperate with the city 
when called upon to do so. The promised outreach to Morrison and the NOPD showed 
Deano’s attempt at reconciliation. His words, however, were not received that way. What 
his letter did accomplish was a tit-for-tat exchange between the state and the city of New 
Orleans. 
In an effort to insulate himself from any blame, Superintendent Scheuering 
weighed in on Deano’s response. In a statement issued to the press, Scheuering wanted to 
clarify a particular accusation made toward the NOPD. Deano indicated in his letter the 
police department failed on many occasions to provide enough evidence to the Revenue 
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Department to close down bar and tavern violators. Scheuering, wanting to “set the 
record straight,” stated, “We realize that even though we do try to obtain as much 
evidence as possibly can, there will be times when this evidence will be insufficient, but 
only in a hearing can the value of the evidence be determined and thus far these hearings 
have not been held.” And, once again shifting blame back to the Revenue Department, he 
stated, “The police department has in many instances during the past year sent in reports 
of arrests for ‘B’ drinking, prostitution, etc. to the Revenue Department, but not only 
have there been no hearings, but receipt of those reports [have] not been acknowledged 
by the state.”121 
Morrison did not rely solely on state actions to show his commitment to combat 
vice. Less than a week after Morrison sent his letter to Deano, he issued a statement 
indicating his wish to strengthen city ordinances on liquor licenses for barrooms and 
taverns. “I expect to call on the council, Morrison stated, “to put more teeth in the 
ordinances and to authorize the Finance Department to suspend or revoke license when 
convictions have been secured for vice and gambling.” Morrison noted the ordinance 
would only permit revocation in cases of a felony conviction. Since vice violations were 
considered misdemeanors under the current ordinance, the city and police had little 
recourse to close repeated offenders.122 
When word reached Deano about Morrison’s intentions for a new ordinance, he 
reached out to him and urged patience in taking any action. “It is my opinion…we should 
not adopt just any ordinance in haste – we should call upon all persons experienced with 
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such regulation and make use of their experience in formulating the proper course of 
procedure.” Deano also urged the Commission Council to be involved in the process. “In 
fact,” he emphasized “all of the departments of city government particularly the 
department of safety and the department of public health, should be consulted in 
preparing an ordinance which is to regulate an industry which can promote or affect the 
public health, safety and morals of our citizens and out tourists.”123  
Liquor retailors also wished to be included in the ordinance discussion. The 
American Association of Small Business sent a letter to Morrison and requested a 
meeting to address the possible new ordinance. “The members of this organization 
engaged in this industry,” association managing director, J.D. Henderson, stated in his 
letter to Morrison, “will be very grateful [for] an opportunity to meet with you, or a 
committee which you may appoint, so that they may act in an advisory capacity in the 
preparation of any ordinance or amendments to those now in existence, before they are 
submitted for approval by the [C]ommission [C]ouncil.” They too saw the rush to create 
a stricter ordinance as not taking into account those liquor retailors who do not violate the 
law and conduct their business in a respectable manner.124  
As the ordinance was being debated, Rev. Robert Jamieson, former member of 
the SCCVC, added his voice to the push for a stricter liquor-licensing ordinance. He 
publicly reminded the Commission Council of the SCCVC’s proposed liquor licensing 
ordinance which had been drafted three years prior. Jamieson remarked that the SCCVC 
ordinance was “kicked around for months and finally at a conference in the city 
attorney’s office commissioner Ott recommended it be held in abeyance because he said 
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it would cost $40,000 or $50,000 to hire plainclothesmen to enforce it.” He stated further 
that, “Now that the heat is on and the subject has such strong political implications, the 
city would probably be glad to spend the $75,000 to enforce a tighter ordinance.” 
Jamieson concluded his remarks bitterly by saying he had a “sneaking suspicion” that the 
ordinance being discussed by the Commission Council had the same provisions as the 
one proposed by the SCCVC who “worked so hard on and got kicked in the teeth for 
their pains.”125 
The rush to pass a new liquor-licensing ordinance concerned French Quarter 
liquor retailers. They questioned the reasoning behind such drastic moves and feared that 
any crackdown on violators of any new ordinance would eventually affect them. They 
made their concerns known in a letter to Morrison from Lyall G. Shiell, an attorney who 
represented over half of the establishments Morrison recommended closed.126 
In his letter, Shiell wished for the mayor to clarify the reason behind the list that 
targeted specific establishments. More specifically, they wished to know if these moves 
were “a sincere effort to enforce existing laws uniformly for the benefit of the entire city 
or [was] it a political move directed solely at the French Quarter.” In order to stave off 
the appearance of the list being political, Shiell recommended that other establishments 
should be included on the list for closure, such as stores, large hotels, restaurants, grocery 
stores, and other places that he indicated had “at one time or another been involved with 
prostitution, lottery, gambling, B-drinking, or other various prescribed violations of the 
law.” While he admitted that the establishments he represented were mainly involved in 
alleged B-drinking violations, Shiell asserted that ninety percent of those violations were 
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due to police entrapment. Shiell wished not to condone violations of the law. However, 
those he represented in the French Quarter did not wish to be used as pawns in any 
political game or “victimized merely because of their geographical locations.”127 
The French Quarter establishments Shiell represented decided to form their own 
organization to help combat “any discriminatory actions” taken by the city or state related 
to any alleged B-drinking, gambling, or prostitution violations. Shiell spoke on behalf of 
the organization and reminded the public that while those establishments Morrison 
recommended for closure were charged with violations, none of them were ever 
convicted. Shiell continued to reinforce the idea that the actions taken by Morrison were 
“strictly an arbitrary and prejudicial move with political implications.”128 
With input from Supt. Scheuering, Morrison responded to Shiell’s statements. He 
informed him that the intent of his request for action was a sincere effort to improve 
conditions in the French Quarter and the list of establishments he sent to Deano were 
given on the basis of their past violations. Morrison also dispelled the idea that the move 
was political when he questioned if Shiell had “considered the political aspect of calling 
on the State Revenue Department to assist…in our desire to improve conditions in bars 
and taverns, then I would not have listed any places and would have limited myself to 
broad generalization.”129 
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In an effort to turn the tables on Shiell, Morrison informed him that any law-
abiding establishment would have nothing to fear from any new ordinance or from the 
State Revenue Department. “As a matter of fact,” Morrison added, “I should think that 
the operators of decent and wholesome bars and taverns would applaud any effort to 
crack down on those who bring disrepute upon the retail liquor business.” Morrison 
continued when he questioned the liquor sellers’ objections to his efforts. “I find it 
difficult to understand,” he wrote, “this complaint against the efforts of the city 
government to clean up and improve conditions among those establishments which have 
been chronic violators.130 
Shiell’s letter and along with the new liquor retailors’ organizations failed to 
impede Morrison’s momentum. A new liquor-license ordinance passed the Commission 
Council five to zero on May 15. The new ordinance was designed to streamline the 
suspension or revocation of liquor licenses of those establishments that violated the law. 
The ordinance also paralleled state law, which triggered any violation of the city 
ordinance to be violation of state law as well. The provisions ranged from what age a 
person could apply for a permit to preventing a person convicted of a felony, or on a 
narcotics or moral charge, from obtaining a license. The ordinance also prohibited 
prostitution, B-drinking, central nervous system stimulants and all anesthetic drugs 
(knockout drops), and any gambling prohibited by law. A provision to set up a special 
five-man plainclothes police squad to monitor bars and nightclubs was proposed by 
ultimately not included in the final passage of the ordinance.131  
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The public back and forth between Morrison and Deano that played out in the 
press did little to show the public that Morrison and the NOPD took the city’s cleanup 
efforts and police corruption seriously. Morrison’s successful attempt to amend the 
liquor-license ordinance showed his intention to work around the state. But the feud did 
manage to serve one purpose. It shifted the subject from police corruption back to 
cleanup efforts, which allowed Morrison to blame the state for the failure to close down 
disreputable bars and taverns. Scheuering’s remarks only furthered the burgeoning 
tension between the city and the state. Cooperation appeared all but dead in the water. 
The distrust only widened with the revelation of an undercover operation conducted by 
the Revenue Department and the New Orleans Item into NOPD corruption. It was a 
situation that took Morrison and the NOPD by surprise. It left Morrison with a 
controversy he could no longer ignore.  
 
The Jack Richter Controversy  
On April 27, 1953, Jack Richter, an underworld figure with an extensive criminal 
record, was arrested in connection with a string of robberies and on charges of being a 
fugitive from justice in Memphis and New Orleans. He was also charged with attempted 
bribery of a police officer. It was reported that Richter attempted to bribe NOPD officer 
Louis Brackman in order to secure permission to open a house of prostitution. After the 
arrest, it was quickly revealed Richter was in fact an informant for the Revenue 
Department who worked in conjunction with the New Orleans Item. He was paid to 
gather information on a police protection racket. When this revelation reached Morrison 
and Scheuering, any goodwill between the state and the city immediately evaporated. Not 
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only had the state failed to inform the NOPD and the mayor’s office that an investigation 
into liquor law violations was occurring, it also appeared that the state intended to entrap 
New Orleans police officers. Brackman just happened to be the officer caught up in the 
operation.132 
The origins of the state-funded investigation began when Richter met with the 
Item’s editor, George Chaplin. Richter informed Chaplin he had information on bars that 
functioned as houses of prostitution as well as on police payoffs. Chaplin informed the 
Revenue Department and put them in contact with Richter. After conducting a 
background check, the department entered into an arrangement with him and agreed to 
pay for any verifiable information he could provide. Their four-week long investigation 
proved lucrative. Raids were conducted on bars in which a number of people were 
arrested and charged with prostitution and operating an establishment that housed 
prostitutes.133 
Though effective, the agreement with Richter proved to be problematic. While the 
use of underworld figures as informants is not unusual, the agreement was controversial 
because Morrison and the NOPD were left completely in the dark about the operation. 
What also made it unusual was how close the Revenue Department was working with the 
Item. It was agreed to that the Item would be the first to receive any information Richter 
obtained from his undercover meetings, thereby allowing them to assign a reporter to the 
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potential story. Only after that was done, would Richter’s information be turned over to 
the Revenue Department so raids could be conducted.134 
Morrison viewed this as a “flagrant interference and a scheme entered into with 
one newspaper for the obvious purpose to produce a scandal.” In a letter to Deano, which 
was again printed in newspapers, Morrison relayed his grievances when he pointed to the 
hypocrisy of Deano’s promise of cooperation. “You speak of co-operation with the city,” 
Morrison wrote, “but your activities obviously have been directed at undermining and 
attempting to create unfavorable publicity in one newspaper.” Morrison continued, “In so 
far [sic] as crime detection is concerned, there has been little or none. Six prostitution 
arrests in two months have added, in my opinion, very little to the cause of law 
enforcement.” He went on to compare the Revenue Department’s record to that of the 
NOPD’s, which arrested and convicted ninety-seven persons for the same crime during 
the same period.135 
Once again, Morrison took this as an opportunity to shift the narrative. Rather 
than see this situation as a police corruption problem, he chose to see it as an image 
problem. The investigation conducted by the Revenue Department embarrassed Morrison 
and the NOPD. It proved again that Morrison chose to focus more on his image than 
discuss the more important issue of police corruption. Morrison’s complaint about 
Deano’s actions, however, was not without merit. Deano’s letter to Morrison, which 
ended with him trying to create a spirit of cooperation, seemed hollow. The investigation 
conducted by the Revenue Department intentionally kept Morrison and the NOPD out of 
the loop. The reason behind this is unknown, but it can be assumed that the state did not 
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fully trust Morrison or the NOPD. Much like the raids conducted at the beginning of the 
month, Deano wished to keep their investigation from leaking to any corrupt police 
officers. 
As expected, Deano denied the allegations. Like he did previously, Deano wrote a 
letter placing the blame on Morrison and Scheuering for lack of cooperation. “Your 
opinion of our activities is of interest to us only after you have demonstrated a sincere 
desire to clean up our city and meet with us to discuss our future plans toward that end.” 
He also took another personal swipe at Morrison when he wrote, “You have been in 
office for seven years and our police officials have been on the force for a much greater 
period of time. It certainly does not flatter your law enforcement program to now 
complain to the Department of Revenue about ‘chronic violators’” But even with these 
remarks, Deano closed his letter with again appealing for cooperation between the state 
and the city.136 
Deano’s counter-letter to Morrison, which was also printed in newspapers, got to 
the heart of the city’s continued problem with vice. Although Morrison and the NOPD 
leadership had been in control for almost a decade these problems persisted. Lack of 
leadership or the desire to do anything about the problem, especially when it came to 
possible collusion between vice elements and corrupt police officers, allowed these issues 
to fester. Police officers had the revised ordinances to go after prostitution and B-
drinking. Enforcement of those laws, however, became the prime issue. 
The public feud that played out in the local press between Morrison and Deano 
destroyed any kind of working relationship they could have had. Their inability to 
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establish trust hindered cooperation and allowed for vice activities to continue 
unopposed. Newspapers took notice of this ineffective policing but did not blame the 
Revenue Department or the state police. They instead questioned the NOPD’s inaction. 
The Times-Picayune editorial board questioned if the NOPD was up to the task of 
cleaning house in their own ranks as well as the city. They also opined that the “failure of 
the department to spot and prove wrongdoing of its own members seems to have been 
characteristic” of the NOPD. They pointed to Raymond Hughes’ arrest as proof of their 
charge. The editorial credited the state police with this arrest. The “the official contention 
that the trouble in the department has been caused by ‘a sour apple or two’ [was] no 
answer to the record of the department in leaving it to outsiders to expose its misdoings.” 
The editorial board concluded by questioning whether Morrison would actively commit 
to improving the police department or continue to ignore the NOPD’s inability to purge 
itself of corrupt officers.137 
Morrison’s cooperation with the state had reached its limit. Over the span of the 
month of April, relations deteriorated rapidly. Accusations lobbed at Morrison by Deano, 
along with the Jack Richter controversy, left no room for future collaborations. Local 
actions would have to be taken if he and the NOPD were to see results and regain the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  “Able to Clean House?,” Times-Picayune, May 1, 1953, 10.	  
	   106	  
The Final Plan 
When the committee’s final plans were released to the public, a special citizens’ 
committee, created by the commission council and finalized in an ordinance passed on 
April 24, resembled Moore’s original proposal. The committee would be comprised of 
three representatives from the organizations Moore had previously listed. Each selected 
member would be approved by the Commission Council before taking up the task of 
investigating the police. Moore noted that the method used in “selecting a citizens’ 
committee was chosen in order that the public may have confidence in the fact that they 
are an independently selected, nonpartisan, qualified group of citizens.” He went further 
when he stated, “The council committee has [taken] no part in the selection of these 
citizens…and has in no way assumed responsibility for them.”138 
Politics was almost completely removed from the process. The only political 
situation that remained was through the appointment and confirmation of the 
representatives by the Commission Council. Moore stressed, however, that establishing 
the citizens’ committee was not intended to relieve the Commission Council of the 
responsibility of helping to fix vice and police corruption. Rather, it was seen as “simply 
an instrumentality to achieve a complete discharge of those responsibilities without a 
duplication of effort or waste of funds.” The responsibilities invested in the new 
committee were to employ investigators and to actively supervise the investigation. They 
also had the power to subpoena witnesses, documents, and other materials, as well as 
administer oaths when taking testimony. Moore noted, “The citizens’ committee will 
make available to the [Commission Council] facts and recommendations from time to 
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time as may be appropriate.” Despite the appearance of the special citizens’ committee 
taking on the bulk of the responsibility to investigate police corruption, Moore 
emphasized the Commission Council would be the ones to act on any recommendations. 
“The primary responsibility for both phases of the investigation, administration and 
criminal,” he wrote, “rest on the commission council.”139 
Moore wished to inspire public confidence in the newly formed committee by 
filling it with people whose credentials would allow people to believe any wrongdoing 
discovered would be corrected. Representing the Metropolitan Crime Commission was 
George C. Stohlman, executive general agent for the Missouri Pacific and Gulf Coast 
railroad lines. He was also on the board of directors of the New Orleans Chamber of 
Commerce. From the Bureau of Governmental Research, Tulane Law professor and 
former U.S. attorney for the eastern district of Louisiana, Leon D. Hubert, Jr. was chosen. 
And from the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, former agent Dudley C. 
Foley, Jr. was appointed.140 
The final component to the formation of the Special Citizens’ Investigative 
Committee was to find a person to lead it. Aaron M. Kohn, a lawyer and former FBI 
agent, served as head of the Chicago Crime Commission, which in 1952, conducted a 
ten-month study on corruption in the Chicago police department. Its final report issued a 
damning set of facts about the state of corruption in the Chicago police department. The 
recognition Kohn received from his tenure as chief investigator caught the attention of 
civic and business groups in New Orleans. They wished for Kohn to do for their city 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Ibid.	  	  
140	  “Citizens Named for Cop Inquiry,” Times-Picayune, April 18, 1953, 1.	  
	   108	  
what he did for Chicago. When an invitation to lead the newly created committee was 
extended to Kohn, he readily accepted.141  
Moore’s new committee emphasized citizen participation in fixing the vice and 
police corruption problem. He believed it was necessary in order to keep the process as 
transparent as possible. Morrison’s political plan, if implemented, could have led to more 
accusations of police corruption and a continuation of the status quo with regard to vice 
in the city. Over the ensuing months, the committee would prove to be apolitical, which 
Moore had advocated, and an effective tool to uncover the extent of police corruption. 
Specifically, it would uncover the connection between police officers and prostitution in 
the city.  
The new committee, which was officially called the Special Citizens’ 
Investigating Committee (SCIC), was created under six specific circumstances: 
1) Lack of community confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the police 
department. 
2) Generally observed violations of the law accompanied by apparent lack of 
enforcement by the department. 
3) Frustration of grand juries, law enforcement officials and the Mayor’s 
Special Citizens’ Committee for the Vieux Carré in their efforts to obtain 
the facts with cooperation of the police department.  
4) Charges of rape, theft, bribery, and self-burglaries* allegedly committed 
by police officers. 
5) Statements that the police department is under-paid and under-manned. 
6) The need for a non-political, unbiased and thorough investigation of the 
police department with the results thereof to be made available for 
appropriate action by the Commission Council, the grand jury, and the 
community as a whole.142 
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Its goal was “to conduct an investigation which would result in such administrative and 
legislative changes as would improve the efficiency, capabilities and morale of the police 
department and gain for it a position of public trust and confidence.”143 
With an official mandate in place, the SCIC began their investigations into the NOPD. 
But, like with most corrupt government apparatuses, the committee faced considerable 
pushback from the NOPD as well as from the Morrison administration. The efforts to 
stonewall and outright end the SCIC’s investigations proved both the NOPD and Chep 
Morrison sought to maintain a status quo that saw a continuation of certain vice in the 
city. Too much money would be lost, either from police payoffs or loss of tourism 
revenue, if the SCIC were to be completely successful. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SPECIAL CITIZENS’ INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE 
 
The Special Citizens’ Investigating Committee’s (SCIC) objective to end 
corruption in the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) was met with the reality of the 
status quo championed by Morrison and the NOPD. Police involvement in criminal 
activities, particularly prostitution, served as a detriment to civic and business 
organizations’ efforts to cleanse the French Quarter of undesirables. The positive work 
accomplished through the SCCVC proved to be all for naught due to the protection police 
officers offered to prostitutes in exchange for monetary gain. The SCIC’s effort to 
investigate the police also served as a way to uncover criminal activities that routinely 
occurred in bars and nightclubs all over the French Quarter, most of which the SCCVC 
was unable to address due to lack of resources and manpower. In reality, the police were 
part of a system that allowed for the perpetuation of prostitution because they shielded 
these women from prosecution. Token raids were conducted as a way to show the police 
were doing something about the problem, but no one arrested during these raids stayed in 
jail longer than a few hours; most being bailed out by the madam of the house they 
worked in. 
The SCIC was plagued from the beginning by stonewalling from the Morrison 
administration and lawsuits filed by members of the Fraternal Order of Police to stop the 
committee from holding public hearings. The lawsuits were ultimately successful when 
on December 2, 1953 a Civil District Court Judge Frank J. Stich issued a preliminary 
injunction that stopped the hearings from continuing. Stich ruled that section five of the 
city charter, which gives the city council the power to issue subpoenas and dole out 
punishment if they go unanswered, was unconstitutional. He did not however, rule 
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whether the SCIC itself was unconstitutional. The injunction left Aaron Kohn and the 
SCIC in a precarious situation. Even though the injunction was eventually lifted and the 
hearings were allowed to continue, Kohn realized the obstacles facing him and the 
committee. He had no choice but to continue with the SCIC’s work using the information 
previously gathered.144 
Just as Morrison relied on his reform image to advance his own interests, so too 
did Kohn. By using television cameras that were present during the SCIC public 
testimonies, Kohn was able to reach the public in a way that could achieve maximum 
impact. He sought to portray a corrupt police force working hand in hand with 
prostitution operators.  
It must be noted that the SCIC was not a committee that centered on the clean-up 
efforts that civic and business organizations had envisioned. Despite this, it managed to 
serve a purpose that was just as valuable as investigations into vice crimes themselves. 
Rooting out police corruption was at the heart of the SCIC’s investigation. If the 
committee were to help remedy the problem and force out any corrupt police officers, 
then the cleanup efforts started by the SCCVC could continue to eliminate undesirables 
from the French Quarter as the civic and business groups originally intended. This 
chapter lays out the extent of the involvement police officers had with prostitution. Not 
only did the investigations reveal they received kickbacks for protection, it also exposed 
the charade behind brothel raids. In doing so, the SCIC proved that police were partially 
responsible for the continued criminal activities in the French Quarter - and that the 
police had no intention of changing this. 
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The Investigation 
From June to December 1953, the SCIC, led by chief investigator Aaron M. 
Kohn, employed undercover operatives to study various hotspots of potential criminal 
activities. They focused their attention mainly on bars and nightclubs in the French 
Quarter. Once an investigator’s observations were complete, the investigator submitted 
their findings in a written report to Kohn. These reports contained information of alleged 
illegal activities and where they took place. It must be noted, however, that they did not 
cite what specific laws were actually broken. The investigations were fact-finding 
missions. It was up to Kohn and his committee to determine how to classify which laws 
were broken. The majority of reports detailed encounters with prostitutes, pimps, drug 
dealers, and other criminal elements. When all the investigations were complete, Kohn 
used these reports to create a witness list and to develop possible questions to ask in the 
next phase of the SCIC. 
The reports themselves portray a city filled with vice activities that police 
appeared unable or unwilling to contain. In one finding, George Stevens, an undercover 
investigator, stated “prostitution existed in a pretty big scale at this time in the city of 
New Orleans. It’s not open but it’s open enough so that if a blind man, well dressed, was 
going down the street, he would be solicited…” When Stevens turned to the description 
of possible police payoffs, he implied it was impossible for the police not to know these 
houses existed. “It appears strange that the man on the beat, or anyone under the 
jurisdiction of the New Orleans police department, could not, or would not, know unless 
he was not interested.” While he admitted that he did not personally observe any police 
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payoffs, he strongly believed they existed, especially in the French Quarter, by way of 
gifts or cash payments.145 
Beyond employing undercover operatives, Kohn requested citizens send the SCIC 
any tips and other helpful information. Citizens heeded his call, most often anonymously. 
In one instance, Kohn received a call that stated three police captains conducted 
“shakedowns” on gambling, narcotics, and prostitution operations in exchange for 
protection. The anonymous informant, who claimed to be a police officer, indicated that 
the police would raid any business that did not make the payoff and receive the “O.K.” 
from one of the captains. Police Captain Joseph Guilliot, who led the NOPD vice squad 
and was alleged to be one of the corrupt captains, was purported to have collected payoffs 
from five hundred illegal establishments. But the anonymous informant’s most damning 
information was the accusation that the entire narcotics squad was part of the shakedown 
operations. Drug addicts, dealers, and prostitutes were their primary targets. The money 
collected would then be delivered directly to the office of Superintendent Joseph I. 
Scheuering every Monday at 3:00 p.m.146 
This anonymous informant directly implicated the vice and narcotics squad and 
confirmed accusations that the police were in some form of collusion with vice operators. 
And the fact that the information allegedly came from a police officer made it even more 
damning. But, one must be skeptical of the information provided. It was never verified by 
Kohn or the SCIC that the informant was indeed a police officer. This did not stop Kohn, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  George Stevens, interviewed by James F. Delany, 10 September 1953, Box 3, Folder 63, 5-7, City 
Council Special Citizens Investigating Committee, 1953-1963, Louisiana Division, New Orleans Public 
Library.	  	  
146	  Aaron M Kohn Investigative Report, 30 July 1953, Box 1, Folder 13, 1-2, City Council Special 
Citizens Investigating Committee, 1953-1963, Louisiana Division, New Orleans Public Library.	  	  
	   114	  
however, from using this information to confirm his preconceived narrative about the 
NOPD. 
Citizens also sent in their tips and information was through letters, both signed 
and anonymously. A typical letter sent to Kohn gave names and addresses of known 
places where criminal elements conducted business. One such letter, signed by a J.J. 
Sheffield, indicated that Sam’s Colombo Vanity, on Iberville near Exchange Alley in the 
French Quarter, was frequented by “cut throats, [and] women of the streets.” Sheffield 
also alleged that the establishment had police protection. Another letter, sent 
anonymously, designated Punch & Judy, another French Quarter bar, of having engaged 
in “very undesirable and shady situation[s].” The writer suggested the bar “operat[ed] 
what appear[ed] to be a very flourishing house of prostitution.” Letters like these were 
straight and to the point and their sheer number showed the widespread support for the 
SCIC’s effort to clean up the city. It also revealed the extent to which citizens viewed the 
police department with distrust.147 
Not all letters sent to the SCIC were as informative as Sheffield’s or the 
anonymous writer. Some people sent in opinion pieces that gave their view of the state of 
affairs in the city. One such letter, sent anonymously, blamed women for the problems 
facing the city. “Prostitution activities can be considered stable business in every town 
and city in the country,” the letter stated, “where women are bartenders, women allowed 
in bars after the late hours of the night or morning, rooming houses above and near bars 
and hotels and motels” and so on. Putting the argument in moral terms, the writer asked 
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Kohn, “How can men respect their wives and children when they have the temptation and 
encouragement of other women who have no ambition to earn a living by work or toil?” 
According to the writer, the solution to this problem rested on the actions of moral 
women: 
All such women should be given treatment and encouragement to change 
their way of life and to work for a living in a respectable manner as the 
average housewife has to earn hers by daily hard work and toil. The 
[s]ocial [w]elfare should work together with the [p]olice [w]omen in 
conjunction with [r]eligious [s]ocieties in various parishes to find work for 
these bartenders and B-drinkers and Pros[titutes]. If there are no women in 
the bars during the late hours of the night there will be very few or no men 
in many a bar after midnight.148 
      
The writer’s letter disclosed the thinking of some citizens who believed the root 
of the prostitution problem lay with women, themselves, much like the members of the 
SCCVC did. An un-virtuous woman tempted men into drinking, which could guide them 
to other actions that led to “broken homes and divorce[d] families.” This sexist and 
dangerous thinking placed too much blame on women and not enough on the men who 
were willing participants in any such “immoral” action. Accountability for men seemed 
to be lacking in the writer’s logic.149 
Other letters expressed a cynical attitude toward the success of the cleanup effort. 
One anonymous letter sent to Kohn stated: 
You must forgive my cynicism regarding the success of your undertaking, 
but reform waves have struck New Orleans many times in the past years 
and have receded, leaving conditions the same as before, and may times, 
even worse. Those who do not accept graft to turn their backs on 
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organized vice, do so in order to assist friends, or as political favors; and 
consequently are equally as guilty as the ones who line their pockets.150 
 
The letter did, however, provide encouragement to Kohn. “Hit and hit hard,” it read, “do 
what you can, you will have the thanks of all the good citizenry…” This letter, while not 
providing helpful information, showed Kohn that he and the SCIC had the support of 
many New Orleanians, though even sympathetic writers recognized that most likely very 
little could be done.151 
The main objective of Kohn’s investigators and the request for information from 
citizens was to identify witnesses willing to testify that they saw a police officer receive a 
payoff.  His efforts achieved mixed results. In most cases, the investigators relied on 
hearsay and other secondhand information given to them when they interviewed people. 
On other occasions, the investigators witnessed an implied payoff. This was the case 
when an investigator saw two police officers enter a bar and head toward a back office to 
speak with a group of men who appeared to run the establishment. The investigator 
observed one of those men go behind the bar, pull cash out of the register and then return 
to the rear of the bar to continue to converse with the police officers. No direct payoff 
was actually witnessed.152 
One informant spoke with an embittered cab driver who hated Morrison for 
leading a cleanup of vice activities. But the driver, who despised the police even more, 
believed they “weren’t satisfied with getting paid off in their districts – they all had to 
come down to the Quarter.” Since cab drivers were a leading conduit for connecting 
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clients with prostitutes, his anger revealed how the police were most likely cutting into 
money the cab drivers would normally receive from house operators, perhaps because 
operators were paying off the police using a portion of money that would normally go to 
cab drivers.153 
While not exactly what Kohn had hoped for, the multiple investigator accounts 
allowed him to claim payoffs did exist since such transactions would most likely not 
happen out in the open. The information gathered by both the investigators and public 
contributions revealed a history of police complacency and complicity of city vice. If 
police officers did not receive direct payoffs from house operators and other business 
establishments, then they willingly turned a blind eye to the problem. This information 
became the basis for the public hearings that soon followed. Kohn sought to present his 
findings and hammer at the close ties between the NOPD and vice operators, which, 
based on the reports he had, were tight knit. 
      
The Police Department Under Scrutiny  
On November 24, Supt. Joseph I. Scheuering testified publicly in front of the 
SCIC. He sought to convey the impression that the police department under his 
stewardship did everything within its power to curb prostitution. But Scheuering’s words 
provided little evidence to support his narrative. During this testimony, Kohn asked an 
array of questions regarding the methods used by the police when confronted with 
alleged prostitution. Scheuering answered that all complaints were investigated, even if 
they came from an anonymous source. However, when asked, “If a member of his 
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department makes contact with a house of prostitution is he required to report the 
contact?” His response was mixed; at times even contradicting what he previously said 
“If it is a known establishment of prostitution he would be required to make report. 
However,” he continued, “if he makes contact with someone suspected of being in 
prostitution he would not be required to report.” Scheuering explained that the only time 
the officer would be required to report alleged houses was if they were questioned about 
it.154 
Scheuering’s statement disclosed the procedure used by police officers when 
targeting prostitutes. They chose to focus mainly on easier targets; targets that were 
known by the police. They turned a blind eye to the rest. He doubled-down on this head-
in-the-sand approach when he adamantly stated, “I do not believe there are houses of 
prostitution.” This denial and lack of awareness showed Scheuering’s complacency with 
the status quo and lack of interest in curbing the prostitution problem.155 
Kohn’s next line of questioning sought to test Scheuering’s knowledge of existing 
laws. When asked about property that housed prostitutes, Scheuering answered that he 
was not familiar with that aspect of the law and did not recall any instance wherein an 
owner was ever even charged with running a house of prostitution. When asked if the 
department had ever thought to notify the property owner that police suspected 
prostitution was being conducted on their premises, he replied that he did not believe this 
had ever happened but agreed the idea was worth considering. The problem with his 
statement is that Scheuering consulted with the SCCVC when the revised ordinances 
were being considered in the fall of 1950. He also would have known all the provisions 
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of the revised ordinances once they were passed. Thus, Scheuering’s claims of ignorance 
of the law were highly suspect.156 
Scheuering’s testimony provided insight into the indifference shown by the police 
department. His answers to Kohn’s questions revealed the lack of enforcement even 
though laws were in place to address prostitution operators. This inaction proved to be a 
pattern that led to Scheuering’s immediate suspension and eventual indictment for 
maleficence in office The next witness would only add to these problems.157  
Kohn continued to question others in the police department who would have 
knowledge of the department’s efforts to curb prostitution. Each officer confirmed 
Scheuering’s lax enforcement. During Acting Superintendent Milton I. Durel’s 
testimony, he indicated he knew of no arrests of the owners of houses of prostitution. 
When asked why this was the case, Durel replied, “The superintendent orders such 
action.” Kohn followed up his question by asking if he had ever suggested to Scheuering 
that they arrest the owners. Durel stated, “No, I don’t believe.” But the question that 
Kohn posed to Durel that he could not answer dealt with the fact that the SCIC received 
more calls and complaints about houses of prostitution than the police department did. 
While Scheuering indicated that the NOPD investigated every complaint sent to them, 
Durel stated that the police department did not receive many complaints. Kohn went 
further by asking, “Will you explain why repeatedly persons who call the office of the 
citizens committee and are told to call the police district without exception say that it 
doesn’t do any good? That nothing happens, or if something does happen, the police go 
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to the house and embarrass the complainant.” Durel only responded with, “I don’t 
know.”158 
Durel had his own stigma of covering up prostitution issues. In a letter dated 
October 12, 1953, Kohn received an anonymous letter offering information on a house of 
prostitution operated by Mabel Clifton. The letter stated that even though various bars 
working in conjunction with Clifton were closed, new establishments opened to take their 
place. It was also alleged that Durel had the position of “top fixer” when it came to 
complaints about houses of prostitution. The letter asserted Durel handled complaints 
directly with the operator of the house in an attempt to smooth over the issue when 
possible. No evidence was provided regarding the accusation toward Durel. But the fact 
that the author implicated him only cemented the notion that the police wished to keep a 
certain status quo with these houses. This fact was even stated at the end of the letter: 
Hoping that I have been of help in some measure to all the important work 
you are doing for the betterment of the city and the people who are native 
as well as others who have come here to live permanently but have been 
powerless most of the time in not being able to keep their immediate 
neighborhood clean because of indifferen[ce] to hands off police work.159 
 
  Scheuering and Durel’s testimony left the public’s faith in the police department at a low 
point. A New Orleans States editorial expressed this when it described the police 
department as being “under a cloud” due to the “widespread reports of possible 
corruption and mismanagement in the department.” In the end, the States opined, “Not 
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much ha[d] dispell[ed] those doubts.” They pointed to Scheuering’s indictment as an 
example of the corruption and mismanagement.160 
Two conclusions resulted from Scheuering and Durel’s testimony about the state 
of the police department. Both gave answers that disclosed the NOPD had an unwritten 
policy of maintaining a status quo with houses of prostitution. It was also revealed that 
within this status quo existed a system in which police and house operators created an 
illusion of enforcement, when in fact, there was very little being done. 
Members of the NOPD were not the only people Kohn questioned during the 
public hearings. Knowing he needed to examine previous work done on this subject, he 
turned to former SCCVC member Rev. Robert Jamieson. Well versed in efforts to 
eradicate prostitution from the French Quarter, Jamieson was more than willing to give 
his testimony on the matter. 
 
The Return of Rev. Robert Jamieson 
In preparation for his investigation, Kohn researched previous efforts to clean up 
prostitution in the city. The most recent of those efforts was the short-lived SCCVC 
created in the wake of the Robert Dunn murder. Jamieson had been the committee’s most 
outspoken critic of prostitution. Wishing to continue his moral crusade, Jamieson 
volunteered to testify, both publicly and privately, in front of the SCIC. 
Rev. Jamieson’s previous work with the SCCVC produced two reports on 
prostitution. The first report delivered in September 1950 gave a list of ten 
recommendations on a revised prostitution ordinance. The final report delivered in 
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December, was of interest to the Kohn and the SCIC. In this report, Jamieson described a 
well-organized citywide prostitution syndicate. Using municipal court records and 
newspaper files, Jamieson and his sub-committee pointed not only to the number of 
convictions that were disproportionate to the number of arrests for prostitution, but also 
to the fact that two well-known houses of prostitutes that were frequented by “exclusive 
clientele” were not raided, even though Supt. Scheuering allegedly knew about them. 
Jamieson wished to share this information to help strengthen Kohn’s case for the 
existence of police corruption.161  
In a series of interviews conducted, between August 1953 and February 1954, 
Jamieson provided insight into the workings of Morrison’s defunct SCCVC. Specifically, 
he spoke of his work as chairman of the commission’s sub-committee on prostitution. 
Jamieson’s interview furthered the narrative that the police and courts had a history of lax 
enforcement of the prostitution ordinance. He also spoke of the important findings of the 
Kefauver investigation, which found that a “new era” of prostitution operations had 
arisen. Jamieson stated:  
No longer did you have the women tapping on windows or accosting on 
the streets of the French Quarter, but a more elaborate system made it 
much more difficult to contact prostitutes, a system of calls girls and party 
girls, that were not necessarily in residence upon the premises but were on 
call either by a madam who lived on the premise or cab drivers who knew 
their phone numbers and so on.162 
 
This new system of prostitution made it difficult to root out the problem because it was 
easier to hide in plain sight. While houses of prostitution continued to exist, their main 
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form of advertising was word of mouth. In other words, people had to know what and 
whom they were looking for in order to find a prostitute. 
Jamieson informed Kohn that during his sub-committee’s investigation, he 
discovered only thirty-two prostitutes were arrested within a six-month period. However, 
those who were arrested were ultimately charged with vagrancy rather than prostitution. 
Jamieson blamed the presiding judges for not having held hearings to properly charge 
and prosecute the women. This changed once the revised ordinance was enacted. But 
Jamieson did not quite believe it would last. He confirmed this when he corroborated 
Kohn’s suspicion that Morrison and the police were involved in “double talk” with regard 
to actively cleaning up vice in the city.163     
As proof of this allegation, Jamieson provided Kohn a confidential memorandum 
issued to Morrison that contained comments on the SCCVC’s investigation as of May 31, 
1951. The memo indicated that houses of prostitution, which were brought to Morrison 
and the police’s attention by the sub-committee, were, with the exception of one, still 
operating. One house, the memorandum read, remained open despite being raided six 
times within a six-month period.164 
Jamieson publicly testified to this information on December 29, 1953. His 
testimony provided the public the same information he gave in private interviews Kohn 
and even described the time he was personally propositioned in the French Quarter. 
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Recounting his work on the Sub-Committee on Prostitution Activities, Jamieson stated its 
findings that “Prostitution was a problem not only because there were women involved in 
it and it existed not only because there were women, but we found of the major reason for 
prostitution existing was the fact that it was profitable to individuals other than the 
women involved.” The sub-committee used this reasoning as the basis for its 
recommendation to the Commission Council to revise the prostitution ordinance to better 
enforce and prosecute prostitutes and those who profited from their labor. The 
unanimously approved ordinance, Jamieson said, even gained the approval of the 
American Social Hygiene Association (ASHA), an organization that conducted its own 
investigation of prostitution in the city for the previous three years. Each of ASHA’s 
reports continued to give the city a poor rating due to the ease of obtaining a prostitute as 
an outsider as well as the number of places that could provide a prostitute.165 
Jamieson’s invocation of the ASHA’s reports allowed the SCIC to review an 
outsider’s perspective on the issue. He pointed to a report issued by the group in April 
1953 that found many of the places they investigated and listed in prior reports continued 
to be in operation. In an effort to be thorough, Jamieson met with the ASHA investigative 
representative and participated in a ride along. After the meeting, he concluded the 
information provided by ASHA was credible. Based on these facts, Jamieson stated, “The 
conclusion we arrived at…was that prostitution, as it was being practiced in the City of 
New Orleans, could only possibly continue because of a laxity of enforcement.” The 
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revised prostitution ordinance was helpful, but without enforcement it remained a hollow 
gesture.166 
During his time on the Sub-Committee on Prostitution Activities, Jamieson 
interviewed prostitutes and inquired about their mode of operation. While he found no 
evidence of an organized syndicate, he did find that various houses worked in 
conjunction with each other, which allowed them to shuffle women from house to house 
as needed. Jamieson also discovered through the course of his interviews that houses of 
prostitution created a procedure in the event of a raid. Someone would tip off the house 
that a raid was to occur, and when the police arrived only a few women in the house were 
picked up, leaving others behind. The house operator created a system in which women 
would alternate who would be arrested and who would stay behind. No direct evidence 
was discovered, however, that connect the police to tipping off the houses. Nevertheless, 
it was strongly implied the police were involved due to the fact that the tip had to have 
come from someone with direct knowledge of the raids or worked close to those who 
organized and executed them.167 
Rev. Jamieson’s interviews and public testimony served two purposes. Firstly, it 
gave insight into the workings of prostitution in the city by confirming the Kefauver 
report’s conclusion about the existence of a new system arising out of the older known 
form of prostitution and how prostitution continued to exist despite the introduction of 
the revised prostitution ordinance in 1950. Secondly, it served to further Kohn’s case 
against the mayor and the police department. Kohn viewed their inactions as a direct 
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dereliction of their duties. He believed they had no interest or intention of completely 
closing down the houses. 
Any moral outrage perceived by the Morrison administration came out of the need 
to appear to tackle a problem the public deemed a nuisance. But it was businesses and 
civic groups with a stake in keeping the city safe for residents and tourists who were 
actually driving the action rather than the public at large. Jamieson fit in the middle. He 
was a civic leader who sought to clean up the French Quarter because his congregation 
was located next to a known house of prostitution. Rather than abandon his crusade, 
Jamieson continued to fight against prostitution even though he had left his French 
Quarter congregation and moved to his new one in Harahan, a suburb of New Orleans. 
Having publicly interviewed police officers and a member of the former SCCVC 
who had knowledge of prostitution in the city, Kohn sought the testimony of an actual 
prostitute who could give a first-hand account of operations as well as show how the 
police fit into their daily activities. The witness, Kohn hoped, would provide the final 
undisputed piece of evidence needed to tie the prostitutes and police together. This 
witness was Doris Gellman. 
 
Doris Gellman    
On December 20th, Doris Gellman sat before the SCIC, her testimony televised 
for all of New Orleans to witness. She was tasked by Kohn to describe her experience as 
a prostitute from 1946 to1951. Kohn hoped her testimony would provide further evidence 
of the lack of police enforcement of prostitution laws as well as shed light on any 
possible collusion with houses of prostitution. Gellman’s testimony, however, was 
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marked by interruptions by Morrison and censorship from members of the committee. 
They allegedly did not wish for her to describe her work in great detail in order to 
maintain an air of decorum for the people watching the proceedings at home. 
During her testimony, Gellman described the various ways “girls” worked as 
prostitutes. Some worked in houses where men arrived and sought their services, and 
others worked in houses where “the girls were there to call for dates.” According to 
Gellman, men would call the operator of the house and the prostitute would leave the 
house accompanied by a chauffeur to meet up with the client. House operators used this 
method as a way to limit their business’ visibility.168 
Gellman admitted to working for various notable house operators intermittently 
during her time as a prostitute, usually going “where the most money was.” Each operator 
conducted their business as they saw fit in order to keep functioning. One such person 
was Norma Wallace, whom Gellman worked for. Wallace, a well-established madam, or 
landlady, was well-known throughout the city due, in part, to many influential people 
who were her clients.169 
Christine Wiltz’s historical narrative, The Last Madam, delves into Wallace’s life 
using Wallace’s tape recordings, which Wallace recorded in the last two years of her life. 
Wiltz was able to piece together Wallace’s interactions during the 1950s, during the 
decade-long effort to clean up the city. In that time period, Wiltz concludes that Wallace 
developed a relationship with Superintendent Scheuering. She was quoted as saying, “He 
said I had a nice place and he would go along with it as long as he could.” Wallace’s 
statements confirm that Scheuring and the police knew of these houses and sought to 
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protect the status quo. One has to be cautious, however, about taking her words as fact. 
Neither Wallace nor Wiltz provide direct evidence of this relationship. It is all based on 
Wallace’s recollection.170   
Gellman described the process women went through before they started working 
for Wallace. She explained that women would first go to Wallace’s house to be 
interviewed by her. Then, after the interview was conducted, “If she wants you to go 
work,” Gellman said, “she put you on.” When Wallace accepted a woman, she gave them 
the option of either staying in the house full-time or, like Gellman, work only when she 
needed to. However, when the “heat was on,” Gellman indicated she worked at a call 
house for another operator.171 
One such operator was Cody Morris, for whom Gellman was employed off and on 
from 1944 to 1949. She alleged that Morris had between nine and eleven women working 
a night. Those women on call would travel rather than have clients visit the house. 
Regardless of whom she worked for, there was one rule every woman had to follow. 
Each woman, according to Gellman, was required to get a blood test every week by 
Friday in order to work. “We had to show slips that said we had no venereal diseases,” 
she stated. This slip of paper had to be from the Board of Health. In Gellman’s case the 
doctor who examined her and other prostitutes worked for the Board of Health and 
provided the documentation. If a woman were found to have a sexually transmitted 
infection, she would have to go to a drug store to buy the appropriate medication. The 
health of the prostitute was important not only to continue repeat business but also to 
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avoid having a disgruntled client who could decide to contact the police. When asked by 
Kohn if the police helped procure medication, Gellman answered no.172 
Gellman’s time as a prostitute for Wallace and Morris allowed her to become 
familiar with how the prostitution business functioned in the city and how they managed 
to stay in operation for so long. This is what made her an important witness for Kohn. 
She could specifically describe how each operator differed in their dealings with clients 
and the police. The house call operations were more complex system of the two. Kohn 
pressed Gellman to explain the system with as much detail as possible. His first set of 
questions revolved around how the clients, or “dates,” were arranged and how money 
was exchanged for services. She explained, “[the date] would call the house. He would 
call Cody [Morris] and tell him how many girls he needed. Sometimes there was a party 
and he wanted three or four. Sometimes just one or two. We’d get the money first and 
then give him the date.” The dates would be arranged by either cab driver or by the 
hotel’s house detective.173 
Once a date was set, the woman would be driven to the hotel where the client was 
staying. A bellhop, who the woman tipped on arrival, would then escort her 
inconspicuously towards an elevator to the client’s room. Each date cost approximately 
ten dollars. Once the date was over, money would be divvied up depending on who 
arranged the date. If a cab driver made the arrangement, he received forty percent, the 
woman received thirty percent, and the house received a dollar. The rest went to the 
people at the hotel. If the house detective arranged the date, he received five to ten 
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dollars. This was separate from the amount paid by the client. Morris kept ledgers 
containing names of the girls, the dates they went on, the cab driver who picked up the 
dates, how much money the girls received, and how much money the cab driver got. 
According to Gellman, these records were meticulously maintained. With regard to 
traditional house operations, cab drivers were relied on to deliver clients to the house. As 
with the other system, cab drivers were given a cut of any money made from a client. The 
less complex system contained more risks due to its centralized location and the potential 
foot traffic it drew from men seeking their services.174 
The information presented by Gellman helped set the stage for what came next in 
her appearance before the SCIC. Kohn’s most important line of questioning dealt with the 
description of a routine police raid on a house and what came afterwards. Gellman 
explained that when a complaint was made to the police on a house, the house operator 
would be tipped off beforehand. When the police arrived, “They [took] two or three girls 
out of the place and [left] the rest. You see, we took turns going to jail. They didn’t want 
us to go out of business.” Even though she never indicated who “they” were, nor did 
Kohn ask for clarification, it can be inferred that she was referring to the police. The next 
line of questioning reflected this assumption. Gellman informed the committee that 
during the times she was arrested, the police never actually charged her with prostitution. 
“They always charged us with loitering,” she said. Even when caught in the act, she 
stated, “They charged us with loitering – playing cards in a house of prostitution.” When 
they were arrested, the house operator would give them one hundred dollars for bail. The 
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money was given to the desk sergeant and the women waited for someone from the house 
to pick them up.175 
Kohn continued with his line of questioning and asked Gellman if a trial had ever 
occurred. She responded that trials did occur, however, no one was ever found guilty. 
“This happened so many times I can’t remember. It was a joke to us. We’d just go down, 
put up the money and get out.” Gellman even recounted a time when the police raided a 
house she was working in and a police officer “[came] up and [said] to us, ‘Who’s going 
to jail tonight?’ He would say he would rough us up a little bit to make it look good.” In a 
sense, the arresting officer put on a show for the people who gathered once the police 
wagon arrived to take the women to jail. It gave off the appearance that police were 
serious about cracking down on prostitution. Gellman’s description of the orchestrated 
arrests added to Kohn’s narrative. It became more than apparent that police were 
involved with house operators. Almost to the point that it was nothing out of the ordinary, 
that was routine and to be expected.176 
As Gellman continued to testify about the city’s prostitution operations, Kohn’s 
next line of questioning became a story of its own. At one moment Kohn veered toward a 
topic more sexual in nature when he asked her to explain what a “French Parisian show” 
was, causing Morrison to interrupt before she could answer. He advised Gellman not to 
go into graphic detail about the subject matter, while city attorney Henry B. Curtis 
advised the SCIC that her “testimony is improper and indecent and immoral. It is 
indecent and shocking. I would recommend to the council that this line of questioning be 
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stopped.” Rather than allow Gellman to answer the question and draw the ire of the rest 
of the committee, Kohn dropped the matter and moved on.177 
One has to wonder what Kohn’s reasoning was to ask such a sexually charged 
question in this particular public form. Even Gellman appeared hesitant to answer. He 
already knew what the term meant due to Gellman having told him in a private interview. 
It can be assumed that this was done to show the public the extent prostitutes went to 
please a client, even if that meant engaging in an act of lesbianism, which was considered 
a crime against nature.178  
Morrison and Curtis’ objections were understandable if Gellman’s private 
description was revealed in front of TV cameras. Even the New Orleans States objected 
to this question and opined, “It is not necessary for any witness to describe to [the 
committee] what constitutes an act of prostitution.” The editor acknowledged the 
importance of Gellman’s testimony, but asked the committee to stick to questions 
regarding the purpose of the investigation, which was to investigate the police 
department.179 
Up to this point, Gellman’s testimony had yet to provide the SCIC with firm 
confirmation that police were paid off by house operators. Kohn continued to press 
Gellman for this piece of evidence, but she admitted she never saw any money being 
exchanged. She did, however, give three examples of times where money was collected 
and possibly used to pay off the police. The first was when she worked in a house where 
the operator would take two dollars a night for “towel money.” She made it very clear 
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though that “They called it towel money, but we knew it was for police protection.” 
Asked if the operators recorded this money in their ledgers, she explained that they did 
not out of fear that other police officers might find them and cause more problems for 
their officers. Another example given was when she saw a police captain “hanging 
around” one of Morris’ businesses. Kohn asked if she heard any discussion around the 
house as to whether any money was given to the captain. She said yes, “I heard Cody say 
that’s all he came around for.” The third example dealt with Frank Rivard, a city official 
connected to the commission council. Gellman stated she saw him multiple times at 
businesses frequented by prostitutes. Much like with the police captain, while she did not 
see money exchange hands, she testified that the reason Rivard came around was to 
collect money. However, she provided no evidence to support her assertion. Gellman also 
indicated that Rivard had on various occasions solicited the services of prostitutes.180 
These pieces of evidence were not exactly what Kohn was hoping to uncover 
when he questioned Gellman. She failed to provide him with the eyewitness account that 
would have helped solidify his belief that the police were colluding with house operators. 
Furthermore, Gellman failed to mention during her testimony that while she was “dating” 
Police Detective Frank Marullo, a former member of the vice squad, he admitted that he 
was the collector for all the “cat” houses. The money he collected came from the two 
dollars women paid for “towel money.” Why Gellman did not say this in her public 
testimony, especially when she said that she knew what the towel money was used for, is 
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not clear. One can assume she was either nervous when speaking to the committee and 
forgot or she was trying to protect Marullo.181 
Gellman’s testimony allowed the SCIC to gain an insider’s perspective of the life 
of a prostitute and with it, how prostitution operated in the city. She also acknowledged 
and confirmed that a system of arrest and release existed, which allowed for the 
perpetuation of prostitution. Her admission that women tended not to be charged with 
prostitution, even when caught in the act, was telling. If anything, her testimony showed 
that police officers were more than willing to turn a blind eye on the problem. As for the 
motive for doing so, it is logical to believe it was mostly done for monetary gain. In 
either case, the police, by their actions or inactions, kept prostitution functioning in the 
city despite their rhetoric to the contrary.  
Gellman’s appearance before the SCIC allowed the public to hear an in-depth 
account of how prostitution operated in the city. Through her testimony she was able to 
convey the police had firsthand knowledge of the workings of a house of prostitution and 
that they had no intentions of shutting them down. If anything, this confirmed the 
suspicions of Kohn and New Orleanians who believed police corruption contributed to 
the problem. Newspaper editorials likewise believed prostitution’s continued existence in 
the city was due to police corruption and indifference. Scheuering, Rev. Jamieson, and 
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The Report  
On April 26, 1954, the SCIC’s official report was delivered to Commissioner A. 
Brown Moore along with seven copies distributed to other members of the Commission 
Council and Mayor Morrison. The report contained the SCIC’s final assessment of the 
state of the police department and its involvement with vice elements, as well as its 
recommendations for how to remedy these problems. The SCIC concluded existing laws 
were adequate to combat illegal activities, but evidence existed that unequivocally 
indicated they suffered “from the failure of city officials and employees to discharge their 
sworn duty to enforce” them. In other words, the police department, whose responsibility 
was to enforce the laws, was the target of their criticism. The committee’s conclusion 
applied to all aspects of illegal activities, particularly prostitution, which the report 
provided damning evidence of lax enforcement and payoffs. Testimony from people such 
as Gellman finally allowed for the failures of the police department and the city to be 
publicly exposed.182 
One example given by the SCIC regarding the city and police department’s 
inaction to curb crime was the back and forth between Morrison and Guy Deano, Jr. of 
the Louisiana Department of Revenue that occurred the previous year. The committee did 
not understand why the city did not take action against those establishments labeled 
“chronic violators of the law.” The report concluded that, “No explanation was given 
why such action was not being taken, or had not been taken, against these acknowledged 
illicit establishment by the municipal authorities, both from the standpoint of effective 
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arrests and municipal licenses revocation authority.” While Morrison tried to place the 
blame for lack of action on the Department of Revenue, the SCIC concluded Morrison 
and the city were actually responsible, thereby vindicating Deano. They simply refused to 
act in accordance with the authority provided to them under the law. The police, the 
enforcers of the law, were just as complicit because they too refused to act despite the 
clear authority provided to them.183  
The Morrison administration and the police department’s inaction, however, were 
just a portion of the problem. Bars and nightclubs housed many of the illegal activities in 
the city and the SCIC report placed them at the epicenter of the problem. They provided 
space for “vice and corrupt practices” to flourish. Investigators found these 
establishments were breeding grounds for vice, yet were left “relatively unhampered by 
police.” The report concluded that these places rarely concealed their operations and 
“existed with the New Orleans police alternately encouraging and harassing [bars], while 
sharing in their profits.” Police officers were routinely, and on certain occasions, in an 
organized fashion, accepting payment in the form of money, services, and even liquor. 
Some of the laws being violated in these establishments were B-drinking, prostitution, 
serving as headquarters for prostitutes, and the sale of pornographic and salacious 
materials.184  
The SCIC found the city had yet to “elevate itself, through law enforcement, from 
the bottom category in the national perspective of prostitution.” Meaning, the police 
department had failed to elevate its standards of employing police officers that exhibited 
a higher standard of professionalism. They based their conclusion on evidence discovered 
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during their investigation that revealed, “organized prostitution, though curtailed by 
effective police work between 1946 and 1949, had been permitted to return.” The 
committee estimated the return to have occurred in early 1950, which saw “flagrant law 
violations in the Vieux Carré.” The SCCVC had helped draft and pass a newly revised 
ordinance to strengthen laws against prostitution, thereby giving police the tools to tackle 
the problem. However, the SCIC concluded the police had failed to enforce this revised 
ordinance.185 
The SCIC also found evidence of an “alliance between police and panderers in the 
vice of New Orleans.” Per Louisiana statute, pandering is defined in one of its forms as 
“receiving or accepting by a male, as support of maintaining, anything of value which is 
known to be from earnings of any female engaged in prostitution.” The committee used 
this definition to implicate police officers who took payoffs from vice operators. The 
report stated: 
There is substantial amount of evidence to indicate that the process of 
enforcing the laws against prostitution has bred a number of public 
officials and employees, who, to protect the law violators while creating 
the appearance of police activity for the record for the press, engage in the 
preparation of false police reports, and commit one or more of the 
following crimes: perjury, pandering, bribery, extortion, or malfeasance.186 
 
Police payoffs were not the only issue the committee uncovered. The prostitution 
problem was compounded by the apparent incompetence of Superintendent Scheuering, 
who the report singled out. Scheuering denied knowing anything about brothel operators. 
But evidence collected by the SCIC investigators, along with a report by the American 
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Social Hygiene Association proved his denial to be false. Scheuring was well aware of 
what was happening and chose indifferent over action.187 
The evidence presented in the report showed not only individual police officers’ 
involvement in the perpetuation of prostitution, but also revealed the extent to which the 
police department, as a whole, was intertwined with the city’s vice operators. 
Scheuering’s denial of knowing anything about houses of prostitution, and the evidence 
disproving it, showcased a concerted effort to cover up how the upper echelons of the 
police department were in one way or another involved with the problem. According to 
the report, “Some policemen ha[d] informed the committee and its staff either that they 
are not administratively authorized to take legal action against these establishments, or 
that in the past they have been penalized for taking conscientious action against them.”188 
The committee ultimately concluded organized prostitution continued to exist, 
even though the police knew of various operations, due to “collusion between prostitution 
and the police” and stated the police department “in order to provide statistics of police 
activity and pacify the public…conducted ‘token’ raids, varying in number with the pulse 
of the community attitude.” Superintendent Scheuering was placed at the center of the 
problems. The committee went so far as to state that while between 1946 and 1949 
prostitution was effectively policed. “The change of law enforcement from good to bad 
was immediate upon the appointment of Joseph Scheuering to be superintendent of 
police.”189 
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Scheuering, whether he had direct involvement with payoffs or not, managed to 
foster a culture in the police department that made it conducive for these actions to have 
taken place, including the continued operation of houses of prostitution. This is why a 
cycle of arrest and release existed. Both house operators and police officers knew the 
unwritten arrangement, and they both profited from it. The SCIC report laid bare the 
arrangement for the public to see. What was once only alluded to, became fact by the 
release of the SCIC’s report. The police and vice elements colluded with each other for 
mutual benefit. 
The SCIC investigation and report revealed the extent to which a culture of 
prostitution existed in the city. Neither the police nor the city administration did much to 
counter this besides undertaking small token raids, and making announcements 
professing their commitment to clean up the city. In the end, the police, in coordination 
with house operators, helped sustain prostitution in the French Quarter. Since 1950, 
business and civic groups seemed to be the only ones pushing for a cleanup of vice in the 
French Quarter and city. But their efforts, while appearing to have made some minor 
advances, faced setbacks from the two groups that were integral in making those 
advances permanent: city hall and the police department. 
The success of the SCIC came in the form of the disclosure of the extent of 
corruption in the NOPD, especially when it came to prostitution. While not being able to 
complete their entire investigation, the SCIC was able to prove Kohn’s narrative of a 
corrupt police department that cared more about money and keeping a status quo than 
following and enforcing the law. The lawsuit filed by the NOPD, which ultimately 
stopped the investigations, was the first sign that police officials were involved in double 
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speak about their support for the committee. Even Morrison engaged in this double 
speak. He supported the SCIC only to the extent that it was good for him politically to do 
so. Yet, when it came to public hearings, he was adamantly against them. He opposed 
them because the hearings showed to the city the amount of corruption that was allowed 
to exist under his watch. Morrison’s reform image appeared hollow and took a political 
hit.190 
What made the SCIC a failure was that nothing really changed because of the 
SCIC investigations. Morrison agreed with only a third of the recommendations the 
committee laid out, and those that he agreed with were only superficial in nature. 
Morrison also refused to fire Scheuering even though he proved himself to be 
incompetent, willfully ignorant of the law, and was implicated by witnesses of being 
heavily involved in payoffs.191  
Though the legacy of the SCIC is mixed, the report they issued gave a detailed 
account of the kinds of illegal activities that continued to occur in bars and nightclubs, 
throughout the city and French Quarter. B-drinking, prostitution, the hiring of prostitutes 
as barmaids, and allowing bars to service as headquarters for houses of prostitution were 
just a few of the many of the activities witnessed by investigators. This discovery showed 
that with as much effort civic and business organizations exerted to clean up the French 
Quarter of undesirables, their efforts appeared to be in vain. But this did not stop them 
from continuing to try.  
During their investigation, SCIC also inquired about homosexual activities in the city. 
While not thoroughly explored by the committee, its work can be seen a continuation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison, 200, 217.	  
191	  Ibid., 208.	  
	   141	  
the investigation conducted under the SCCVC. No committee in the city had devoted its 
work solely to this issue. However, four years after the end of the SCIC, Jacob Morrison 
would seek to continue his work into what he considered the homosexual issue. This new 
committee would be known as the Committee on the Problem of Sex Deviates. 
  
	   142	  
CHAPTER FIVE  
SEXUAL DEVIATES 
 
By the late 1950s, civic and business organizations had successfully pressured the 
city into creating the Special Citizens Committee for the Vieux Carré (SCCVC) and the 
Special Citizens’ Investigating Committee (SCIC), which were both designed to advance 
their reform agenda aimed at ridding the French Quarter of B-drinkers, barmaids, 
prostitutes, corrupt police officers, and all those they deemed undesirables. One group 
that they had yet to target in a focused way were homosexuals. An early attempt by the 
SCCVC had not led to any sustained investigation due to their attention being drawn to 
targeting women they deemed immoral. But the rise of homosexual visibility continued 
to be an issue for those who saw them as a hindrance to gentrification efforts. They were 
also seen as not being the right kind of tourists and residents the city wished to attract. 
Because of this, their elimination or, at the very least, driving them back into the 
shadows, became a priority.  
Raids on bars and taverns that catered to homosexuals were the most common 
tool used by the police. But to many in the French Quarter community, it was not enough. 
The raids failed to permanently close down these establishments thereby allowing 
homosexuals to continue patronizing, congregating, and working in them. Police were 
limited as to what actions they could take. The creation of the Committee on the Problem 
of Sex Deviates (CPSD) sought to rectify the problem and draft recommendations to 
better police homosexuals within the confines of local authority. 
The creation of the CPSD did not stem from any one specific event or public 
outcry like the two previous committees did. This was an issue French Quarter residents, 
particularly Jacob Morrison, had tried to bring to the attention of municipal authorities 
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including the police. With the SCCVC, they felt their concerns had finally been listened 
to. And while the SCCVC did attempt to investigate the issue, it was placed on the 
backburner. The SCIC managed to point out the how widespread the problem was in the 
French Quarter, but since the committee was charged only with investigating police 
corruption, they had no mandate to proceed on this issue. The Sex Deviates committee 
offered French Quarter residents, and civic and business groups the opportunity to push 
the city into acting on the issue. This was the first time these allied reformers had 
managed to place the issue front and center and they had no intention of wasting the 
moment. 
The newly formed City Council appointed Jacob Morrison to lead the CPSD. 
Morrison had a history of not only being a crusader against prostitutes, but also against 
homosexuality. In 1952 he drafted a “homosexual ordinance” for the SCCVC that sought 
to amend an ordinance that sanctioned people dressed in clothing of the opposite sex. The 
ordinance, however, was shelved because the committee believed more investigation was 
needed. It never received a vote by the city’s Commission Council. Morrison also helped 
lead the charge in helping to close down Starlet Lounge, an establishment frequented by 
homosexuals, in1953 and 1954. His tenacious investigative approach and his legal 
background gave him the credentials to lead this committee. The other committee 
members were Inez Phillips who represented the Chamber of Commerce, Philip J. Kroll 
from the Young Men’s Business Club, and Irving Ton, who represented the Metropolitan 
Crime Commission. The addition of Inez Phillips to the committee marks the first time 
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that a woman was included on such a committee that had up until the creation of the 
CPSD were dominated by white men.192 
Homosexuals, who for most of the decade faced harassment both locally and 
nationally, became an easy target for police and civic leaders to demonize. Seen as being 
outside of societal norms, they were categorized as “sex deviates,” which was not 
something that was exclusive to this time period. What made them targets in the 1950s 
was their increased visibility, especially after the more permissive war years. Just as men 
wished to push women back into traditional gender roles, so too, did they wish to do the 
same for homosexuals.193  
By the 1950s, homosexuals were perceived to be a problem not only for the city’s 
tourism efforts but also for its residents. Those in the French Quarter complained to the 
police about the criminal elements homosexuals supposedly attracted to the area. 
However, the dislike of these individuals went beyond just the idea that they were 
magnets for crime. The attack against homosexuals and homosexual acts was a moral 
crusade. It showed that while crime was one aspect these organizations focused on, 
morality was another, and at times, a more important concern. 
Male prostitutes existed and worked in the French Quarter, which Doris Gellman 
documented in her testimony before the SCIC. Kenneth Marlowe also wrote a memoir 
describing his brief experience as a male prostitute around the time Sen. Estes Kefauver 
came to the city. But neither the SCCVC nor the police appeared to equate prostitution 
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and homosexuality, particularly in relation to gay men. They were treated as separate 
problems as evident in the SCCVC’s meeting minutes.194  
Historians who have focused on homosexual life in New Orleans generally agree 
that the 1950s was a time of targeted efforts to harass and intimidate a group of people 
viewed as undesirable. The efforts put forth by civic and business groups during this 
decade showed that they took the issue seriously and tried to combat this rise in visibility. 
They also sought to impose a moralistic way of living that many reform-mind 
individuals, particularly Richard Foster, believed had become too loose and tolerant. 
Speeches given by Foster when he was the chairman of the SCCVC took on a moralistic 
tone that told of the evils of homosexuals, especially with regard to them “continuously 
recruiting” children.195  
But for those who took the lead in promoting continued targeting and harassment 
of these people, it became a morally driven effort. The language used by these individuals 
showed the focus of such cleanup efforts was more about strict moral objections rather 
than about cleaning the French Quarter for tourism purposes.196 
This chapter explains the origins of the first and only municipal committee ever 
created in New Orleans that focused exclusively on homosexuals. It also considers the 
work done on the issue earlier in the decade by previous committees. The SCCVC and 
the SCIC played a role in the early development of identifying the problem and trying to 
figure out solutions to remedy it. But each committee encountered roadblocks that 
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prevented them from going further. The Sex Deviate committee sought to break that 
trend.   
 
Previous Attempts 
The 1950-52 SCIC succeeded in its attempts to convince the city’s Commission 
Council to adopt their ordinances on B-drinking and prostitution. This emboldened them 
to try and tackle another issue on their agenda, the “homosexual problem” in the French 
Quarter. In their first meeting on March 31 Chairman Richard R. Foster brought up the 
issue to the entire committee. He stated homosexuals had flocked to the French Quarter 
in great numbers due to not being tolerated by other cities which had driven them out. 
Because of this, Foster believed, they created “deplorable” conditions in the Vieux Carré, 
“more so than people realize.”197 
Foster again brought up the issue in the committee’s second meeting. He asked 
Captains Joseph A. Guillot and Joseph Sonnenberg what the police were doing about 
homosexuals in the French Quarter. Guillot responded that his initial investigation found 
only a few instances of homosexuals working at or patronizing bars in the Vieux Carré. 
Capt. Sonnenberg believed that many had left town because “the heat [was] on.” By the 
end of the year, however, the committee revealed they had received numerous complaints 
of an influx of homosexuals into the city, particularly those frequenting the Starlet 
Lounge located in the French Quarter.198 
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The subject would not be broached again until September 6 when committee 
members requested and received a response from municipal Judge Harold J. Moore 
concerning how to successfully rid the city of homosexuals. He stated he was in favor of 
longer jail sentences for those convicted of homosexual acts for a second time. He 
preferred, however, to set up a probation department to keep track of repeat violators. 
Moore also recognized the problem with obtaining convictions. “In many cases,” Moore 
stated, “testimony is so weak that you cannot convict and brand a man a homosexual.” 
He cautioned that arresting officers and the courts must be sure of their case. If an 
individual were to be arrested and not convicted, it could ruin the individual’s reputation. 
This caution caused the committee to focus their efforts on other issues, which could be 
more easily resolved. Nonetheless, the issue remained on the SCCVC’s agenda.199  
On February 23, 1951, with the success of the passage of the B-drinking and 
prostitution ordinances, the committee redoubled their efforts to target homosexuals. Rev. 
Robert Jamieson and Jacob Morrison informed the committee there was an “alarming” 
influx of them into the city. Jamieson phrased the homosexual problem in stark terms 
when he stated, “these degenerates are striking younger generations and that New 
Orleans, from all indications, is getting cast-offs from all over the United States.” This 
predatory description of homosexuals showed the committee’s commitment to further 
label homosexuals as immoral and dangerous individuals. His statement was given more 
credence by a complaint received from parents who believed these adult “degenerates” 
were “induc[ing] teen-agers to join them.”200 
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The complaint above came from the mother of a sixteen-year-old girl who 
discovered her daughter frequented the Starlet Lounge and “joined in with the 
degenerates at the establishment.” The mother wanted to know if these people could be 
driven from the community. Jamieson answered that the police did not have the necessary 
“tool[s] in their hands” to handle the situation. Capt. William Dwyer of the First Police 
District, who was also in attendance, agreed that the police lacked the means to fully 
handle the situation. His main problem was the lack of an ordinance through which 
homosexuals could be charged. Without a specific ordinance, the police could only 
charge them with loitering and vagrancy. It was agreed that the Sub-committee on 
Legislative Affairs would investigate the situation and draft an ordinance, if at all 
possible, to combat homosexuals. Both Jamieson and Morrison pledged their cooperation 
with the investigation, including obtaining information from other cities about how they 
dealt with the issue.201 
The following month, during a review of a report on prostitution, Jamieson 
announced his sub-committee had also made the effort to study homosexual activity in 
the French Quarter. The report identified at least six establishments in the area that 
catered to homosexuals. Furthermore, he believed homosexuals targeted many 
establishments frequented by servicemen, such as bars, and areas where juveniles 
congregated, particularly high schools, in an attempt to recruit them. He concluded that 
homosexual activities had reached a high not previously seen in the city. The one thing 
the subcommittee did not indicate was whether it was their opinion that the homosexuals 
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who frequented these establishments were also prostitutes, especially in those places that 
service members congregated.202 
At the same meeting, Foster reviewed the report and agreed to establish a new 
sub-committee dedicated to the homosexual problem. Headed by Leonard V. Huber and 
frequent guest, Jacob H. Morrison, the sub-committee sought to create an ordinance to 
discourage “perverts” from coming into the French Quarter, whom Foster believed were 
comprised mostly of “out-of-towners.” Capt. Dwyer, also in attendance, reiterated his call 
for the creation of a new law against “degenerates.” Again, Superintendent Joseph 
Scheuering cautioned the SCCVC on the language included in any new ordinance. As he 
expressed a year before, Scheuering believed mass raids of known homosexual 
establishments were not the answer because “wholesale raids where you have to arrest 
everyone, leads to the injuring of someone’s character.” Scheuering advised a more 
cautious and precise approach to the new sub-committee’s work. As to what specifically 
could be done, he provided no details.203 
While the official minutes showcase how individuals in the SCCVC advocated for 
a new ordinance against homosexuals, outside activities by these individuals give a sense 
of how seriously they took this issue. In a speech to the Civic Council of New Orleans, 
Foster spoke of the dangers of homosexuals by continuing his theme that they were set on 
converting the city’s youths by targeting high school boys and girls in an effort to recruit 
them. He saw homosexuals as “continuously recruiting” by “enticing [boys and girls] into 
places habituated by homosexuals” where they “see an obscene show or something of 
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that nature as a starter.” He even said parents went to the police, “begging them to save 
their children.” Foster continued to promote his belief that a strong ordinance to ward off 
homosexuals was desperately needed.204 
Foster’s speech showed the extent to which he tried to garner public support for 
his and the SCCVC’s anti-homosexual efforts. Whether this effort garnered public 
popularity is unknown. However in the February 23 meeting, Rev. Dana Dawson, a 
friend of Rev. Jamieson and in attendance at his request, opined that the people of the city 
were fully behind the committee’s work due to the dangers homosexuals presented to the 
city’s youths. While he did not provide definitive proof of his assertion, Dawson’s 
presence showed that at least some members the city’s clergy were fully supportive of the 
effort.205 
On March 9, the new sub-committee issued letters to law enforcement agencies in 
Houston, Washington, D.C., Cleveland, Ohio, Chicago, Boston, New York City, and 
Philadelphia. These letters inquired whether they experienced a similar increase in 
homosexual activities, as well as if they had any laws, statutes, and ordinances on the 
books that were useful in combating the problem. Instead of receiving responses from the 
cities’ police department, local chambers of commerce issued replies on their behalf. 
Three types of responses were received. The Chicago Association of Commerce 
and Industry responded by pointing to municipal codes relating to prostitution. Their 
letter stated that these codes “give the police the power to arrest and prosecute persons of 
evil fame who congregate in public.” The letter, however, did not provide any actual 
ordinances relating to homosexuals. Moreover, the author acknowledged he did not know 
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if the city had a homosexual problem or whether the police even used this code to arrest 
them.206 
The Cleveland and Boston Chambers of Commerce issued responses explicitly 
detailing how their cities relied on state statutes to combat homosexuals. The Cleveland 
Chamber of Commerce explained that Ohio statute §13043 regarding sodomy was used 
to arrest possible homosexuals in their city. However, they indicated the city had not 
experienced the same problems as New Orleans and saw no rise of homosexuals coming 
into the city. The Boston Chamber of Commerce informed them police used 
Massachusetts’ Chapter 272, Sections 34-35, which outlawed sodomy, buggery, and 
unnatural and lascivious acts. Unlike Cleveland though, the Boston Chamber of 
Commerce indicated that their city had in fact seen an influx of homosexuals to the city 
and therefore more arrests were made.207 
The last type of response was one of general denial of any problem whatsoever. 
The Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia plainly stated, “we wish to advise 
that Philadelphia has not had the same problem as you have at this time.” Furthermore, 
unlike the others, this two-sentence response named no state statute or city ordinance 
regarding homosexuals. However, it does leave questions as to whether this denial 
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stemmed from the Philadelphia’s desire to sweep the issue under the rug or if the city’s 
culture allowed for more tolerance with regard to homosexuality.208   
These three responses showed that most cities had not taken any steps in 
combating homosexual activities through local ordinances. Local municipalities seemed 
to prefer the state pass anti-homosexual laws, which allowed them in some instances, 
such as in Philadelphia, to deny there was a problem at all. However, no matter which 
side created the law or ordinance, the goal was the same: criminalize homosexuality. The 
responses also revealed that New Orleans was not the only city where local civic and 
business groups took an active role in attempting to rid their city of the homosexual 
problem. 
After reviewing the information sent to the sub-committee, Foster came to the 
conclusion that “it [would] be necessary to have the [state] legislature pass a law or laws 
on the subject. A city ordinance would not be comprehensive enough.” Morrison agreed 
and appeared to shelve the idea of creating such an ordinance. A few months later, 
Morrison sent a letter to State Senator Robert R. Richards, whose district comprised the 
French Quarter. In his letter, he attached a proposed draft of a bill that sought to “clarify 
and make more effective the punishment of unnatural sexual crimes, particularly where 
minors are concerned.”209 
Despite the growing consensus that any efforts to create anti-homosexual laws 
should be handled by the State, Foster informed the SCCVC on April 9 that a new 
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ordinance drafted by Morrison was ready for consideration. It focused on amending an 
existing ordinance concerning publicly dressing in clothing of the opposite sex. But after 
consideration by the committee, they believed further investigation was still needed and 
Morrison’s ordinance was once again shelved.210 
On April 14, in a letter to Morrison, Foster reported that he had spoken with 
Beuker Amann, an Assistant City Attorney who was working with the SSCVC, who 
agreed that any further action should be taken by the state legislature. Morrison 
responded with his own letter which stated that while he acquiesced to Amann’s 
suggestion, he still believed a city ordinance would be beneficial and argued the 
ordinance was “designed to prevent the enticing and luring or persons in bars, saloons, 
etc. to engage in any indecent, immoral and unnatural practices.” This was the final 
action taken regarding the draft ordinance. The SCCVC soon disbanded after some in the 
community, and even the committee itself, felt the group did not go far enough in its 
actions. The defunct SCCVC’s efforts to take local legislative action against homosexuals 
became dormant.211 
 
The SCIC Efforts 
Even though the legal effort to create laws to prevent the gathering of 
homosexuals in the city moved to the state legislature, local officials still maintained their 
focus on the issue. During their investigation in 1953 and 1954, the Special Citizens’ 
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Investigating Committee (SCIC) exposed several bars and nightclubs that notably catered 
to homosexuals. These allegedly problematic places including Tony Bacino’s, the 
Rendez-vous, and the Starlet Lounge, which were all located within the French Quarter. 
Interestingly, the investigation also revealed how police corruption helped perpetuate the 
city’s homosexual problem, much like it did with prostitution. It was discovered that “gay 
kids” who frequented these establishments were often the targets of police shakedowns. 
In order to continue the money flow, corrupt police officers allowed establishments that 
catered to homosexuals to remain in operation, thereby allowing homosexuals, both 
residents and out-of-towners, to continue to frequent these places. It was a cycle, much 
like with prostitution, that perpetuated itself because of the corruption.212 
The SCIC’s final report concluded the mayor’s office and the police department 
had allowed these conditions to continue unchecked from 1950 to 1954. At various times 
throughout their inquiry, the investigators found these bars and nightclubs consistently 
violated various city ordinances, including “lewd homosexual activity.” The committee 
further found “juvenile homosexuality” received “consistent stimulus from the open and 
immoral practices permitted, and apparently encouraged by some bar operators” due to 
police inaction. While not specifically making the connection, one can conclude that 
based on the SCIC’s report, this inaction resulted more from the police-led corrupt 
shakedown practices rather than any other motive.213 
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The report recommended that the police “should be required to report 
immediately…any violations of the regulations controlling the right of individuals and/or 
groups of individuals to operate a retail liquor establishment.” The committee also 
recommended all employees should be required to submit a personal history form and be 
fingerprinted. It was hoped that by taking these actions, the police could uncover 
homosexuals who worked at these establishments and force them out of their jobs. If this 
failed to get rid of these individuals, then continued police harassment would run these 
establishments out of business.214 
The SCIC’s recommendations did not specifically aim to curb homosexual 
activity in the city. The recommendations, however, had the potential to be used by the 
police as justification to shut down these bars and nightclubs. The two committees 
showed the determination of local civic and business leaders to make a moralistic case 
against homosexuals. These leaders were willing to use scare tactics to show the dangers 
that homosexuals presented not only to the residents to the French Quarter but also to 
New Orleanian families in general. It had become their moral duty to suppress and, if 
possible, run them of town. The only way they saw this possibly happening was for the 
police to thoroughly conduct raids that struck at the center of the city’s gay life: bars and 
nightclubs.  
After the end of the SCIC, efforts to legislate homosexual activity in the city 
remained dormant for almost four years. In that time, police relied on raids and targeted 
harassment as a way to remedy the situation. The results, however, were not what civic 
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and business organizations had intended. On the one hand, raids publicly shamed those 
individuals caught in homosexual establishments, on occasions even charged them with 
loitering and vagrancy. On the other hand, police used extortion and shakedowns for 
monetary gain, which gave them motivation not to completely eliminate the problem. 
Either way, there was no major incentive to close establishments that catered to 
homosexuals, nor was there a dedicated drive to completely remove them from the 
French Quarter.  
In 1958, four years after the ended of the SCIC, a committee established by the 
newly formed New Orleans City Council, took aim solely at the homosexual problem. 
Jacob Morrison, a familiar individual who had previously led efforts against prostitution, 
would chair this committee. He hoped to follow the success of shutting down the Starlet 
Lounge with finding a way to minimize or even eliminate homosexuals from the French 
Quarter. But the question became, how could he succeed where others failed? And, 
outside of existing state sodomy laws, what else could be recommended that was not 
already being done? 
 
The Committee on the Problem of Sex Deviate in New Orleans 
It is not clear why a new committee was formed four years after the end of the 
SCIC. There is no one specific event or situation that occurred in the city that would have 
allowed for its creation. However, on July 22, 1958, the New Orleans city council voted 
on the establishment of a citizens committee dedicated to studying “the acute problems 
caused by sex deviates in New Orleans.” Council president Glenn P. Classen appointed 
Jacob H. Morrison to lead this effort, which consisted partially of French Quarter 
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residents. It was deemed necessary for the committee to be comprised of “residents and 
civic workers from the area who had first-hand experience in coping with the behavior of 
the homosexual, the pervert and the lesbian.” The committee was also comprised of civic 
group representatives from the Metropolitan Crime Commission, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Young Men’s Business Club. Religious leaders were asked to join 
but none accepted even though clergymen repeatedly asked for the city council to take 
action against homosexual activity.215 
Councilman Fred J. Cassibry suggested the committee study the issue and meet 
with representatives of the city attorney’s office, the police department, and the city 
finance department, which issued liquor licenses. Cassibry believed sex deviates 
“create[d] disturbances. They are up all hours of the night. They are a source of constant 
irritation to the people in the Quarter.” The irony of this is that that the French Quarter 
historically catered to people who were up at all hours creating disturbances. One simply 
cannot definitively determine whether homosexual or heterosexuals were the cause of 
this problem. But to fit the narrative, people like Cassibry and Morrison were more than 
willing to place the blame on homosexuals.216 
During the meeting, various individuals in attendance relayed their frustration 
with sex deviates in the French Quarter. One resident told the council that Jackson 
Square, Pirates Alley, and Pere Antoine, areas that buttress the St. Louis Cathedral, were 
gathering spots for them. “I’ve tried for the past 12 years to do something about it,” the 
resident said. “We should have foot policemen patrolling Jackson Square and the two 
alleys.” Aaron M. Kohn, director of the Metropolitan Crime Commission, spoke in 
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agreement. He described bars as the “center of all kinds of vice.” He believed these bars 
attracted homosexual clientele by employing homosexuals to draw them in. “They have 
no intention to be legitimate buyers of liquor,” he said. “These people operate actually as 
a public nuisance.”217 
The intriguing part of Kohn’s statement is his mention of bars attracting 
homosexuals by employing homosexuals. The revised ordinances drafted by the SCCVC 
and passed by the city’s Commission Council, had made it illegal for bars to employ 
“sexual perverts.” The ordinances even forbid those they deemed sexual perverts from 
patronizing these establishments. If these ordinances were put in place as an alternative 
way of making homosexuality illegal, it poses the question as to why the police did not 
use them more frequently. The most obvious answer is that, much like with prostitution, 
it was difficult to determine who was homosexual without having a police officer witness 
a person engage in a homosexual act or have direct evidence that a person was in fact a 
homosexual.  
When police Superintendent Provosty A. Dayries spoke to the council, he 
conveyed the police department’s frustration in policing homosexuals. “You cannot just 
point to a person and say that he or she is a sex deviate,” he said. He further explained the 
obstacles of charging a person with a homosexual offense. Under state law, a person must 
be found committing or attempting to commit a “degenerate” act. Outside of this, they 
could only be charged with loitering or other similar offenses under municipal ordinance. 
Detective Rene Sabrier, leader of the special (vice) squad, informed the council that after 
he visited various cities, he found they “all [had] the same problems that we have” 
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regarding homosexuals. However, he suggested that if the police could not obtain 
evidence of homosexual acts, then a person could still be charged with vagrancy, no 
visible means of support, public intoxication, disturbing the peace, wearing clothes of the 
opposite sex, or using obscene language.218  
The meeting continued with council members and residents offering various 
opinions about what should be done to combat the homosexual problem. Councilman 
Victor Schiro believed the city should revoke the liquor licenses of bars frequented by 
homosexuals. French Quarter residents, such as P.J. Kroll agreed with this measure. So 
did Jacob Morrison, who stated, “the whole thing revolves around the control of 
barrooms, night clubs and the places where people congregate.” Morrison stated the 
council already had the power to do so but acknowledged there were legal problems 
involved. He did not, however, specify what those problems were. The only known 
effective method to shutter these establishments was to continuously raid them until the 
operators eventually gave up and closed the business down.219 
Also in attendance was New Orleans area state Rep. Edward F. LeBreton, Jr. He 
advised that the homosexual problem was complicated and did not believe the issue could 
be resolved in a few meetings. LeBreton’s caution stemmed from his own past legislative 
efforts to curb sex deviates. In June 1958, LeBreton spearheaded the state legislature’s 
effort to convene a six-member committee to study the problem of sex crimes and 
deviates. The proposed committee would be tasked with reviewing laws already on the 
books and recommending any changes that might needed. LeBreton mentioned, “In 
California they [sex deviates] are forced to register. Once they knew that they had to 
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register they just got out of California.” He continued that “New Orleans offer[ed] a fine 
rendezvous for them to come.” Months later when the six-member committee was 
formally established, LeBreton declared “the number and extent of sex crimes in 
Louisiana [was] on the increase and constitutes of one of the most serious problems in 
law enforcement in the state today.”220  
Raids were the tool most used by police to deal with the problem. Existing city 
ordinances allowed for this, but they did not end the problem. On July 24, 1958, 
Superintendent Dayries took it upon himself to look into possible ways to curb the 
presence homosexuals in the city. As the SCCVC did previously, Dayries circulated a 
letter to forty-two city police departments that inquired whether their cities had a problem 
with gay men and lesbians. Dayries explained that the French Quarter had an 
“atmosphere which appeals to these people,” that resulted in “complaints from residents 
of the immediate vicinity” of bars and nightclubs within the neighborhood. “Although we 
know certain establishments cater almost exclusively to such person[s],” he continued, 
“there is no way of proving such to be the case.” Dayries requested information on what 
steps these cities had taken to counter their own problems with these “undesirables.” 
Specifically, he asked: 1) was there any specific legislation for handling homosexuals and 
lesbian?, 2) If not, what action is taken to keep them out of the city?, 3) Did they take 
action against bars and nightclubs that catered to them?, and 4) If action is taken against 
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the bars, is it accomplished through special ordinance or strict enforcement of regulations 
concerning bars?221 
Within the next few months, Superintendent Dayries received varied responses. 
Much like the responses given to the SCCVC in 1951, the majority of the cities indicated 
that they had no special legislation to handle the problem. Instead they used strict 
enforcement of liquor license laws. Cities such as Buffalo, New York, Cincinnati, Ohio, 
Cleveland, Ohio, and Tampa, Florida kept known homosexual establishments under 
constant surveillance and made arrests if any laws were violated. Others used frequent 
raids and harassment in handling the issue. In Houston, for example, the police not only 
performed raids but kept records “on all known degenerates.” Louisville, Kentucky, 
however, said the problem was minor and took no action. With regard to taking action 
against bars and nightclubs, strict enforcement of liquor license violations was the 
preferred method.222 
The responses revealed that the efforts by these cities were no different than those 
of the New Orleans Police Department. Raids and harassment were the preferred way to 
deal with the problem. It also revealed the continued limitations of the NOPD. Without 
actually witnessing a homosexual act, the police had little recourse but to continue their 
harassment strategy in the hopes of driving out homosexuals from the French Quarter and 
the city. Therefore, the NOPD limited their response to only one option: going after bars 
and nightclubs where homosexuals congregated.  
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Those individuals and organizations that sought to eliminate homosexuals from 
the French Quarter knew the task would be difficult. Based on past recommendations 
from the SCCVC, anything that could be legally done was being done already. Unless a 
police officer witnessed an activity that would fall under the state’s sodomy law, there 
was very little they could do besides charge them with lessor crimes. This would not be 
enough to push homosexuals out of the neighborhood. Raids conducted on bars and 
nightclubs, as well as targeted police harassment, had a minimal effect. It was up to Jacob 
Morrison to try and discover a way to change this.  
The Committee on the Problem of Sex Deviates was a way for Morrison to 
accomplish this goal. French Quarter residents, civic, and business organizations counted 
on Morrison and the CPSD’s success. Their previous attempts with the SCCVC proved 
unfruitful. However, because the sole purpose of the committee was to find a solution to 
the homosexual problem, this was their best chance to enact the change they wanted. 
Whether the CPSD would succeed where the SCCVC failed depended on the cooperation 
from the City Council and the NOPD. Without their full support, any recommendations 
that could come from the committee would ultimately be all for naught. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
THE COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF SEX DEVIATES 
  
The Committee on the Problem of Sex Deviates (CPSD) was the first great 
chance for French Quarter residents, and civic and business organizations to deal with the 
Vieux Carré’s homosexual problem. The investigation and subsequent report contained 
recommendations that were either already being implemented by the police or relied on, 
even encouraged, citizens to openly discriminate against homosexuals. The main issue 
with the CPSD was that, just like with the SCCVC, it proved difficult to draft city 
ordinances that could effectively police homosexuals and keep them out of the French 
Quarter, much less the entire city. From this perspective, the committee can be seen as a 
failure. But one cannot overlook the fact that the CPSD sanctioned the actions police had 
used against homosexuals, which was to raid bars, individually harass them, and even 
turn a blind eye when homosexuals were targeted and assaulted in an act commonly 
known as “rolling.” These aggressive actions gave those who sought to rid the French 
Quarter of homosexuals a reason to declare the committee a success. 
The success of the CPSD is relative in the sense that the report created by Jacob 
Morrison allowed for the NOPD to create winners and losers. The winners were people 
like Morrison who finally had his issue heard by the City Council and allowed for 
multiple raids and closures of establishments that catered to homosexuals. The losers 
were homosexuals who became the target of those raids, which on occasion led to arrests. 
While the arrests were humiliating, the subsequent printing of a person’s name and the 
arresting offense in the daily newspapers was much worse. This tended to lead to a 
person being fired from their job or disowned by their families. In fact, Morrison and 
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those that supported his efforts most likely welcomed those humiliating consequences 
even though it was possible that a wrongful arrest could ruin a person’s life or livelihood.   
The bulk of the report created by the CPSD consisted of summaries from other 
studies conducted, both in the United States and the United Kingdom, that place 
homosexuality in a historical, social, and moral context. It also included information 
gathered by police Superintendent Provosty A. Dayries, who had sent letters to various 
cities asking about their homosexual problem and what ordinances were available to 
combat it. The CPSD similarly sent a letter and requested the same information. Using 
this information, they were able to compile a list of recommendations the City Council 
could use to create ordinances.  
The difficulty with drafting recommendations was that they could not conflict 
with state law. The only reasonable recommendations Morrison could provide were either 
those that were already being implemented or to ask citizens to conduct themselves in a 
manner that openly discriminated against homosexuals. The report admitted that being a 
homosexual was not illegal. However, homosexual acts were offenses that could lead to 
an arrest. These arrests tended to come from the state' sodomy law or the city ordinance 
banning cross-dressing. But much like with prostitution, the act had to be witnessed, 
which happened outside of homosexual establishments private spaces. 
This chapter examines the CPSD report and the recommendations offered to the 
New Orleans City Council. It also seeks to place the committee into the larger context of 
the cleanup effort in the French Quarter. Jacob Morrison became the de-facto face of the 
movement to gentrify the neighborhood for the betterment of its residents and to help 
promote tourism. But his efforts proved to be no different than those that came before 
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him. Yet it is worth considering the impact this seemingly insignificant committee had on 
homosexual life in New Orleans. The sanctioning of police harassment by city officials 
made it so that the government, not just the police, residents, and civic and business 
organizations, were against homosexuals who lived and visited the French Quarter.  
 
The Report 
When the CPSD report was released in late 1958, it sought to answer the 
questions, “What accounts for the…apparent increase in homosexuality?” and “Why do 
certain cities or sections of cities have an overflow of sex deviates, while others seem to 
have almost none?” To answer this question, the report contained a compilation of 
information consisting not only of the responses gathered from various cities, but also a 
brief history of homosexual figures and excerpts from Dr. Alfred Kinsey’s Sexual 
Behavior in the Human Male. This information allowed the committee to base their 
report on perceived historical facts and related scientific efforts, which addressed the 
much larger issue of homosexuality that the committee itself could not completely 
comprehend. “The general over-all problem of sex offenses is beyond our province,” it 
said. “However, it has become so acute in all of its phases that we could not avoid 
exploring certain of its aspects that are not, strictly speaking, our concern.” While the 
report acknowledged that their efforts were to combat homosexuals in the city, a “cure” 
was, the report opined, “beyond the power of mankind.”223 
The report argued that environment was paramount to the spread of 
homosexuality. A person could be homosexual and not act on their impulses. However, if 
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there existed an avenue for them to act on this impulse, such as a bar or a nightclub, then 
a person would cross that line between being and becoming a “practicing homosexual.” 
This is what Morrison and the committee were trying to avoid. If there were no 
establishments that catered to homosexuals, then in their view, there would be no way for 
a homosexual to actively engage in homosexuality, which would “prevent the spread of 
the evils of sex deviation.”224  
Even with the parsing of an active and inactive homosexual, the CPSD continued 
to classified homosexuality as a “sex deviation” that “plagued society.” This helped 
outline their stated desire to find a way to “control” the conduct and behavior of 
homosexuals. Their historical conclusion led them to link homosexuality with crime, 
supporting their argument that homosexuality “inspired lust” and was a “fruitful source of 
corruption.”225 
The report also sought to make a moral argument against homosexuals. Terms 
such as “evil,” “immoral,” and “deviate,” where used to show that even though a person 
might have homosexual tendencies and not act on them, they were still viewed through 
this moral lens. The phrase “inspired lust” was used in connection with the idea that sex 
perversion “bred crime” and was a “fruitful source of corruption.” This language played 
into the narrative that homosexuals in the French Quarter, especially at places where they 
congregated, were breeding grounds for crime and other harmful antics.226 
Residents, like civic and business organizations saw no moral difference between 
homosexuals and B-drinking and prostitution. All three were seen as corrupting and tied 
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to crime. The “Report to Britain’s Parliament on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution,” 
which was cited by the report, stated “the general loosening of former moral standards” 
was a reason for an increase in tolerance of homosexuals. It is this tolerance that 
Morrison and the people he represented rejected. For them, tolerance allowed 
homosexuals to thrive and become more visible. But for the CPSD, there was very little 
that could be done to diminish the tolerance shown toward homosexuals. Their only 
options were police raids and trying to make it illegal for landlords to rent to 
homosexuals. 227  
The issue of economic tolerance was a sticking point in the report. The committee 
found that economic tolerance of homosexuals and their activities made it more difficult 
to police and control them. This was especially a problem when seen through the idea 
that environment and contact helped spread homosexual activity. The report made a 
distinction between actually being a homosexual and acting on these homosexual 
tendencies. Being a homosexual, in and of itself, did not constitute a crime. It was only 
those who acted on it that the committee wished to combat. Having businesses that 
tolerated such actions allowed those with homosexual tendencies to give in to their 
”weaknesses” and cross into criminal and immoral activities. Because of this, it was 
concluded that the “regulation of the conduct of the sex deviate may well prevent the 
spread of the evils of sex deviation.”228 
Policing was therefore key to not only stopping the spread of homosexuals in the 
city but also to protect the French Quarter and the public at large from homosexuals’ 
“contamination and evil influence.” When the report discussed the “tolerance” of 
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homosexuality, it framed the issue as “the passive tolerance of evil begets more evil.” 
The solution to this problem was to publicly shame and condemn homosexuals so that a 
“climate of hostility” could arise. Their hope was that bars and nightclubs would avoid 
catering to homosexuals and “the evils it brings forth.”229  
At the start of their investigation, the committee contacted and received twenty 
responses from major cities asking about their efforts to regulate homosexuals. As 
stipulated in the report, the majority of the cities did not have a specific ordinance dealing 
with this issue. However, they did use certain aspects of ordinances that pertained to bars 
and nightclubs to justify their policing. These ordinances tended to deal with cross-
dressing, solicitation for the purposes of prostitution or any act of “sexual perversion,” 
and any establishment that permitted lewd acts. The report gave further evidence that the 
major focus for any effort to control homosexuals would be through controlling the 
locations where they gathered. If these establishments simply did not exist, then the 
“flagrant public conduct of homosexuals would hardly be noticeable.” It was also 
concluded that if these establishments were to be controlled or eliminated, it would help 
stop the spread of homosexuals because it would take away an avenue for them to meet, 
“awaken” and act on their homosexual tendencies. Liquor, after all, was a “high-pressure 
aphrodisiac” according to the report.230 
Even though the CPSD acknowledged the effective use of Ordinance No: 18,565 
CCS, which was commonly known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, that 
prohibited new barrooms and nightclubs in residential and commercial sections of the 
French Quarter, and enforcement of state law as success stories for limiting the spread of 
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bars and “queer shops,” targeted harassment was the only action that seemed to work. 
This was simply not enough for the committee and its members. They continued to 
believe that even though they were able to shut down various nightclubs, the French 
Quarter continued to be “teeming with homosexuals who brazenly flaunt public decency 
in many of its barrooms and even on the street.” Therefore, the committee believed 
targeted harassment needed to not only continue, but also be expanded. The Maggio et al 
v. City of New Orleans case was the prime example of what such targeted harassment 
could accomplish. 
On the night of July 22, 1958, at the direction of Superintendent Dayries, the vice 
squad conducted raids on bars and nightclubs all across the French Quarter that catered to 
homosexuals. In Supt. Dayrie’s own words, the objective was to “get rid of the 
undesirable elements of the French Quarter” which included “sex deviates,” 
“degenerates,” and “persons of lewd nature.” In total, eighteen persons were arrested. 
Included were Roy Maggio, Louis Robichaux and Amos McFarlane of Tony Bacino’s 
bar. Maggio, the manager of bar, and Robichaux and Amos, bartenders, were charged 
with violating 828 M.C.S. Section 5-66, which provided: 
No person of lewd, immoral or dissolute character, sexual pervert, inmate 
of brother or house of prostitution or assignation, B-drinker…. shall be 
employed in such a place as a singer, dancer, beer carrier, waiter, 
bartender, waitress, girl bartender or barmaid. Nor shall such persons be 
allowed to congregate or frequent such places.231 
       
When the bar opened for business the following night, it was raided yet again. The police 
were determined to target this particular bar and those who ran it. An example was being 
made. The police continued their raids for six more nights. However instead of 
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acquiescing to the continuous raids or shutting down the bar, Maggio, Robichaux, and 
McFarlene decided to sue the city to prevent further raids and arrests. While the court on 
August 6, 1958 granted their restraining order, it was eventually overturned.232  
The overturning of the restraining gave the police the legal recourse to continue 
their raids. With this, the police continued to use raids as a form of harassment and 
intimidation against homosexuals and homosexual establishment. There was very little 
these individuals could do to stop the police from eventually putting these places out 
business, which left few places for homosexuals to congregate within the French Quarter. 
The CPSD summarized their research and came to two conclusions. The first is 
that American cities “made little progress in legislating the subject, which is exemplified 
by the fact that out of twenty leading cities, there are ordinances of only six which 
contain specific references to homosexuals and sex perverts, and enact[ed] regulations 
affecting their behavior.” The common theme among the cities was that the state had a 
better legal handling of such laws than a city would. However, the responses received by 
the committee made it obvious that there was no direct way to combat homosexuals. As 
the responses showed, they relied on other ordinances to justify an arrest.  
The second conclusion discussed the need for police to rely on liquor laws and 
other barroom ordinances to regulate homosexual conduct. In other words, the police 
must better enforce laws pertaining to places were homosexuals gather. The CPSD 
believed that homosexuals used alcohol to lower their inhibition in order to engage in 
homosexual activities. If the city were able to eliminate bars and nightclubs from this 
equation, then “it is doubtful if the problem of a public nuisance would arise from the 
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activities of homosexuals.” While they did not believe sex deviate crimes would 
completely go away, they did believe that the numbers would lessen and that “flagrant 
public conduct of homosexuals would hardly be noticeable” and “would not become a 
stench in the nostrils of the public.”233 
This proposed solution not only dealt with the visibility problem, but, in their 
eyes, also removed an avenue for which homosexuals could “entice others, particularly 
youths, into perversion.” The committee invited a moral argument to be made for the 
elimination homosexuals from the French Quarter and the city. However, the idea that 
homosexuals were recruiting others, especially youths, was not an argument that gained 
much traction when it came to demanding action from the city. Richard Foster made the 
same case in 1951 when he spoke to the Civic Council of New Orleans and accused 
homosexuals of targeting high school boys and girls. But, the SCCVC’s actions did not 
reflect an urgency to combat the issue, unlike their efforts against B-drinking and 
prostitution.234 
But their blanket accusations went further than just recruiting youths. In a French 
Quarter tour taken in 1951 by SCCVC member Rev. Robert H. Jamieson and other 
prominent residents, Mrs. Lou W. Van Sicklen informed them that male prostitutes were 
also targeting people in the French Quarter. “[There] were male prostitutes preying on 
young boys and sailors and soldiers” she said, and even conveyed how she “heard a 
boy…solicited and saw the degenerate give him a key to be used in case he wanted to 
visit him.” She even told of a doctor who worked at Charity Hospital who told her that 
homosexuals were “full of V.D. (venereal disease) but [were] not subject to examinations 
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given to female prostitutes.” Mrs. Van Sicklen noted the Starlet Lounge was a hang out 
for them, and that they recruited high school children from there.235  
While Mrs. Van Sicklen’s story was not mentioned in the CPSD report, Jacob 
Morrison would have heard stories of male prostitution in the French Quarter from either 
observing it himself or from in account from a fellow Vieux Carré residents. But to him 
and the committee, being a homosexual or prostitute made no difference. The danger of 
visibility was still present. The report veritably bragged that homosexual bars were closed 
due to police harassment, and possible replacement were unable to open due to the 
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance that prohibited new bars from opening in residential 
and commercial sections of the Vieux Carré, and Ordinance No. 17,855, which required 
neighborhood consent to open a new bar. This, however, did not prevent homosexuals, as 
worded in the report, from “brazenly flaunt[ing] public decency” in bars that remained 
open.236   
The CPSD knew that the police alone could not monitor all homosexual activity 
in the French Quarter. They relied on tips and complaints from people in order to crack 
down on homosexual establishments. This kind of information was crucial for any 
policing to be functional. This is why the committee found it crucial to gain and keep 
public opinion on their side. Economic tolerance by businesses allowed places for 
homosexuals to continue to congregate. Tolerance by individuals also made this possible. 
According to the report, there were many people who supported the police effort but 
where hesitant to come forward for fear of being “tarred by the same abominable brush.” 
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The committee hoped that by publicizing their work and the problem of sex 
deviates, individual opinions would shift, thereby creating a “frigid climate of hostility.” 
With this hostility, bars and nightclubs would reject homosexuals because they would be 
bad for business, which would either force homosexuals to conform to societal norms or 
be driven out of town. It all came down to public perception and support. Raids on bars 
and nightclubs were part of this strategy. The more the police could villainize 
homosexuals, the easier it would become for them to continue their raids and target 
individuals without any criticism from the public.237     
The report’s mixture of history, scientific research, legal procedures, and 
committee members’ own personal prejudice became the basis for the recommendations 
the CPSD submitted to the City Council. The basis of their recommendations came down 
to the idea that the city should create a climate of fear to discourage homosexual 
activities in public spaces. But, as indicated in their report, their main objective was to 
prevent homosexuals from acting on their impulses, thereby reducing their numbers. 




The report submitted for consideration contained three “practical” 
recommendations that pertained to the police, landlords, and the City Council. The 
recommendations were made in consultation with director of the Department of Finance, 
the Superintendent of police, and a representative of the City Attorney’s office. The 
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CPSD prefaced these recommendations by acknowledging the uniqueness of New 
Orleans as a place where people pride themselves on being “care-free, broad-minded and 
easy-going.” People come to the city to “see something different.” But that “different” 
did not include homosexuals. The recommendations sought to remedy this by making it 
clear that it would take more than just the City Council passing an ordinance.  
The first recommendation pertained to the police. Through their investigation they 
discovered that police departments, who admitted to having a homosexual problem, 
relied on procedures and laws the NOPD had already at their disposal. It was 
recommended that: 
Continue [to maintain] strict supervision over the activities of such 
barrooms, nightclubs and saloons [that] attract known sex deviates among 
their clientele. Prompt action in arresting and changing sex perverts who 
act as entertainers, waiters and bartenders should be continued and 
multiple charges preferred against these persons as authorized by City 
Code (Section 5-66).238 
 
In other words, the CPSD recommended the police department continue to target, harass, 
and arrest homosexuals in bars and nightclubs under an existing city code. The committee 
found these actions worked not only in humiliating and shaming homosexuals, but it also 
served as warning to any future individuals who might be thinking of attending and 
congregating in these locations. As they said in their report, the less visible homosexuals 
were in public, the less likely they will choose to act on their homosexual impulses.  
The second recommendation concerned landlords. The CPSD indicated that 
“Persons who don’t hesitate to rent their premises to individuals with all the appearances, 
mannerisms and repulsive conduct of sex deviates, should take a new look at their sordid 
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consequences that stem from the acts of such persons.” In other words, they asked that 
they did not rent to homosexuals. It would have been difficult for the CPSD, the police, 
or the City Council to recommend an ordinance that forbids landlords from renting to 
homosexuals. The same argument that Supt. Joseph I. Scheuering made in 1950 still 
stood; it was difficult to determine who was and was not a homosexual. And if a person 
was falsely accused and arrested, it could ruin their lives. If in some instances police were 
unable to determine who was a homosexual, then landlords would have the same 
problem. But, even if a landlord could tell or knowingly rented to a homosexual, it was 
their prerogative to do so since it was not illegal to be a homosexual. The CPSD knew 
this, which is why they made no legal recommendation other than to plead with landlords 
not to rent to known homosexuals.239   
The third recommendation consisted of a list of seven “practical and enforceable” 
amendments to city codes that the City Council could adopt. The first proposal called for 
fingerprinting and photographing applicants for permits to operate a bar or nightclub. The 
application should also be given to the owner of the property to make them aware of how 
the property was being used. This recommendation was not new. Jacob Morrison, during 
his time working with the SCCVC, had advocated for this policy. Not only could it have 
been used against prostitutes and other vice operators, which would have been the case 
under the SCCVC, but it could also be used against possible homosexuals who wished to 
be employed by bars and nightclubs.240  
The second proposal sought to amend 828 M.C.S. Section 5-66, that forbids the 
employment of sex perverts as well as allowing them to congregate in an establishment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239	  “Report of Committee,” 14.  	  
240	  “Report of Committee,” 15.  	  
	   176	  
They advised that the ordinance should be amended so that anyone found in violation of 
this ordinance could be prosecuted by either the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, the 
State Board of Tax Appeals, or the City Department of Finance. While their case was 
being investigated, an operator’s permits for selling liquor would be suspended or 
revoked. If found guilty, the establishment would be barred from being used as an 
“alcoholic beverage outlet” for at least six months and a day, or one year depending on 
the severity of the violation. In this same vein, the next proposal suggested the city 
should restore its ability to revoke and suspend alcohol licenses and permits, and place 
the power in the hands of the Finance Department.241   
This recommendation went straight for the bars themselves. The most important 
part of this proposal was the idea that liquor licenses should be suspended while an 
establishment operator’s case was being heard, which would financially cripple the 
business until the time the case was ruled on. If an establishment were not permitted to 
serve liquor on the premises, then more often than not, people would be disinclined to 
patronize it. This would have been a de facto closure of a bar or nightclub that catered to 
homosexuals. Also, with regard to revoking or suspending alcohol licenses, the city 
already had the authority to refuse the renewal of licenses. The proposal would simply 
expand it.  
The next proposal advocated for the expansion of an ordinance that forbid the 
leasing of property for houses of prostitution. The CPSD suggested this be expanded to 
include the leasing of property that would be used as a “congregation point for known sex 
deviates.” Much like the previous proposal, this one aimed to limit the creation of any 
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new bars and nightclubs that might cater to homosexuals. Having these two connected in 
the same ordinance is revealing of how the CPSD and its supporters saw homosexuals. 
They were just as immoral as prostitutes, both using sex to lured people to them, and the 
case of homosexuals, to convert them.242  
The fifth proposal suggested amending Section 63-18 of the City Code, which 
pertained to persons wearing clothes of the opposite sex. The CPSD wished to clarify the 
prohibition to include wearing clothes of the opposite sex “in any place of 
entertainment,” and believed it should “forbid lascivious conduct in such places.” This 
expansion specifically targeted entertainers. It was assumed that most, if not all, cross-
dressing entertainers were homosexual. But what the committee failed to mention was 
that this type of entertainment was popular among locals and tourists alike. Club My-O-
My, a nightclub located on Lake Pontchartrain, was popular with homosexuals as well as 
heterosexuals. Even celebrities such as Carman Miranda and Howard Hughes were said 
to have visited the place. While it made sense to target these entertainers due to the 
visibility of perceived homosexual activities, businesswise it could also prove a mistake 
because this form of entertainment drew in tourists and their money.243 
The prostitution ordinance, in the sixth proposal, was suggested to expand and 
“inflict its penalties on those who entice to or engage in sex perversion.” This 
recommendation was broad and gave no specifics about what exactly consisted of sex 
perversion. It can be assumed, however, that it specifically meant engaging in a 
homosexual act. Why the CPSD included this in their recommendations is unclear. 
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Louisiana already had a sodomy law (Revised Statute 14:89) on the books by 1958. This 
made any expansion of the prostitution ordinance to include homosexuals redundant.244 
The last proposal asked the City Council to consider increasing the penalties to 
those who violated the city ordinance to control sex deviates, which at the time stood at a 
maximum of $100.00 fine and ninety day in jail. The CPSD did not, however, give a 
recommendation as to what the fine should be or how much more jail time should be 
issued. What it did do was warn those who wished to engage in homosexual acts would 
pay not only a social penalty, but also a financial one and increased jail time. The 
committee did not care how homosexuals remained invisible, as long as they were, 
whether it is by remaining in the closet, in jail, or driven out of town.245       
Taken as a whole, the proposed recommendations were not a major adjustment to 
what the police and the city were already doing to combat the perceived homosexual 
problem. The report advocated for the continuation of the status quo of harassing 
individuals and raiding establishments because the CPSD believed it was the most 
effective way of controlling the city’s homosexual populace. As much as they tried to 
convey their report in a balanced manner by including Dr. Kinsey’s report and other 
historical individuals, the committee members’ bias was still apparent in the report, 
mainly due to the moralistic language used. The committee made clear that even though 
they knew homosexuals existed, and in all probability, were born that way, they were not 
welcome within the city.  
In January 1959, Councilman Fred J. Cassibry, after his review of the CPSD 
report, blamed Mayor deLesseps S. Morrison for not pressing the police department to 
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better clean up the French Quarter. In a statement to the press, Cassibry said,” I have 
heard alibis and excuses from the mayor about enforcing the law in the Vieux Carré. 
Notorious barroom owners in whose bars crime has been repeatedly exposed have been 
allowed to continue to operate.” He told of French Quarter residents who spoke with him 
about the troubles they saw continue to occur: 
It was the same old story of shakedowns, ‘B’ drinking, lewd and immoral 
shows, thefts through the device of so-called ‘rolls’ and in addition to 
these complaints we had the usual protest from residents of the quarter 
about the large number of homosexuals frequenting certain of the 
barrooms of the area. A large number of these French Quarter barrooms, 
particularly on Bourbon St., persist in flouting our laws and prey upon our 
visitors and tourists, which does tremendous damage to our name and our 
prestige throughout the nation.246 
 
The only action the Morrison administration took was the refusal to renew alcohol 
licenses to certain bars and nightclubs that had a history of violating city ordinances. And 
because of this, Morrison refuted Cassibry’s accusations against him. Morrison also 
managed to deflect responsibility due to his emphasis that the state had the final say in 
who would receive a renewed license.247 
Within days of his statement, Cassibry announced his intention to introduce and 
sponsor six ordinances based on the CPSD recommendations. These included the 
photographing and fingerprinting of employees, including entertainers, in establishments 
that sold alcohol. Another ordinance stated that “members of a show or cast or any 
entertainer attired in clothes other than the type worn by his or her sex shall not be 
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permitted to mix with the public attending a place of entertainment.”248 The ordinance 
went further by also prohibiting these people from wearing 
Clothes, ornaments, accouterments, facial makeup or costume as (1) are 
designed to denote that the wearer is a homosexual or lesbian or sex 
pervert; (2) or that is designed to stimulate or arouse unnatural sex desires; 
(3) or that is reasonably likely to entice any person or persons to unnatural 
sex practices.249   
 
The provisions would not apply during Mardi Gras, when cross-dressing was an 
acceptable action. Another provision of this ordinance pertained to patrons, which stated: 
No patron of any barroom, cocktail lounge, night club or other place 
holding a liquor permit shall engage in lewd or lascivious conduct or in 
excessive kissing, fondling or embracing of an adult person of the same 
sex, or in the intentional touching or caressing of the sexual organs of 
another person of either sex.250 
 
The third ordinance expanded the city ordinance prohibiting the leasing of 
property to be used as houses of prostitution. This ordinance would be extended to 
include the prohibiting of property to be used “as a gathering place where known 
homosexuals, lesbians or sex perverts, engage in lewd, indecent, obscene or lascivious 
practices.” The ordinance also stipulated that: 
It shall be an offense for homosexuals, lesbians and sex perverts to accost, 
importune, or entice to lewdness or sex perversion any person on the city 
streets, or alleys or in any park, playground, depot station, terminal or 
other public place, site or building or to behave in public as to occasion 
scandal or offend the peace and good morals of the people.251    
 
The fourth ordinance concerned employment, which was an expansion of Section 
5-66. In this amended version, the ordinance specifically included the wording, “No 
person of known or admitted lewd, immoral or lascivious character, homosexual, sex 
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pervert, [or] lesbian” to the ordinance. The language made it clear that this was to include 
homosexuals in this ordinance and forbid them from working and gathering in bars or 
nightclubs.252 
The fifth and sixth ordinance mandated that a copy of the liquor license 
application should be sent to the property owner, and those that hold the liquor license 
must display signs with the price of drinks in two conspicuous places inside the 
establishment. These last two were the only ones that were not included in the CPSD 
report. But the first ordinances can be justified because it would allow the landlord to 
know what their property is being used for.253 
The editorial board of the Times-Picayune, like they did with the previous 
committees, weighed in the City Council’s proposed ordinances. The board endorsed the 
fingerprinting and photographing ordinance, believing the tool was needed to keep bar 
operators from hiring undesirables. However, they faulted the police for not doing their 
job in the first place. Once again, the laxity of law enforcement came into question. 
Regardless of this criticism, they still endorsed this particular ordinance.254  
On January 27 and February 5, 1959, the City Council unanimously approved in 
some form all seven of the committee’s recommendations. Groups such as The Women’s 
Society of Christian Service of St. Mark’s Methodist Church and the Vieux Carré 
Property Owners and Associates pushed for Councilman Fred. J. Cassibry and the City 
Council to adopt the new bar ordinances. Even with these new ordinances in place, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252	  Ibid.	  
253	  Ibid.	  	  
254	  “Is It Needed?,” Times-Picayune, January 29, 1959, 16.	  
	   182	  
problems with enforcement still existed. But regardless of this predicament, the CPSD’s 
work was accomplished.255 
The CPSD efforts to solve the homosexual problem in the French Quarter can be 
seen as a success in the eyes of civic and business organizations that fought for most of 
the decade to make it possible. The CPSD able to conduct their investigation unimpeded, 
due largely because Morrison had conducted much his investigation earlier in the decade 
as well as from the lack of input from outside voices. Their recommendations were taken 
seriously and were unanimously adopted by the City Council. Based on this measure, 
compared to the previous committees, the CPSD can be seen as the most successful.  
The most important aspect of the committee, which the City Council did not 
recognize in their adopted ordinances, is the police conduct toward homosexuals. This in 
itself is what made the CPSD so consequential. Their efforts helped to sanction the 
NOPD’s continued actions that created a hostile environment for homosexuals 
throughout the 1960s. It publicly endorsed the police efforts to target, harass, arrest, and 
publicly shame homosexuals. These harsh actions also allowed the police to continue to 
ignore homosexuals being “rolled,” which the police had done for most of the decade.  
The most famous of these incidents occurred in September 1958, before the 
CPSD’s report was released. It involved Mexican national Fernando Rios, who was 
visiting the city. After being picked by John Farrell, a Tulane student, from the gay bar 
Café Lafitte’s, he was then beaten in an alley next to St. Louis Cathedral by Farrell and 
his two friends. He would later die from his injuries. The Tulane students were later 
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arrested, charged, and tried for Rios’ murder. However, the defense was able to portray 
Rios as a deviate thereby allowing the three students to be acquitted.  
The CPSD was the shortest of the three committees established in the 1950s, but 
it managed to have the largest impact of the committees. The effects of the CPSD’s work 
were felt by a broader segment of the population, rather than just female prostitutes, 
which the SCCVC and SCIC focused on. It also sanctioned harsh treatment of 
homosexuals, which could lead to the ruining of a person’s reputation and even ending 
with the loss of a person’s livelihood and families.  
The goals of civic and business organizations were to make places the French 
Quarter “safer” for residents and tourists. However, the overt use of moralistic 
terminology did more than just help to persuade those in various committees that 
homosexuals needed to be policed. It framed the issue in a way that was different than the 
other undesirables that these groups targeted. Instead of focusing strictly on safety, which 
was the case with B-girls, barmaids, and prostitutes, homosexuals were seen as sinful 
people that needed to remain hidden, not act on their impulses, or be driven out of town. 
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CONCLUSION 
New Orleans of the 1950s was dominated by Mayor deLesseps S. “Chep” 
Morrison and his politics of reform. While his politics tended to be a façade for his much 
larger goal of becoming governor of Louisiana, the residents of the French Quarter, and 
civic and business organizations took the reform movement seriously. Even though their 
motives were self-servicing and based on misogynistic and homophobic ideas, they 
managed to hold a sincere belief in the gentrification efforts of the French Quarter and 
make it a place safe for residents and tourists alike. However, their beliefs hard harmful 
and oppressive effects on those they targeted, particularly women and homosexuals, who 
became easy scapegoats for the perceived troubles of the neighborhood. To them, these 
undesirables, who also resided in the Vieux Carré and whose visible they sought to 
combat, posed a hindrance to their efforts. The Special Citizens Committee for the Vieux 
Carré, the Special Citizens’ Investigative Committee, and the Committee on the Problem 
of Sex Deviates were created and used by business and reform interests to further their 
evolving moral and profit-motivated agendas. The creation of these committees showed 
the power they held in the city. It also showed their limitations. The committees 
themselves helped advance their agenda, but without the cooperation of the city and 
police, their efforts would only take them so far.   
The death of Robert Dunn, Jr. was the catalyst used by these civic activists to 
pressure city leaders and law enforcement officials into acting on their behalf. Efforts in 
the1950s achieved mixed results in the short-term but proved to be more consequential in 
later decades. Efforts by prominent French Quarter residents, as well as civic and 
business organizations to clean up the neighborhood ultimately achieved the 
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gentrification they sought, which came with the removal of many, but not all, of the 
undesirables they crusaded against. The historiography regarding these efforts does not 
adequately portray the significance of the three committees established to combat vice 
and advance the gentrification of the French Quarter. Also, the connection between these 
committees and the harsh crackdowns of the 1960s cannot be more apparent. If not for 
the sustained efforts to target prostitutes, B-girls, homosexuals, and corrupt police 
officers, the status quo would not have been challenged.  
As New Orleans entered the 1960s, French Quarter residents who tried to 
revitalize the neighborhood gained a new ally in their efforts. He was Orleans Parish 
District Attorney Jim Garrison, who was elected in 1962 and ran on the platform of 
cleaning up the city, especially the French Quarter. When he became District Attorney, 
he used the ordinances and policies drafted by these committees to conduct raids and 
prosecute criminals to the fullest extent of the law in an effort to shut down vice operators 
in the French Quarter. But, much like Morrison before him, he used the cleanup effort to 
try and make a name for himself, thereby faltering on his agenda. His obsession over the 
John F. Kennedy assassination would be one of the causes his moral reform efforts 
lapsed.256  
Regardless of the outcome of Garrison’s personal efforts, the three committees 
did manage to create a perception of success relative to their goals, even though they can 
also be seen as failures. The Mayor’s Special Citizens Committee for the Vieux Carré’s 
work was the most consequential based on the fact that they provided the police and 
Garrison the tools necessary to combat prostitution and B-drinking in the 1960s. Shutting 
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down notorious madam Norma Wallace’s house on Conti Street in the French Quarter 
was one of the biggest prizes for French Quarter residents. For decades, Wallace’s 
prostitution operation continued to function in the neighborhood and surrounding areas. 
She too had police protection and participated in the same catch and release raids the 
police conducted. But in the end, she could not keep up with the constant raids and 
arrests. 
The SCCVC’s work within the larger historiography tends to be relegated to a 
few paragraphs, particularly in Edward Haas’ work, where he used the committee in the 
context of police scandals during the Morrison administration. Haas is correct to place the 
committee in this context, but the committee deserves more credit than it has been given. 
The SCCVC helped bring about lasting changes in the long run when it comes to 
prostitution in the French Quarter. The focus of French Quarter residents as well as civic 
and business organizations to target them, led to the most blatant houses to be closed 
down for good.  
Even though the SCCVC was eventually successful in substantially reducing the 
presence of prostitutes and B-girls in the French Quarter temporarily, it was ultimately a 
failure in the long run. A nostalgia for these two groups soon followed. Both Angela R. 
Demovic and Christine Wiltz tell how time transformed prostitutes and B-girl into as a 
part of New Orleans, and specifically, the French Quarter’s heritage. In 1972, Norma 
Wallace was interviewed for New Orleans magazine where a sympathetic article was 
published, much to the chagrin of many of its readers. However, in August 12, 1972, 
Wallace was invited to the Press Club to speak and was presented with a key to the city. 
She was treated as a celebrity, due in large part to the people who came to see her. Many 
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of her former clients stood in line to receive her autograph. She was even listed as a 
celebrity guest at the Roosevelt Hotel in New Orleans that was attended by Bing Crosby, 
Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards, and New Orleans Mayor Moon Landrieu.257 
Even B-girls received a rehabilitated image. Demovic describes B-girls as having 
gone from “malevolent knock-out-drug user in the 1950s” to “an integral part of nostalgic 
remembrance of the past in the 1990s and 2000s.” The B-girl became a symbol and a 
myth because she was seen as a part of French Quarter life in the past. Whether seen as 
malevolent or “voluptuous law breaker,” as Demovic describes them, they were 
acknowledged as a legitimate part of French Quarter history and mythology.258 
The work conducted by the Special Citizens’ Investigating Committee in bringing 
police corruption to the forefront, made it the second most successful of the committees. 
Even though they were stymied by a lawsuit filed by the NOPD, their investigation still 
managed to uncover the extent of corruption in all areas of the police department. The 
SCIC allowed for a modest cleanup of the department, which trained new recruits to not 
completely fall into the same trappings as the more senior officers. But the temptation of 
corruption from working in the French Quarter was still there and, some may say, 
continues to this day.  
This committee was also the most controversial. The controversy came from the 
police and Mayor Chep Morrison, which both tried to stop the investigations in its tracks, 
even though they publicly supported its efforts. For Morrison, his motivation came from 
his reform image. However, it is because of this reform image that Morrison also 
objected to the committee’s work. Any wrongdoing connected to the police department 
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would certainly tarnish his carefully crafted image. The NOPD objected to the 
investigation because it did not wish to have its reputation tarnished by having definitive 
proof of the department harboring corruption documented and made public.  
But the importance of the SCIC’s work cannot be overlooked, especially when it 
came to their investigation into police ties with prostitution. With the connection 
unveiled, the NOPD were shamed into doing its job and closing down houses of 
prostitution with more conviction than with previous attempts. This caused a great 
reduction in prostitution, thereby almost completely eliminating the issue in the French 
Quarter.  
The Committee on the Problem of Sex Deviates had immediate and far-reaching 
consequences for those the committee targeted. The CPSD sanctioned the continued use 
of harassment by the police, which in some cases led to extortion, not only from bars but 
also from individual patrons. This led to a moral ambiguity and gave reason why the 
police seemingly opposed any reforms that sought to challenge the status quo. The 1960s 
saw the rise of much harsher treatment of homosexuals by the police and the CPSD made 
this possible.   
Even though in the short term it helped sanction harsh police raids and targeted 
harassment, the CPSD’s work failed to push homosexuals from the French Quarter. The 
increased bar raids and arrests allowed the committee to be viewed as a success. Bars 
were put on notice that if they catered to homosexuals, they ran the risk of being shut 
down and humiliated in the press. The committee hoped that this threat of humiliation 
would drive homosexuals out of the French Quarter. The police were even willing to 
overlook what would now be considered hate crimes against homosexuals as a way to 
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show them that they would receive no protection. The most notable case concerned 
Fernando Rios, a Mexican national who was “rolled” by three Tulane undergrads in 
1959.  
But homosexuals and the establishments that catered to them persisted. In 1958 
Roy Maggio et al v. City of New Orleans was an example that homosexuals would not go 
quietly back to being invisible. Even though the plaintiffs lost their case and did not 
openly admit to being homosexual, the case is important because it showed that 
homosexuals were wiling to fight back against city and police efforts to reduce their 
visibility and usher them out of the city. 
Even today, homosexuals continue to exist, thrive, and remain visible in the 
French Quarter. One can also argue the CPSD inadvertently shined a spotlight on 
homosexuals in the city thereby given them more visibility. It also showed that 
homosexuals existed in the city and were not going anywhere, regardless of how many 
raids and arrests were made. Frank Perez and Jeffrey Palmquist‘s book about long-
operating Café Lafitte in Exile is proof that visibility was key to eventual acceptance of 
homosexuals and that the efforts by the CPSD, the police, French Quarter residents, and 
civic and business groups were ultimately a failure.  
The power and efforts of these prominent French Quarter residents as well as 
business and civic organizations cannot be ignored. It is because of their actions that the 
French Quarter has taken on a different tone than it did in the 1950s. But what made the 
city and the French Quarter so attractive to tourists back then, sex, can still be seen in 
some form today. No matter how hard these groups of people fought to change the 
culture of the French Quarter and make it a wholesome place for the kinds of tourists they 
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envisioned, they were unsuccessful in doing so. Tourists come to the city to let loose and 
bask in the care-free atmosphere. 
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